Militant Islam Monitor > Weblog > Jews4Jihad:J Street Philly To Host Khalil Shikaki - Brother Of Pal.Islamic Jihad Fuhrer - Helped Establish PIJ Network In US
Jews4Jihad:J Street Philly To Host Khalil Shikaki - Brother Of Pal.Islamic Jihad Fuhrer - Helped Establish PIJ Network In US
August 2, 2024
MIM: The Jews4Jihad aka J Street Philadelphia is holding their '6th Annual Event' on Wednesday,November 6 at the Pyramid Club in Philadelphia, starting at 6:30 pm. " to celebrate the strength and resilience of our pro-Israel,pro -peace- pro democracy movement".
"We'll be joined by community leaders, local and national J Street staff – including J Street President Jeremy Ben-Ami – and by two extraordinary experts in Israeli and Palestinian politics, Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin and Dr. Khalil Shikaki."
MIM: Dr.Khalil Shikaki is the brother of Fathi Shikaki aka Shaqaqi who founded Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza in 1981. He was eliminated by the Mossad in 1995. Khalil was directly involved in the establishment of a PIJ wing in the United States in Tampa, Florida where he took the position of Director and Research Associate of the newly created World & Islam Studies Enterprise (WISE), a think tank 'which promoted public policy initiatives set up by then-University of South Florida computer science professor, Sami al-Arian. PIJ is a designated terrorist organisation in many countries.
In 1991 Shikaki was employed as professor at the University and working for the PIJ as the Director and Researcher of the 'World Islamic Studies Enterprise' as a Public Relations and 'publicity agent' for the PIJ while at the University of South Florida in Tampa. He left to take a job at An Najah University in Nablus a notorious terrorist hub.
While in Nablus Khalil Shikaki established his own spinoff of the World Islamic Studies Enterprise' (WISE) in 1992 which moved to Ramallah in 2000 and exists to this day.
He tellingly named his 'enterprise' "The Palestinian Center For Policy And Survey Research".
Despite his obvious terrorism ties Khalil Shikaki is described as a 'moderate' which affords him influence and access to the media, educational institutions and policy makers. In reality he is acting as a propagandist/publicity agent and PR operative to promote the fake narrative of the non existent 'Palestinians' and advocate for the establishment of a "Palestinian State".
In his role as director of the "Palestinian Center For Policy And Survey Research' Dr. Khalil Shikaki reprised his role as the director and researcher of the PIJ's "World Islamic Studies Enterprise" at the University of South Florida.
J Street's promotion of Khalil Shikaki by inviting him to speak at their Nov. 6th event in Philadelphia proves their role as 'Jews4Jihad' and useful idiots who are aiding and abetting Israel's enemies.
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MIM: Al Arian was first arrested in 2003, jailed and finally deported to Turkey on February 4, 2015.
MIM: The St. Petersburg Times wrote in 2003:
'"The trial demonstrated that Al-Arian was deeply connected to the PIJ, which is believed responsible for more than 100 deaths in the Middle East. He was described by his own lawyers as a fundraiser for the 'charitable arm of the PIJ.' And Al-Arian was not blind to the group's monstrous tactics, as he was the regular recipient of faxes announcing the group's suicide bombings."
MIM: Al Arian's and the PIJ's toxic terror legacy lives on to this day in the United States through his wife and children who are still in this country.
In 2024, the New York Police Department and Mayor Eric Adams stated that Al-Arian posted on Twitter a photo of his wife at the 2024 Columbia University pro-Palestinian campus occupation. Adams cited the posting as evidence of non Columbia-affiliated individuals training and providing tactics to students to escalate their protests.[119]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sami_Al-Arian
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MIM: J Street aka 'Jews4Jihad' is a hardcore leftist group which promotes jihad and Jew hatred by aligning with anti Israel organizations and individuals to undermine Israel's national security interests and destroy the Jewish State under the guise of 'human rights concerns' for the 'Palestinians'. The secular self hating Jews of J Street wants to see Israel eliminated unless it becomes a 'secular democracy' devoid of Zionism and by extension Judaism which would nullify its raison d'etre as a Jewish country.
Conversely, the useful idiots who make up J Street unconditionally promote and champion the establishment of an Islamosupremacist "Palestinian State". J Street has no issue with an artificial 'country/jihad hub' ruled by terrorist groups like Hamas,PIJ. the PLO,Fatah etc. according to Sharia law, That this would mean the de facto exclusion of Jews allowed in the phantom "Palestinian State" is irelevant to the Jews4Jihad of J Street since accusations of "apartheid" only go one way.
Unlike the demands J Street makes of Israel such as ending the non existent 'occupation' and preventing Jews from living in Judea and Samaria which they mendaciously refer to as 'The West Bank' their support for a terrorist/ Islamic ruled "Palestinian State" which bans Jews from residing in it is unconditional,
J Street insanely claims that a 'Palestinian State' is essential for Israel's security and encourages the 'international community' to aid and abet Israel's enemies by giving their 'kosher' seal of approval to their efforts to portray Israel as an illegitimate pariah state:
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Excerpt from JStreet's Policy website headlined "Occupation, Annexation & Settlements"
"The ongoing Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory is a major obstacle to the achievement of Israeli-Palestinian peace, is a systemic injustice violating the rights of the Palestinian people, and poses a severe threat to Israel's long-term future as a democratic homeland for the Jewish people."
"...US officials and Members of Congress should clearly and consistently refer to West Bank settlements as illegal, as the position of the US government has done in the past and as is the view of the United Nations and most other countries, including all of the European Union."
MIM: At the end of the JStreet policy page there are 'questions' with their answers promoting the "Palestinian and Hamas narrative aka' Die Juden Sind Unser Ungluck' - 'The Jews Are Our Misfortune' and the Nazi fallacy of 'Lebensraum'. JStreet's policy page advocates for the removal of Jews from Judea and Samaria to reach a "two state solution".
MIM: Lebensraum is defined as "The territory that a state or nation believes is needed for its natural development, especially associated with Nazi Germany.
The "question" on JStreet's Policy webpage below reveals J Street's abject hypocrisy revealing that expelling Jews whom they demonize as "settlers" from Israeli land is acceptable and necessary in order to accomodate a "Palestinian State" and ensure a "Jewish and democratic state".
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MIM: Imagine J Street's virtue signaling outrage and accusations of 'extremism' if the proposal to "relocate' the Jewish population out of 'The West Bank" had named "Palestinians" in place of Israelis (!)
Do you really think it's possible to move so many Israelis out of the West Bank in order to reach a two-state solution?"
"Relocating a small minority of the total settler population will undoubtedly take bold leadership, but is the only way to ensure Israel's future as a Jewish and democratic state."
https://jstreet.org/policy/settlements/
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MIM: The event announcement from J Street Philadelphia boasts of having "two extraordinary experts in Israeli and Palestinian politics," Dr. Khalil Shikaki aka Shaqaqi is The Director Of the 'Palestinian Center For Policy And Survey Research'. Shikaki started the PSR in 1992 in Nablus which he relocated to Ramallah in 2000.. He and his "think tank" which conducts survey and research into "Palestinian" issues also does damage control and public relations for Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad by claiming that despite their openly stated genocidal intent vis a vis Jews, Israel and non Muslims their (non existent) ' moderates' can still be credible 'peace partners'.
While acting as director of PSR he was also employed as the' Dean of Scientific Research at Al Najah University', a notorious terror hub which is still operating today.https://www.chronicle.com/article/palestinian-university-features-exhibit-showing-suicide-bombing-in-jerusalem/?sra=true
Khalil Shikaki undeniably and knowingly aided and abetted the founding and operations of his brother Fathi Shikaki aka 'Shaqaqi's Palestinian Islamic Jihad terror group is America while teaching at the University Of South Florida in Tampa . There is no question that he was aware and complicit in the terrorist activities and sympathies of its students and faculty while teaching at Al Najah University in Nablus which he left in 1999.
"PIJ was formally established in Gaza in 1981 by two Palestinian activists: Fathi abd al-Aziz Shaqaqi, a Rafah-based physician, and Shaykh Abd al-Aziz Awda, an Islamic preacher from the Jabaliyya refugee camp, as well as Ramadan Shalah, Bashir Moussa, and three other Palestinian radicals. Based in Egypt, Shaqaqi and Awda were originally members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Their views on the destruction of Israel led them in 1979 to establish Islamic Jihad-Shaqaqi Faction, a branch of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.[18] and conducted operations out of Egypt. The Shaqaqi Faction was expelled from Egypt in 1981, following the assassination of Anwar Sadat, the 3rd President of Egypt, by the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.[19] Shaqaqi and Awda returned to Gaza where they formally established PIJ,[20][21] from where it continued its operations.
"Islamic Jihad also control dozens of religious organizations in the Palestinian territoriesthat are registered as NGOs and operate mosques, schools, and medical facilities that offer free services.[64] Like other Islamic associations, these are heavily scrutinized by the Palestinian National Authority who have shut some of them down.[64] In one Islamic Jihad kindergarten graduation, children dressed up in military uniforms, waved guns, shouted anti-Israel slogans, and spoke of blowing themselves up to kill "Zionists".[65][66]
Islamic Jihad also operates dozens of summer camps for children. They have opened up 51 summer camps which attracted approximately 10,000 children in 2010."https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palestinian_Islamic_Jihad
MIM: The Investigative Project On Terrorism published an extensive investigation into Khalil Shikaki's terrorism connections whhich is posted below.
MIM: Here are two excerpts from an article that appeared on September 25th, 2 weeks after 9/11. It was published in the Journal Of Higher Education,
"Palestinian University Features Exhibit Showing Suicide Bombing in Jerusalem"
Sept, 25,2001
"Al-Najah, which was founded in 1918, has been the site of numerous clashes over the past year. Sixty of the university's 9,000 students reportedly remain in Israeli "administrative detention." The institution has become popular among supporters of militant Islam, and a number of suicide bombers have come from its student body.
Twenty-one Palestinians have blown themselves up in suicide bombings since the intifada began. More than 50 people have been killed by these acts and hundreds wounded. The radical Islamic movements Hamas and Islamic Jihad have carried out the majority of the attacks.
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MIM: All the documentation on this page proves that Khalil Shikaki has helpled and supported his brother Fathi Shikaki Shaqaqis' Palestinian Islamic Jihad and has been covering for Islamonazi terror under the guise of being an "expert on Palestinian public opinion".
According toan excerpt from his bio on the Brandeis University Crown Center For Middle East Studies where he is described as "A Founding Senior Fellow".
"A world-renowned expert on Palestinian public opinion and a widely published author, he has taught at several institutions, including Birzeit University, An-Najah National University, the University of Wisconsin in Milwaukee, and the University of South Florida. He was also a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, in 2002." https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/people/fellows.html
MIM: Shikaki's teaching stints include the documented terror hub of Birzeit University in Ramallah. In September of 2024 8 Bir Zeit 'students' were arrested by the IDF for planning an 'imminent terror attack'.
"Israel Arrests 8 Palestinian Students Suspected Of Planninng Terror Attack'
9/8/2024
"Israeli security forces said Sunday they had arrested eight Palestinian students suspected of planning a terror attack in the immediate future.
The students, from Birzeit University near Ramallah, were nabbed following an investigation into Hamas cells in Palestinian educational institutions, the Israel Defense Forces and Shin Bet said."
https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-arrests-8-palestinian-students-suspected-of-planning-terror-attack/
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MIM:J Street Philadelphia's inclusion of documented terror enabler Khalil Shikaki whose brother the Palestinian Islamic Jihad founder Khalil Shikaki murdered and maimed scores of people in an effort to destroy Jews and Israel is proof of their moral and intellectual bankruptcy.
Their loyalty is to a warped and destructive ideology to the point where they actively engage with terror supporters like Shikaki and join him in his efforts to defend the enemies of Jews and Israel.
Unfortunately 'Judische Selbsthass' is a pathology which is becoming more prevalent by the day.
"Kenneth Levin, a Harvard psychiatrist, links a Jewish self-hatred with the famous Stockholm syndrome. He thinks of it as "an attempt by some Jews to gain social acceptance in an environment that is hostile towards Jews." It's all about victims who adopt the outlook and the agenda of their victimizers."
J Street's political manifestation of their sociopathic self loathing is a case study of their collective psychosis.
The members of J Street aka 'Jews4Jihad' have aligned themselves with their enemies in a warped 'suicide pact'.
A look at the Jew hating and genocidal Hamas Covenant from 1988 is proof that this is the case.
https://embassies.gov.il/holysee/AboutIsrael/the-middle-east/Pages/The%20Hamas-Covenant.aspx
For people who champion Israel and are f\ighting against jihad and Jew hatred its time to push back against JStreet's promotion and legitimization of jihad supporters like Khalil Shikaki and in doing so "save them from their dishonest selves".
Grifter Khalil Shikaki is touted as a 'reknowned expert on Palestinian public opinion".Given that "Palestine" and a "Palestinian people' have never and do not exist and he is peddling an illusion.
In order to sustain his fraudulent 'scholarship' he must continue to regurgitate his false narrative that groups like Hamas, his brother's Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the PLO are representive of the 'Phantom Nation' that is 'Palestine' and that continued funding and engagement with them will lead to peace in the the Middle East.
Khalil Shikaki is a national security threat . His 'work' with the leaders of Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the United States, ties to his Islamonazi brother Fathi, and his professorships at the terror universities in Bir Zeit in Ramallah and Al Najah in Nablus are further proof that he is a terror supporter and enabler.
If J Street won't divest themelves from him both he and they should be denied any venue which will further legitimize and promote him and their pro jihad and anti Israel Jew hatting agenda.
The Pyramid Club in Philadelphia should take his terror activities into account and act accordingly.
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MIM: The J Street Philadelphia Event Announcement:
"Save the date for J Street Philadelphia's 6th Annual Event on Wednesday, November 6 – one day after the election – at the Pyramid Club in Philadelphia. Our VIP Reception will start at 6:30pm, followed by the main program at 7:30pm.
In a year filled with trying times, we invite you to celebrate the strength and resilience of our pro-Israel, pro-peace, pro-democracy movement. We'll be joined by community leaders, local and national J Street staff – including J Street President Jeremy Ben-Ami – and by two extraordinary experts in Israeli and Palestinian politics, Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin and Dr. Khalil Shikaki."
This event is a great evening every year. So don't miss out on this critically important event for our community and the chance to strengthen and build our chapter going forward.
Featured Speakers:
Jeremy Ben-Ami
President, J Street
Jeremy Ben-Ami is the President of J Street with a background of deep experience in American politics and government and a passionate commitment to the state of Israel. His political background includes serving mid-1990s as the Deputy Domestic Policy Advisor in the White House to President Bill Clinton and working on seven Presidential and numerous state and local campaigns. He was Howard Dean's National Policy Director in 2004 and helped manage a Mayoral campaign in New York City in 2001. He has been recognized for his leadership including being named one of 50 "People of the Decade" by Ha'aretz, the influential Israeli daily newspaper, and by the Jerusalem Post, which included him in its list of the 50 Most Influential Jews in the world.
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Dr. Dahlia Scheindlin is a leading political expert and author based in Tel Aviv. She's been featured on CNN, written numerous columns for the New York Times, and is the author of the 2023 book The Crooked Timber of Democracy in Israel: Promise Unfulfilled.
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Dr. Khalil Shikaki is renowned for his work in Palestinian polling and policy as the Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. One of our most in-demand speakers, he's a co-author of the annual Arab Democracy Index and is an expert in Palestinian politics and institution-building.
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MIM: Khalil Shikaki was heavily involved in the formation and operation of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the United States.
The American Palestinian Islamic Jihad HQ was based at the University of South Florida aka 'Jihad U' whose fuhrer Sami Al Arian used his cover as an IT professor to raise funds and coordinate terror attacks by PIJ in Israel.In 1995 the Palestinian Islamic Jihad 'Shaqaqi Faction' headed by his brother Fathi committed a suicide bombing attack on a bus in Kfar Darom. 7 pn April 9th 1995, Israeli soldiers were killed and 1 American citizen. Fathi Shikaki/Shaqaqi a physian and Secretary General of the PIJ was killed 6 months later by a Mossad agents In Malta.
The murdered American was 20 year old Alisa Flatow, a Brandeis University student. It is perversely ironic that Khalil 'Shikaki' is still "A Founding Senior Fellow' at the 'Crown Center For Middle East Studies' at Brandeis.
"A world-renowned expert on Palestinian public opinion and a widely published author, he has taught at several institutions, including Birzeit University, An-Najah National University, the University of Wisconsin in Milwaukee, and the University of South Florida. He was also a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, in 2002."
University. https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/people/fellows.html
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MIM: The Investigative Project On Terrorism - whose mission is to "Investigate Analyze & Expose' documented Khalil Shikaki's involvement with Palestinian Islamic Jihad wing which was lead by Sami Al Arian in the United States and the Islamic Committee Of Palestine (ICP).
Al Arian was convicted of terrorism offenses and was deported to Turkey in 2015 where he continues his jihad activities as the 'Director" Of The Center For Islam And Global Affairs at Zaim University in Istanbul. Jonathan Turley was one of his lawyers.
MIM: Quotes by the sentencing judge excerpted from Wikipedia:
In his ruling, Moody harshly criticized al-Arian for doing nothing to stop suicide bombings perpetrated by the PIJ. "I find it interesting that you praise this country in public," he said, "the one you called Great Satan."[22] He continued:
You lifted not one finger. To the contrary, you laughed when you heard of the bombings ... You are a master manipulator. The evidence is clear in this case. You were a leader of the PIJ.[8][23]
Describing the PIJ suicide bombings, the judge said: "Anyone with even the slightest bit of human compassion would be sickened. Not you, you saw it as an opportunity to solicit more money to carry out more bombings."[22] Reacting to Al-Arian's contention that he had raised money for charities, Moody said: "Your only connection to widows and orphans was that you create them."[24]
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KHALIL SHIKAKI AND THE FORMATION OF THE PALESTINIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD NETWORK IN THE UNITED STATES
Biographical Information on Khalil Shikaki
Khalil Shikaki was born on September 8, 1953 in Rafiah in the Gaza Strip. He began his university studies at Bir Zeit University in the West Bank in 1971. He received his bachelor's degree in International Relations and Middle Eastern studies from the American University in Beirut in 1975, and his master's degree in the same subjects from the same university in 1977. From 1977 until 1980, he worked for General Motors in Kuwait. From 1980 until 1985, Khalil studied for his Ph.D. at Columbia University in New York City, where he also received a Middle East Institute Certificate in 1983. From 1985 to 1986, he taught at Columbia. The following year, he returned to the West Bank and became a professor at An-Najjah University in Nablus. When An-Najjah University was closed during the Intifadah, Khalil returned to the United States and taught at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee before moving to Tampa, Florida in 1990 to assume the position of Director and Research Associate of the newly created World & Islam Studies Enterprise (WISE), a think tank set up by then-University of South Florida computer science professor, Sami al-Arian.
In 1991, he became a professor at the University of South Florida in Tampa. In 1992, after An-Najjah University was reopened, Khalil applied to return to the West Bank. But Israeli authorities denied him permission on the basis of intelligence information that he had maintained a covert relationship with his brother Fathi, the head of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). Khalil denied that he had maintained such a relationship--and got the State Department to pressure Israel into giving Khalil permission to return to the West Bank. In the face of such U.S. pressure--coupled with strong editorial support by New York Times columnist Anthony Lewis -- Israel relented and granted him entry into Israel. In 1993, Khalil formed the Center for Palestine Research and Studies in Nablus. To this day, Khalil has steadfastly denied any connection to the Islamic Jihad, that he maintained a covert relationship to his brother, or had any knowledge of the subsequent disclosure that the academic center in Tampa where he worked served as the clandestine Islamic Jihad terrorist apparatus. In fact, evidence released by the FBI and INS in addition to other documentary evidence introduced at the trial of Sami al-Arian shows that Khalil was a key intermediary in the organization of the American arm of the PIJ. The evidence further contradicts the claims made by Shikaki that he did not know of the real backgrounds of Al Arian or Ramadan Abdullah Shallah or of the front groups for PIJ.
Khalil Shikaki And The Trial Of Sami Al-Arian
In February 2003, after a decade-long investigation, University of South Florida Professor Sami al-Arian was indicted for his alleged work on behalf of PIJ, stemming from fundraising efforts related to various organizations he founded to promote PIJ and its ideology in the United States. Khalil Shikaki served as the director of one of those organizations, WISE, the World Islamic Studies Enterprise.
On December 6, 2005, after a six-month trial, Sami al-Arian was acquitted of 8 of the 17 charges against him; the jury deadlocked on the remaining 9 charges including conspiracy to aid a terrorist organization. The Department of Justice announced that it stood by its evidence against al-Arian and is in the process of deciding whether to retry him on the unresolved charges or to hand him over to the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement to commence deportation proceedings.
Despite the mixed outcome, the editorial board of the St. Petersburg Times, usually a favorable publication for al-Arian, has called for al-Arian's deportation from the U.S., writing:
"[e]ven though Al-Arian was not convicted of supporting terrorist acts, he stands exposed for what he is - a carrier of hate. He is not just an innocent academic with unpopular views about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as he has so often claimed, or a 'prisoner of conscience.' The trial demonstrated that Al-Arian was deeply connected to the PIJ, which is believed responsible for more than 100 deaths in the Middle East. He was described by his own lawyers as a fundraiser for the 'charitable arm of the PIJ.' And Al-Arian was not blind to the group's monstrous tactics, as he was the regular recipient of faxes announcing the group's suicide bombings. As a legal resident, Al-Arian has abused this nation's hospitality and engaged in conduct that may warrant his deportation. The trial has laid bare Al-Arian's involvement in one of the most violent groups in the Middle East. He may now claim an acquittal, but he can never again claim moral innocence." [emphasis added].
Additionally, Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement spokesperson Pam McCullough told the St. Petersburg Times on January 2, 2006, that "[w]e believe there is clear and convincing evidence that he had ties to terrorist organizations."
The indictment and wiretaps entered into evidence during the trial outline some of Khalil Shikaki's connections with Al-Arian even after he left WISE. Overt act (number 23) involved a money transfer from an account of the Muslim Women's Society (MWS) -- a subsidiary of another organization created by Al-Arian, the Islamic Committee for Palestine -- which ended up as a payment to Khalil Shikaki.
While Shikaki recently has asserted that he deposited money only into an Islamic charity in the West Bank, these assertions are belied by documentation of the money trail.
A relevant section in the Al-Arian indictment reads:
(23) On or about March 3, 1993, SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN wrote a $12,040 check drawn on the MWS account, payable to SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH. SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH deposited this check into his personal bank account at First Union National Bank in Tampa, Florida, on or about March 9, 1993. SAMEEH TAHA HAMMOUDEH then wrote a $12,040 check drawn on his personal bank account, payable to Khalil Shikaki, which was deposited on March 10, 1993 into Khalil Shikaki's personal bank account at Nationsbank in Tampa, Florida.
The records show that three checks totaling to $12,040 were then written on the Shikaki account. Two, drawn in the amounts of $6,300 and 4,655 respectively, were cashed at Bank Hapoalim in Tel Aviv on March 23; another, for $1,085, was cashed by FIBI Bank in Switzerland on March 29.
Moreover, it is patently clear that Shikaki has not been candid in asserting that no money ever changed hands between him and Sameeh Hammoudeh. The facts show that the account from which Hammoudeh paid Shikaki is the very same one to which Fathi Shiqaqi--his brother and the head of the Islamic Jihad-- sent $19,985 on April 22, 1994. Again, on December 16, 1994, Hammoudeh sent Shikaki another $3,250 out of this account. All these were entered into evidence during the trial as part of Government Exhibit 112.
Further, on October 4, 1990, Sami Al Arian paid Shikaki $2,745 out of an account in Tampa that was used for PIJ business.
In another overt act (230) discussed in the indictment, and introduced into evidence as Government Exhibit 325, Taher Jaber Al-Awani of the International Institute of Islamic Thought (aka Unindicted Co-Conspirator Five in the trial), wrote a letter to Sami al-Arian, described as:
A letter dated November 6, 1992, from Unindicted Co-Conspirator Five. In the letter, Unindicted Co-Conspirator Five said that his group viewed SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN, MAZEN AL-NAJJAR, Khalil Shiqaqi (sic), BASHIR MUSA MOHAMMED NAFI, RAMADAN ABDULLAH SHALLAH and ABD AL AZIZ AWDA as part of and an extension of his group and promised to send the remainder of the money pledged previously. Unindicted Co-Conspirator Five instructed SAMI AMIN AL-ARIAN that he could use the money regardless of the party or the facade for which the money was designated.
Wiretaps of conversations between Shikaki, Sameeh Hammoudeh, Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, Mazen al- Najjar and Bashir Nafi, introduced into evidence at trial, indicate that Shikaki distributed money in the West Bank for Al-Arian associates and that his accounts were used to hold their funds, but that Shikaki cut his ties to the group in late January 1995, shortly after PIJ was declared a blocked terrorist organization by President Clinton.
In a wiretap dated January 15, 1995 (entered into evidence as Government Exhibit 1198), Mr. Hammoudeh asks of Mr. Shikaki: "If you please, do us a favor. There is an amount of money for orphans in Nablus." The U.S. government argued and introduced evidence, in the case against Al-Arian that "orphans" was one of the code words for Palestinian Islamic Jihad "charitable" work. Mr. Shikaki replies: "Um ... Eah. [Pause.] [Sighs.] Okay, when you want to give it to them."
In a January 28, 1995 wiretap (entered into evidence as Government Exhibit 1207), Hammoudeh called Shikaki again from Florida to push him on the funds transfer. Shikaki refused to help. This conversation took place just five days after President Clinton signed an executive order prohibiting financial transactions with PIJ. Hammoudeh asks, "What have you done for us regarding the subject." Shikaki responds, "Ehh ... I did not do anything for you yet, by God, Sameeh. If you have another way to give them money, a way other than my way..." Hammoudeh then says: "By God... I mean I can send them a check through the mail. But I thought this way is better, more secure."
A February 15, 1995 wiretap (entered into evidence as Government Exhibit 1206) further demonstrates Shikaki's involvement with Al-Arian and his associates, and suggests that Mr. Shikaki played an integral role in the distribution of money for ICP- and PIJ-connected figures. In the wiretap, Mazen Al-Najjar, Al-Arian's brother-in-law and a leading member of WISE and ICP who was arrested and deported from America in 2001 for his connections to terrorism, converses with another WISE-linked figure, Bashir Nafi.
Al-Najjar asks, "Do you know what our problem with the Orphan Sponsorship Project is now?...We cannot find someone to receive the money and distribute it….Khalil refused to receive .…In the past we were depositing it in Khalil's account here." Al-Najjar is referring to Mr. Shikaki's personal account in Florida. The prosecution in the Al-Arian trial introduced bank records that showed Shikaki's account to have received multiple deposits from Al-Arian associates.
Khalil Shikaki and the Islamic Committee For Palestine
William Reece Smith, Jr., a former provost of the University of South Florida (USF), was hired by USF to investigate the university's role and responsibility in the creation of the World & Islam Studies Enterprise (WISE) where Ramadan Shallah, the current head of the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine, was director prior to his appointment within the Islamic Jihad. Although Smith largely found the university blameless in knowingly casting aside evidence that a terrorist cell had been set up on campus, the report contained various interviews with key figures in the controversy. These interviews are significant since they provide on-the-record statements by key officials and thus can be checked for their veracity by examining independent evidence.
In his report, Smith wrote that Khalil "received a written invitation from Dr. [Sami] al Arian to speak at the 1989 (Islamic Committee for Palestine) Conference." This invitation was received while Khalil was teaching at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.
Who is Dr. Sami al-Arian and what is the Islamic Committee for Palestine (ICP)? Perhaps the best one-sentence description of this organization and its director, Dr. Sami al-Arian, was given in an affidavit by William West, a special agent for the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the United States Department of Justice, on November 17, 1995, requesting a search warrant of al-Arian's house and offices. West points out that the ICP was used as a "front" group for the Islamic Jihad:
Based upon the facts and information that I have set forth…, I have probable cause to believe that ICP and WISE were utilized by Sami al-Arian and Ramadan Abdullah Shallah as "fronts" in order to enable individuals to enter the United States, in an apparent lawful fashion, despite the fact that these individuals were international terrorists…
In an immigration hearing in July 1996 for one of the suspects in the Islamic Jihad investigation, INS agent West testified that the ICP and WISE served as "front groups" for the Islamic Jihad in the United States. The evidence clearly shows that both WISE and ICP served as the command post for the Islamic Jihad within the United States.
Sami al-Arian was a professor of computer science and engineering at USF in Tampa. On February 19, 2003, al-Arian was indicted, along with seven codefendants, on 53 counts involving a conspiracy related to his involvement with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. On the Articles of Incorporation of the Islamic Concern Project, Inc., the parent organization of the ICP, the name Sami al-Arian is listed as the Registered Agent and Chairman. The function of the ICP was to facilitate the dissemination of radical ideology through the venue of its annual conferences held in St. Louis and Chicago from 1988 until 1992. In addition to holding these conferences, the ICP, according to the I.C.P. Informational Guide, disseminated publications of the Islamic Jihad Movement within the United States (including the publications Al-Islam wa Filastin and Al-Mujahid).
1988 First Annual Conference of the ICP
The First Annual Conference of the ICP was held in St. Louis, Missouri at the Henry VIII Hotel on December 23-26, 1988. The title of this conference was "Islam, Intifadah and the Future." Speakers at this conference included leading Islamic militants from around the world. One panel, for example, included Basheer Nafi and Sheik Abdel Azziz Odeh. Nafi has been identified by reliable Arab officials and reports and by the FBI "as a significant leading member of the Islamic Jihad" (revealed in the affidavit of William West). Sheikh Abdel Aziz Odeh, the spiritual leader of the Islamic Jihad, who was deported from Israel in 1988 for his role in orchestrating terrorist activities within the West Bank and Gaza Strip, according to a ruling of the Israeli High Court of Justice (845/87).
Recorded on audiocassette at the conference, Odeh, sitting alongside Nafi, boasted of terrorist operations carried out by Islamic Jihad. Odeh spoke of terror activities in Gaza mentioning the events of October 6, 1987, where "four Mujahideen found their martyrs' death after they killed the big Israeli intelligence boss in Gaza." Odeh also made the following statement: "From October '86 to 1987, Palestine witnessed a clear increase in Jihad activities. There were stabbing incidents…there was the Bab al-Maghariba operation, and there was the operation that was not completed by the sister, but had an enormous effect." A review of the ICP conference materials clearly shows that it was not an academic conference -- as Khalil Shikaki would later claim -- but rather a venue for leading international militants to coordinate terrorist strategies and collaboration.
1989 Second Annual Conference of the ICP
Khalil Shikaki made his first appearance, as panelist and speaker, at the second annual ICP convention that took place in Chicago, Illinois on December 22-25, 1989 at the McCormick Center Hotel. The title of this conference was "Palestine, Intifada and the Horizons of the Islamic Renaissance." Militants appearing at this conference included the following:
1) Dr. Sami al-Arian - Director of the ICP.
2) Sheikh Abdel Aziz Odeh - The spiritual leader of the Islamic Jihad who, according to Ziad Abu Amr, in his book Al-Harakah Al-Islamiah fi Al-Diffah Al-Gharbiyeh wa Kittah Ghaza (The Islamic Movement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip) which was published in Arabic in 1989, helped to form the movement with Dr. Fathi Shikaki, Khalil's brother, in 1980 in the Gaza Strip.
3) Sheikh Rashid Ghanoushi - The leader of the Tunisian radical Islamic Al-Nahda movement who was, according to INS Special Agent West in his 1995 affidavit, "identified…as having been convicted in 1989 of the attempted assassination of the president of Tunisia and the overthrow of the Tunisian government, then having escaped and fled to England, where he is living in exile."
4) Dr. Bashir Nafi - Buttressing the claims by an FBI cooperating witness, the book Hamas by Ronni Shaked, published in 1994 in Israel, states that Nafi, in his London office, communicated information from Fathi Shikaki, who was based in Damascus, to the Islamic Jihad operatives within the Occupied Territories. The November 6, 1995 edition of the newspaper Al-Urdun also described Nafi as a possible successor to Fathi Shikaki after Shikaki was assassinated in Malta in October 1995. Also, Thomas Mayer, writing in a book edited by Emmanuel Sivan and Menachem Friedman and published in the United States in 1990 under the title of Religious Radicalism and Politics in the Middle East, stated that Fathi Shikaki found in Bashir Nafi an "ideological friend" whom he met in Egypt and that Nafi had "given refuge to a suspect in Sadat's assassination."
· In an internal ICP document released at this conference called the "I.C.P. Conference Bulletin, December 22, 1989," a recap of the first day's events was given. It included descriptions of the panels that took place. The flyer describes Sheikh Abdul Aziz Odeh, as "a former professor of Shariah at the Islamic University of Gaza and the spiritual leader of the Islamic Jihad Movement. He was expelled from Gaza for his role in inspiring the Mujahideen of Palestine to begin the unprecedented uprising (Intifada)." The ICP Conference Bulletin summarized Odeh's speech from December 22, 1989, by saying that, "It is only by the Islamic Struggle of Jihad that the Muslims must fight the enemies of Allah (SWT). The Shaikh went on to warn the Muslims that if they forget the true purpose of the struggle and lose sight of the Reality, they will be losers in this world and the next. He then concluded his talk by reminding the Muslims that although the struggle is painful, Allah (SWT) says that this struggle brings even more pain to the enemy."
This same internal ICP document chronicling the activities of the first day of the 1989 conference also referred to the speech of Tunisian Islamic militant Rashid Ghanoushi, who spoke on the evening panel on December 22, 1989. The bulletin recounts Ghanoushi's speech in the following words: "Islamic activists must take the necessary steps to eradicate the various social, economic and political challenges we are facing… In doing this, we will become strong enough to confront and destroy this embodiement [sic] of evil -- Zionism."
At the conference, Khalil Shikaki appeared on a panel alongside al-Hashemi al-Hamdi, a member of the militant Islamic An-Nahdah party in Tunisia, and Rashid Ghanoushi, the exiled leader of the militant Islamic An-Nahdah party in Tunisia. According to audio cassettes (which have not been released publicly), al-Hamdi exhorted those attending to engage in a violent jihad against the Jewish state and secular movements: "I request all our Muslim brothers to take an example from Abdullah Azzam [original spiritual leader of Osama Bin Laden and founder of the Jihad movement in Afghanistan], and die as the martyrs died in Afghanistan."
These statements by a broad range of speakers clearly reflect the agenda of the ICP conferences -- ones in which Shikaki repeatedly and actively participated -- to further the cause of violent Jihad and militant Islamic fundamentalist violence against Jews and the West.
1990 Third Annual Conference of the ICP
Khalil Shikaki made a return appearance at the Third Annual Conference of the Islamic Committee for Palestine held in Chicago, Illinois at the McCormick Center Hotel on December 28-31, 1990. The title of this conference was "Islam is the Road to Victory."
This conference, like those preceding it in 1988 and 1989, provided a forum for the dissemination and proclamation of radical Islamic ideology:
At this conference, Khalil Shikaki appeared together on a panel with Muhammad al-Asi. According to an audiocassette recording of this English-language panel, Al-Asi urged military attacks on American forces in the Persian Gulf:
If the Americans are placing their forces in the Persian Gulf, we should be creating another war front for the Americans in the Muslim world and, specifically, where American interests are concentrated - in Egypt, in Turkey, in the Indian subcontinent, just to mention a few. Strike at American interests there!
On December 30, 1990, Khalil appeared on another panel with Dr. Ramadan Abdullah Shallah (who is the current head of the Islamic Jihad operating out of Damascus). In Shallah's speech, he glorified the use of "martyrdom" operations against Israel and encouraged other to follow in the path to martyrdom in the path of Allah and stated that the armed struggle must never be relinquished. He referred to a martyrdom operation carried out by the "shahid" Iyad Abid, and he continues by saying that everyone must "sell their soul in the way of Allah." Shallah's speech continued with the following statement:
There is currently a pervasive lie that there should be no armed Intifadah. And we say that it is a lie because no one can claim that the armed struggle means arming the people in its entirety to face the occupation forces [using] weapons and fire instead of the stone. Demanding armed struggle means that the rifle which has been fighting throughout the years of jihad and struggle in Palestine must not cease and must not be silenced, rather, it [the rifle] must re-fire.
In an important aside in his opening comments, Shallah notes that "Brother Khalil" -- Khalil Shikaki -- had preempted him in making many of the points that Shallah had planned to make. This comment proves that Shikaki knew Shallah prior to mid-1991-- the date he told Reece Smith that the two had first met. It also suggests that Shikaki was aware of and likely shared the same ideological militancy as Ramadan Shallah.
Other participants at this conference repeatedly made radical Islamic statements. Sheikh Muharram of Masjid Sidon in Lebanon, for example, made the following statement:
The Intifadah means that our children, our brothers, and our sisters that were brought up under the rule of the Israelites and under the grasp of the Jews will not be Judaised and will not kneel to the Zionists. As long as the Aqsa Mosque, Omar al Mukhtar Mosque, Salah Al Din Mosque, Izzadin Al Qassam Mosque and the rest of the mosques are still educating the generations of Mujahedeen, the generations will convene in these houses [of worship] and burst forth from them roaring:
'Khaybar, Khaybar oh Jews,
The Armies of Muhammad shall return.
We are all Salah Al Din.
Do not worry, oh Palestine!'
A significant piece of evidence demonstrating the true radical agenda of these conferences --and thus contradicting Shikaki's claim that he was unaware of any political thrust -- exists in a videotape of a conference session showing the decoration of the stage. Behind the podium at the 1990 conference is a poster that depicts Sheikh Izz a-Din al-Qassam, one of the symbols of the Islamic resistance movement, with the words "Harakat Al-Jihad Al-Islami Fi Filastin (The Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine)" and bears the logo of the Islamic Jihad Movement. The fact that this poster was displayed onstage at this conference shows that there was no pretense as to the nature of this conference. Its aim was to provide support for the Islamic organizations, Islamic Jihad and Hamas, within Israel.
Khalil Shikaki's appearance, for the second year in a row, including his appearance on a panel with the future head of the Islamic Jihad, proves his connection to the activities of these radicals and the groups they represent.
1990 ICP Closed Session
In July 1990, the ICP held a small closed session and videotaped Sami al-Arian's comments. The prosecution in the Al-Arian trial entered the tape and translation of al-Arian's comments as Exhibit 451. That video showed al-Arian speaking from a lectern at the front of the small room. Khalil Shikaki was in attendance. And what did Al-Arian talk about on the tape? That Islamic activity had to take a hard position toward the West, and that the position against America up to that point had been weak. Al-Arian said that the only way to redress this failing was to set an example, by engaging in "true armed jihad" against Israel.
This closed session shows that any professed ignorance of Al-Arian's perspective, or that of his organizations, on the part of Khalil Shikaki, is demonstrably false.
1991 ICP Rally in Chicago, Illinois
On September 29, 1991, a rally was held at Curie High School in Chicago, Illinois that was sponsored by the ICP but was, in fact, a rally for the Islamic Jihad. Though Khalil Shikaki was not present at this rally, the rally itself provides further proof of the radical nature of the ICP and its leaders with whom Shikaki affiliated himself. The rally also cements the relationship between the ICP and the Islamic Jihad. The following is a summary of the events that took place at this rally:
In September 1991, al-Arian and his ICP organization sponsored a rally in Chicago. The primary speaker at this rally was Sheikh Abdul Aziz Odeh, the spiritual leader of the Islamic Jihad. Behind the speaker's podium, the stage was decorated with Palestinian flags with the emblem of the Islamic Jihad on them and also posters of Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam, the symbol of the movement. On these posters, the Islamic Jihad emblem was displayed, as were the words "Jihad, victory or martyrdom." Also speaking at this rally was Sulayman Odeh, a man who, according to Ziad Abu Amr, in his book Al-Harakah Al-Islamiah Fil Diffah al-Gharbiyeh wa Kittah Ghaza, published in 1989, was one of the founders of the Islamic Jihad in Egypt in the early 1980s. On display at the event were pictures of "martyrs" and other Islamic Jihad items, one of which bore the words, "The fire of the Intifadah is going to burn everybody who compromises a speck of Palestine." On the video, al-Arian enters with Abdul Aziz Odeh while the crowd chants "Allahu akbar. Israel will be destroyed. Victory will be with us" and "Jihad, Jihad until victory. Victory to Islam."
Another speaker at the rally, Ghassan Ballout, introduced as an ICP representative, said, "The road is straight ahead of us and may our guns be [aimed] one way -- to the chest of the enemy." Later in his speech, he made the following statement, "America -- the enemy of the peoples."
Al-Arian, in his speech to this assembly, made the following statements:
· "They used to say 'There is no God but America,' but the martyrs say today with their blood: 'Khaybar, Khaybar oh Jews, Muhammad's army shall return' [unintelligible two sentences]. Today, the martyrs say with their blood, their efforts and their jihad: With soul and blood, we will redeem you oh Palestine."
· "Yes for Jihad in the name of Allah, yes for Islam, yes for the Intifadah. We're going toward the future that Allah promised us. Allah is one. Mohammed is the leader. The Koran is our constitution. Jihad is our path. Victory to Islam. Death to Israel."
· "Allah tells us that the big victory is being in heaven. Dying for Allah will allow us to be in heaven."
This rally demonstrates the unity between the ICP and PIJ in their statements and in their decorations. The videotape of the event shows clear pictures of children wearing T-shirts bearing the logo of the ICP and waving Palestinian flags with the logo of the Islamic Jihad emblazoned upon them. The evidence makes clear that there is no real distinction between these two groups, and that they worked together to rally support for the activities of the Islamic Jihad.
1991 Fourth Annual Conference of the ICP
· Khalil Shikaki also appeared at the Fourth Annual Conference of the Islamic Committee for Palestine held in Chicago, Illinois at the McCormick Center Hotel on December 27-29, 1991. The title of this conference was "Islam, Palestine and the West." The list of radical speakers at this conference, once again, is a lengthy "Who's Who" of Islamic and Arab radicalism, including:
1) Sheikh Abdel Aziz Odeh - the spiritual leader of the Islamic Jihad.
2) Sulayman Odeh - one of the founders of the Islamic Jihad.
3) Ramadan Abdullah Shallah - the future head of the Islamic Jihad.
4) Kamal Helbawi - spokesman for the Muslim Brotherhood movement.
5) Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman - the spiritual mastermind of both the Sadat assassination and the World Trade Center bombing, who currently is serving a life sentence in a U.S. prison for his role in the conspiracy to blow up the United Nations building along with other buildings and tunnels in New York City.
As he had the previous year, Shikaki appeared on a panel with Dr. Ramadan Abdullah Shallah. Although a cassette tape of this panel is not available, an advertisement in the March/April 1992 version of the English-language publication Inquiry (a publication distributed by the ICP from Tampa and edited by Dr. Sami al-Arian) in Arabic listed both the speakers and the names of each of the panels from the 1991 conference. Evidence of the fact that ICP's Inquiry was an organ of the Islamic Jihad was later shown in a story filed by Reuters from Lebanon. The reporter cited the fact that he had obtained a copy of Inquiry from Islamic Jihad representatives in Lebanon. (Reuters, March 5, 1993)
Dr. Sami al-Arian set the tone of the conference in his speech during the opening session on December 27, 1991, recorded on audiocassette:
· "We are in a battle of life and death, in a battle of fate and future against the Western Hegemony and Tyranny wanting to control the capabilities of the nations in order to enslave, steal and control them."
· "The result is either the Man becomes a Muslim or 'Westerner.' Islam and Westernization cannot unite in the heart of a man at all. And Islam is here in its large meaning, which is the Order of liberating mankind from the worship of all the political, social, economical and ideological idols."
· "The Zionist Project in the heart of the Islamic Nation is the central part of the Western attack and the modern Western challenge, and is a true ally and principal strategic partner in the equation. Therefore, Palestine represents the struggle ground between the Whole Truth materialized by God's Order, and the Order of oppression represented by the civilization of fraud and deceit."
· "The Nation of Islam did not die. The nation that gave birth to Ezzeldine Al-Qassam (Palestinian Islamic leader during the Palestinian war. The brigades of Hamas carrying his name are responsible for the latest terrorist attacks in Israel), Hassan Al-Banna, Al-Nabhani, Sayyed Qotb, Khomeini, Al-Noursi, Al-Mawdudi (Islamic Fundamentalism thinkers and leaders), Al-Islambuli (carried out the assassination of President Anwar Sadat), Misbah Al-Souri, Ismail Al-Faruqi, El-Sayyid Nouseir (assassinated Meir Kahane in New York) and thousands of others, some you know and some you don't, God knows them, (This Nation) is a Nation on its way to revival, glory and victory because it refuses to surrender and cannot be broken."
A panel discussion at the conference featured Ibrahim al-Wazir, a radical from Yemen; Sheikh Abdel Aziz Odeh, the spiritual leader of the Islamic Jihad; al-Hashemi al-Hamdi, a member of the militant Islamic party An-Nahdah in Tunisia; and propagandist Issa Nakhleh. Al-Wazir made the following statement: "We should not leave this meeting without thinking about what we can do in support of the Intifadah." Issa Nakhleh, on this same panel, stated, "I suggested to an Arabic country that we send every month ten million dollars to the Intifadah, clandestinely, and I know how to send it…. The Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, they are the real holy warriors, to whom we are obliged to support with all our means…."
The proceedings of this conference show beyond any question that the ICP and the Islamic Jihad worked as a unified front. The ICP conferences provided a venue where radical Muslims from around the world could gather and share their ideas for the destruction of Israel and the continuation of the Jihad. The fact that Khalil Shikaki spoke at three of these conferences shows that he was active in the radical Islamic arena, and that his ideology was that of the Islamic Jihad that was headed by his brother, Fathi Shikaki. His subsequent refusal to acknowledge the radical nature of those conferences is not credible. He knowingly spoke alongside the militants and participated in their conferences on multiple occasions. The connection is clear: Khalil Shikaki was a proponent of radical Islamic ideology and, specifically of the PIJ.
Khalil Shikaki and The World & Islam Studies Enterprise
The World & Islam Studies Enterprise (WISE) was incorporated in 1991, with Sami al-Arian, the head of the ICP, as its registered agent and one of its founding directors. ICP and WISE were closely linked. WISE's banner publication, Qira'at Siyasiyyah, often published articles that were derived from speeches delivered at the ICP annual conferences in addition to speeches at other similar conferences. An article by Shikaki, derived from his speech at a pro-Hamas conference in Herndon, Virginia, in 1991, was published in the Spring/Summer 1991 issue of Qira'at Siyasiyyah. In addition, Mazen al-Najjar, Sami al-Arian's brother-in-law (deported in 2002 for immigration violations related to his connections with PIJ), and Ramadan Abdullah (Shallah) were listed as members of the board of directors of the ICP according to the yearly filings of the Islamic Concern Project, Inc., the parent organization of the ICP. Both Shallah and al-Najjar also were directors of WISE.
According to Smith's report to USF, it was at the 1989 conference of the ICP that Shikaki met Bashir Nafi. Smith, referring to an interview he conducted with Khalil, stated that "Shikaki learned of the plans for a new research center from Nafi during the 1989 conference. According to Shikaki, the location of the center was not resolved at that time, but he received from Nafi overtures about joining the center as a research associate when it was established."
The research center to which Nafi was referring was WISE. Smith, in his report, cites an interview he had with Nafi where Nafi "stated that he and Dr. al Arian met from time to time when Dr. al Arian visited England, where Nafi was employed as research fellow at a medical school after pursuing a doctoral degree at London University. On occasion during these visits, according to Dr. Nafi, there was further discussion of the proposed research center." At the time that Shikaki was enticed to come to Tampa (in late 1990 according to Smith's report), there were public Arab newspaper reports and independent but publicly circulated interviews and publications that detailed Nafi's involvement with Khalil's brother, Fathi Shikaki. This strongly suggests that Khalil knew exactly with whom he was dealing.
Bashir Nafi
Bashir Nafi's connections to the Islamic Jihad were publicly documented through the years dating back to his friendship with Khalil Shikaki's brother, Fathi, in Egypt in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Nafi's resume lists that he was on the editorial board of the Cairo journal, Al-Mukhtar Al-Islami from 1979-1981. Fathi Shikaki, the founder and leader of PIJ, wrote articles for this journal under the pseudonym of Fathi Ibrahim. In a master's thesis written at USF, Abdulaziz I. Zamel states that Fathi Shikaki also wrote under the pseudonym of Izz al-Din al-Faris. Fathi Shikaki stated in an interview that Al-Mukhtar Al-Islami was of great importance since it served as a mouthpiece for Islamic Jihad ideology. Zamel's thesis also states that, since "Fathi Shikaki and other founders had professional ties and friendship with its editors, [Al-Mukhtar Al-Islami] was adopted and used as a theoretical journal for the group, elaborating on their doctrine and fanning discontent with the Muslim Brotherhood…."
Fathi Shikaki, writing under the name Izz al-Din al-Faris co-wrote an article with Nafi, who himself was writing under the pseudonym of Ahmed Sadiq, in Al-Mukhtar Al-Islami entitled "The Palestinian Issue is the Central Cause of the Islamist Movement" published in July of 1980. Zamel writes that, in this article, "The point of making Palestine's liberation from Zionism 'Islam's number one issue' came to be the hallmark of their movement." Fathi Shikaki also wrote a book that was published by Al-Mukhtar Al-Islami that was titled Khomeini: The Islamic Solution and the Alternative. The connections between the leadership of the Islamic Jihad and Al-Mukhtar Al-Islami were evident, and Nafi's participation on the editorial board of this magazine links him directly to the Islamic Jihad.
After Nafi left Egypt and traveled to England in 1982, his resume states that he became a member of the editorial board of the magazine Al-Taliah Al-Islamiah (a monthly published in London) and served on this board until 1986. Zamel states that Bashir Nafi published and edited Al-Taliah Al-Islamiah (The Islamic Vanguard) "specifically for the group [Islamic Jihad Movement], which was sent to the occupied territories for reproduction, in the same shape and form, and distribution." In his discussion of this periodical, Thomas Mayer writes in "Religious Radicalism and Politics in the Middle East" (SUNY Albany Press, 1990) that "nearly every issue of the periodical recounted the massacre of Muslim believers, Sunnis and Shi'ites alike, in different parts of the world -- the Philippines, India, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Israel and the West Bank -- emphasizing the need to launch a united Sunni-Shi'ite jihad to repel imperialism from Muslim lands and restore Muslim sovereignty over them."
It was unambiguously clear that these magazines with which Nafi had affiliated himself were proponents of the Islamic Jihad ideology that Nafi was instrumental in creating. The best proof of this came in an interview with Fathi Shikaki in the November 8, 1990 issue of Al-Islam wa Filastin (Al-Islam wa Filastin, according to the Informational Guide of the ICP acquired at one of the aforementioned conferences, was disseminated by the ICP in the United States. Fathi Shikaki's quote states that this magazine was one of several Islamic Jihad publications.) In this interview, Fathi Shikaki said that the Islamic Jihad Movement's mission was not only armed struggle, but it also was important to explain to the Muslim people "the history of Islam and since 1979 in Cairo, the magazine Al-Mukhtar Al-Islami was published and then Al-Taliah Al-Islamiah and then Al-Islam wa Filastin…" Once again, Nafi put himself in a position of authority with a publication that was notoriously tied to the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine.
Nafi worked with WISE as the editor of its journal, Qira'at Siyasiyyah, from its first publication in 1991. Khalil Shikaki told Smith that Nafi, as one of the founders of WISE, brought him to Tampa to be the initial director of this research institute. The fact that the credentials of those who hired, worked with and paid Shikaki were so blatantly allied with a jihadist mindset reflects on his own attitudes.
Nafi was deported from the United States in the summer of 1996 for violating his temporary work visa immigration status. He had been admitted into the U.S. on a visa petition filed by Sami Al-Arian, ostensibly to be employed as a researcher at WISE when, in fact, he went to work at the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) in Northern Virginia, the aforementioned Islamist organization wherein un-indicted coconspirator Taher Jaber Al-Awani in Al-Arian indictment overt act # 230 is noted. Interestingly, this is but one of a number of examples of immigration fraud committed by these senior PIJ operatives and their front organizations supporting their operations in the U.S.
If Khalil Shikaki misrepresented his prior relationships with other PIJ operatives on U.S. visa applications, that would have constituted visa and immigration fraud on his part as well.
Ramadan Abdullah Shallah
The other figure who plays prominently in the discussion of WISE and its Islamic Jihad connections is Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, who went from WISE to become the General Secretary of PIJ. As stated earlier, Ramadan Shallah was identified as one of the founders of the Islamic Jihad by Ziad Abu Amr, a professor of Political Science at Bir Zeit University in the West Bank, in his book Al-Harakah Al-Islamiah fi Al-Diffah Al-Gharbiyeh wa Kittah Ghaza (The Islamic Movement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip) that was published in 1989 in Arabic. Ramadan Abdullah Shallah lists on his resume that he is a "co-founder" of WISE. According to the Smith report, Shallah joined the staff of WISE as administrative director in 1991. The repeated claims by Khalil Shikaki that he only knew the man by the name Ramadan Abdullah (the name he used at WISE) and that he knew of no connection between Shallah and the Islamic Jihad is contradicted by the evidence.
Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, according to news stories published after he was named the new leader of the Islamic Jihad, studied at al-Zaqaziq University in Egypt at the same time as Fathi Shikaki; both joined the Egyptian Islamic Jihad that was responsible for the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt in 1980. According to an October 30, 1995 article in the Israeli newspaper Ma'ariv, Shallah helped rebuild the infrastructure of the Islamic Jihad with Fathi Shikaki and Abdel Aziz Odeh when the two were deported from Israel in 1988. Shallah's brother, Omar, was used as a liaison between Shallah in London and operatives in the Gaza Strip. The article also reported that Ramadan Abdullah Shallah headed the London office of PIJ and, with the help of Bashir Nafi, was in charge "of transferring funds to finance Islamic Jihad's activities in the territories, and he worded the leaflets distributed by the organization in the West Bank and Gaza Strip."
Shallah's resume, as does Nafi's, lists membership on the editorial board of Al-Mukhtar Al-Islami from 1979-1981. Al-Mukhtar Al-Islami, as previously cited, was described as a "mouthpiece" of the Islamic Jihad Movement. Furthermore, Shallah's resume states that he was on the editorial board of al Nour between 1982 and 1985. Zamel lists the publication and distribution of al Nour, an Arabic monthly published in Jerusalem, as an instrument of the Islamic Jihad Movement. On top of the fact that he became the leader of PIJ after the assassination of Fathi Shikaki, his participation on the editorial boards of these magazines provides even more substantial proof that Shallah was outwardly a supporter of PIJ and that this support was well known in the Palestinian community.
Khalil Shikaki and Ramadan Abdullah Shallah
· When asked about his prior knowledge of Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, Khalil Shikaki has repeatedly claimed that he knew Shallah only as "Ramadan Abdullah" and that he knew of no connection between Shallah and the Islamic Jihad while the two worked together at WISE. However, communications between the two men released by the FBI show that Khalil Shikaki used Shallah as an intermediary to secretly contact his brother Fathi (at the time, the head of PIJ), that Khalil knew that Shallah was a high level member of PIJ, and that Khalil collaborated with Shallah and his brother Fathi in several joint projects, including one revolving around Mousa Marzouk, the head of the Hamas political bureau.
· The following is a translation of a letter sent from Ramadan Abdullah to Khalil Shikaki on August 24, 1992:
In the name of Allah, the merciful, the compassionate
August 24, 1992
The brother Khalil may Allah bless him
Peace be upon you and may Allah bless you and protect you.
Regarding the subject of your brother Mohammad, I was told that his admission is not easy and that he does not have an admission in advance, and if you see in him a will to study, we will try again.
Regarding (Laker), he has an old admission from Sudan and we will try to send the admission to be able to receive the exit pass, but the fear is that the East People would turn him back.
Regarding the project of Abu Omar [the nom de guerre of Musa Abu Marzouk], it was decided to help him, but we want a clear picture of the evolution of the project so the needed (material) would be sent, but let the letter be sent through the fax and (let it be) quick.
There is a subject I do not know if you could help in it or no, but he [Fathi Shikaki] asked me to give you the message, and that there is a young man from the area of your parents who was studying at the university of Al Najah - Literature faculty - Sociology, but he was prohibited from entering the West Bank, so he did not continue his studies and he had left for graduation a number of hours approximately two school sessions and he is now outside the country and he is not allowed to go back before three years as the authority stated. Actually, he is trying to continue his studies at the capital university [Damascus] where is the man who always asks me to take care of you [Fathi Shikaki]. A recommendation letter is needed from the crippled man [Note: The Arabic here states that the man's legs have been cut at the thigh.] and the intermediary to this man is the man who wrote the second article you sent and that needs to be adjusted, he is a close friend of him, or he works with him as you know. It is said that the first man had written such letters in these situations and it was helpful. The name of the young man is Anwar Abdel Hadi Mohammad Abu Taha.
Finally, my regards to you and to your family and congratulate me on the printer and this letter I printed on a small Macintosh that Jissam sold to me for a very reasonable price and I hope to improve my speed, God willing.
Abu Yasmin
[Ramadan Shallah]
This letter clearly shows that Khalil was doing work for his brother in Israel and that the middleman between Khalil and Fathi was Ramadan Shallah. Fathi was asking Khalil through Shallah to be a courier for him between two individuals within Israel. How can Khalil claim that he knew nothing about these connections when he was exchanging letters with Ramadan Abdullah Shallah about operational issues that Fathi wanted to be fulfilled? Also, how can Khalil Shikaki justify references to a joint operation with the leader of Hamas, Mousa Abu Marzouk, if, as he claims, he had no connection to any radical Islamic terrorist groups?
· The following is a translation from Arabic of a fax sent from Khalil Shikaki to Ramadan Abdullah on December 6, 1992:
In the name of Allah, the merciful, the compassionate
Date: 12/6/1992
From: Khalil Shikaki
To: Dr. Ramadan Abdullah
Peace be upon you and may Allah bless you and protect you.
Regards to the family and to Bashir [Nafi] and Sami [al-Arian] and Mazen [al-Najjar] and Samih [Hammoudeh] and I hope that they are doing well.
I got your urgent letter and I am very sorry for being late in my response, but the reason is, as you know, that I don't know more than you or Bashir about the budget. Anyway, I think that the division was like this:
About 3,000 for equipment.
About 5,000 for repairing the office.
About 3,000 for translation, printers, monitors, etc.
About 2,000 for letters, telephones, and others.
That's all that I have now. If I have anything else that I can help you with, please contact me.
The typist has begun to type my article and I think that it will be ready very soon. [Two words unable to decipher] and I will send it to you by fax at the moment that it is ready, God willing.
Again, send my regards to all the guys and peace upon them and may Allah bless you and protect you.
Note: My father arrived to my house yesterday in Tulkarem to offer his condolence for the death of my uncle Abu Hatem (Wafa's father). I wish to speak by phone to the one who asks me to take care of you [Fathi Shikaki], it is possible to prepare that? I do not know when my father is going to go back to Gaza, but it is possible that he goes back after tomorrow after the end of the condolences.
This letter shows that Shikaki was remaining abreast of the activities of WISE even after his departure (he had resigned from WISE in October of 1991, writing that "due to my feeling that there is some reservation on my way of work by some honorable brothers, and to my disagreement with other honorable brothers on the best work methods in the building and the advancement of the center.") Moreover, it shows that he knew that Shallah would be the person to ask in order to contact his brother, Fathi. This fax proves that Khalil knew of the connection between Ramadan Shallah and Fathi Shikaki, and that this connection was good enough that Fathi's own brother, Khalil, would defer to Ramadan for his brother's whereabouts.
· When Shallah came to WISE in 1991, Khalil Shikaki was its director. Perhaps he did not hire Shallah, but it is inconceivable that Shikaki would not know the background of this individual who would be coming to work with him at WISE.
· The Egyptian passport that Shallah used to enter the United States listed his name, in Latin letters, as "Ramadan Abdalla Mohamed Shallah."
· On Shallah's resume held by USF, from either late 1992 or early 1993, his name is listed as "Ramadan Abdullah Shallah, Ph.D."
· On his INS Employment Eligibility Verification form from December 1993, submitted to the USF, his name is listed as "Ramadan Abdullah Shallah" though his signature says only "R. Abdullah."
These facts cast serious doubt on Shikaki's claims that he did not know Ramadan's last name was Shallah.
Khalil also is cited in the Smith report as claiming that he had not met Shallah prior to Shallah's arrival at WISE in mid-1991. This claim would be hard to reconcile with evidence that the two appeared on the same panel at the 1990 ICP Conference in Chicago on December 30, 1990 (described above) and that, indeed, Shallah even referred to "the brother Doctor Khalil" in the beginning of his speech.
Similar to his claims about meeting Shallah, Khalil Shikaki told Smith that he met Dr. Sami al-Arian for the first time in October 1990 when he moved to Tampa to begin his work at WISE. As noted above in reference to the ICP Conference of 1989, Khalil Shikaki received an invitation to speak at the ICP Conference from Sami al-Arian. If this was the case, then Shikaki met Al-Arian at the latest in December 1989 -- nearly a year earlier
Khalil Shikaki and the 1991 UASR/IIIT Conference
A July 1991 conference held in Herndon, Virginia by the United Association for Studies and Research (UASR) and IIIT served as perhaps the largest gathering of radical Islamic militants ever held in the United States. The title of this conference was "The Islamic Movement in the Shadow of International Change and Crisis in the Gulf." Shikaki, who portrays himself as a moderate, attended the conference, addressed by these major speakers: Ishaq al-Farhan (Jordanian Islamic Action Front), Kamal al-Hilbawi (Muslim Brotherhood), Sami al-Arian (ICP/WISE), Taha Jaber al-Alwani (IIIT), Mousa Abu Marzouk (Hamas), Khalil Shikaki (WISE), Ramadan Abdullah (Islamic Jihad), Ahmed Bin Yousef (UASR/Hamas), and Mohammad al-Asi (Hizbollah). Shikaki's own speech at the conference was entitled, "The Arab and Palestinian Future after the Gulf War."
UASR, formerly located in Springfield, Virginia, and now defunct, was known for its publication of pro-Hamas literature and served as Hamas' strategic arm in the United States. The group's first president, according to its articles of incorporation, was Mousa Abu Marzouk, the former head of the Political Bureau of Hamas and currently a high-ranking Political Bureau official based in Amman, Jordan. The current president and one of the founders of the UASR is Ahmed bin Yousef. Among the books published by the UASR which promote Hamas are: The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas): Background of its Inception and Horizons of its March (1989); Ahmed Yasin: The Phenomenon, the Miracle, and the Legend of the Challenge (1990); Hamas: Palestinian Politics with an Islamic Hue; and The Islamic Movement in Israel: Pangs of Resurgence and Challenge of Future (1990).
Once again, Khalil Shikaki is shown to be involved with radical Muslims from around the world.
Khalil Shikaki and the Middle East Studies Committee at the University Of South Florida
The Smith report (USF) states that, "Dr. [Khalil] Shikaki, Dr. [Sami] al-Arian and Dr. [Bashir] Nafi met with representatives of the USF Middle East Studies Committee in June 1991 to discuss the possibility of future cooperative efforts." Smith continues, "Some nine months before the USF/WISE agreement was finally entered into, Shikaki became an adjunct professor in the Department. Department members learned more about his academic credentials and his reputation as a leading Middle East scholar. They also came to know that he held moderate political views. He made no secret of his brother's leadership of the Islamic Jihad, while also claiming to abhor violence and fanaticism, in disagreement with his brother's views and activity." As the possibility of a formal agreement between USF and WISE was developing in October 1991, Smith adds, "The Committee sought to learn more about WISE's legal structure and sources of financing. Information was requested of Dr. Shikaki who agreed to provide it in whatever format was desired. The Committee asked for a letter. On November 12, 1991, Dr. Orr [chairman of the Committee on Middle East Studies at USF] received a letter over the signature of Ramadan Abdullah…advising that WISE was incorporated in early 1991 as a 'non-profit research organization incorporated in the state of Florida' whose research activities were funded by 'several non-profit organizations as well as private individuals residing within the United States and abroad."
According to Smith's report, Al-Najah University was reopened late in 1991. Shikaki made arrangements to return. "He obtained an Israeli permit to [return home] but, upon attempting to enter Israel from Jordan in January 1992, he was denied entry and his papers were confiscated without explanation by Israeli authorities." Shikaki remained in Jordan for a few weeks trying to gain entry, but returned to Tampa to continue his protest from there. After returning from Jordan, Shikaki worked in conjunction with Orr and others in drafting the USF/WISE agreement that was "executed on March 11, 1992 by the Dean of the College of Arts and Science and others on behalf of the University and by Ramadan Abdullah on behalf of WISE." Smith further stated that, "in early 1992, some members of the Committee [USF], together with scholars of other American universities, protested Shikaki's exclusion from the West Bank in a joint letter addressed to the Israeli government…. The protests had effect. The Israeli government reversed its position and Shikaki was allowed to return to the West Bank and his university in June 1992."
Here, a question is raised as to what Khalil Shikaki's impetus was for developing an agreement between WISE and USF if not to create a legitimizing front for the terrorist activities of ICP and WISE. Among the consequences of the agreement, Ramadan Abdullah Shallah was employed to teach political science at USF -- the same Ramadan Abdullah Shallah who shortly thereafter was to become General Secretary of Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
https://www.investigativeproject.org/khalil_shikaki.html
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MIM: In 2018 the New Yorker magazine published a 'puff piece' portraying Shikaki as a victim and heroically overcoming obstacles which were still being put in his way by malevolent forces (Jews) and others.
Under Threat Of A Government Crackdown
By Bernard Avishai
Feb. 3, 2018
"Shikaki's place in that community was hard earned. He was born in 1953, in Gaza's Rafah refugee camp, the son of farmers from a village near Rehovot, by then destroyed. He moved to Jerusalem in 1968, and enrolled at Bir Zeit University, in the West Bank, in 1971. He continued his studies at American University, in Beirut, staying in that city through the civil war, and earned a master's degree, in 1977. He first learned the value of survey methods in Kuwait, where he got a job in the marketing department of General Motors. In 1985, Shikaki earned a Ph.D. in political science at Columbia University, in New York, where he also received a Middle East Institute certificate and became a visiting scholar.
His older brother Fathi, meanwhile, had taken a very different course, which shadowed Shikaki's career. Fathi earned a medical degree in Egypt, where he fell in with the Muslim Brotherhood. In 1981, still in Egypt, he founded Palestinian Islamic Jihad, to fight the Occupation and impose a pietistic theocracy.
In 1991, when the younger Shikaki was teaching at the University of South Florida, he petitioned to return to the West Bank, but the Likud was still in power, and mere association with his brother precluded it. After the 1992 Madrid peace conference, however, Shikaki became engaged in second-track negotiations with Israel, and journalists—the late Anthony Lewis, of the Times,among them—and members of Congress from Florida who knew him began a letter-writing campaign on his behalf.
The Israeli government finally relented, and he moved to the West Bank to teach and to set up his center. Another blow awaited him, however. In January of 1995, Islamic Jihad's most horrific suicide bombing killed twenty-one soldiers and a civilian in Israel. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin reportedly ordered the Mossad to assassinate Fathi; it did, in Malta, that October. "I cannot win a popularity contest," Shikaki told me. "When it suited their purposes, Likud people linked me to Fathi, while some Palestinian activists hate me for working with the Israelis."…"
MIM: The poor dear...
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MIM:Khalil Shikaki's bio on the website of his 'Palestinian Center For Policy And Survey Research' lists him as 'Professor of' Political Science' and 'Director'.
Khalil Shikaki is a Professor of Political Science and director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (Ramallah, Palestine). Since 2005 he has been a senior fellow at the Crown Center for Middle East Studies at Brandeis University. He finished his Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University in 1985, and taught at several Palestinian and American universities. Between 1996-99, Dr. Shikaki served as Dean of Scientific Research at al Najah University in Nablus. He spent summer 2002 as a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington DC. Since 1993, Dr. Shikaki has conducted more than 200 polls among Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and, since 2000, dozens of joint polls among Palestinians and Israelis.
Between 1998-99, jointly with Dr. Yezid Sayigh, Dr. Shikaki led a group of more than 25 Palestinian and foreign experts on Palestinian institution building. The findings of the group were published in a Council on Foreign Relations' report, Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999). Shikaki and Sayigh were the principal authors of the report.
Dr. Shikaki's research has focused on the peace process, Palestinian state building, public opinion, transition to democracy, and the impact of domestic Palestinian politics on the peace process. He is the co-author of the annual report of the Arab Democracy Index and a member of the Steering Committee of the Arab Barometer, two initiatives led by the Arab Reform Initiative. His recent publications include "The future of Israel-Palestine: a one-state reality in the making," NOREF Report, May 2012; "Coping with the Arab Spring; Palestinian Domestic and Regional Ramifications, " Middle East Brief, no. 58, Crown Center for Middle East Policy, Brandeis University, December 2011; Public Opinion in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Public Imperative During the Second Intifada, with Yaacov Shamir, Indiana University Press, 2010; and "Palestine 1993-2006: Failed Peacebuilding, Insecurity and Poor Governance," in Stephen Baranyi (ed.) The Paradoxes of Peacebuilding Post-9/11 (Vancouver, Canada: UBC Press, 2008).
https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/192
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MIM:Khalil Shikaki's 'Palestinian Center For Policy And Survey Research' is described below as a "think tank" devoted to "objective and non partisan research" which raises the obvious questions as to how 'objective' and 'non partisan' they can be if they are allowed to operate in the 'Palestinian Authority' terror base of Ramallah and are a "registered non profit entity with the Palestinian Ministry Of Justice". (!)
Besides the fact that a country called Palestine doesn't exist the claims of "objectivity and non partisanship" are completely oxymoronic.. The charade of having 'the seal of approval' and protection of the 'Palestinian Ministry Of Justice' leaves no doubt that Khalil Shikaki and his 'Palestinian' Center For Survey And Research is itself a propaganda ploy aimed at promoting the dangerous pretence since 1992 that Hamas' genocidal aims to eliminate Israel and all Jews is simply a passing ideological misunderstanding which can be 'moderated' under the right circumstances. See Shikaki's screed below "Can Hamas Moderate?". Khalil Shikaki has taken on a 'good cop' public relations role and is promoting the aims of Hamas (and PIJ) by pushing for a 'Palestinian State' and blaming the lack of one on Israel and the Jews.
Shikaki's involvement with the founding of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad network in the United States is documented and undeniable.
"...[He moved] to Tampa, Florida in 1990 to assume the position of Director and Research Associate of the newly created World & Islam Studies Enterprise (WISE), a think tank set up by then-University of South Florida computer science professor, Sami al-Arian.
In 1991, he became a professor at the University of South Florida in Tampa. In 1992, after An-Najjah University was reopened, Khalil applied to return to the West Bank. But Israeli authorities denied him permission on the basis of intelligence information that he had maintained a covert relationship with his brother Fathi, the head of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ).
Khalil denied that he had maintained such a relationship--and got the State Department to pressure Israel into giving Khalil permission to return to the West Bank. In the face of such U.S. pressure--coupled with strong editorial support by New York Times columnist Anthony Lewis -- Israel relented and granted him entry into Israel.
In 1993, Khalil formed the Center for Palestine Research and Studies in Nablus. To this day, Khalil has steadfastly denied any connection to the Islamic Jihad, that he maintained a covert relationship to his brother, or had any knowledge of the subsequent disclosure that the academic center in Tampa where he worked served as the clandestine Islamic Jihad terrorist apparatus.
In fact, evidence released by the FBI and INS in addition to other documentary evidence introduced at the trial of Sami al-Arian shows that Khalil was a key intermediary in the organization of the American arm of the PIJ. The evidence further contradicts the claims made by Shikaki that he did not know of the real backgrounds of Al Arian or Ramadan Abdullah Shallah or of the front groups for PIJ.
In an immigration hearing in July 1996 for one of the suspects in the Islamic Jihad investigation, INS agent West testified that the ICP and WISE served as "front groups" for the Islamic Jihad in the United States. The evidence clearly shows that both WISE and ICP served as the command post for the Islamic Jihad within the United States.
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About us
PSR is an independent nonprofit institution and think tank of policy analysis and academic research. PSR was founded with the goal of advancing scholarship and knowledge on immediate issues of concern to Palestinians in three areas: domestic politics and government, strategic analysis and foreign policy, and public opinion polls and survey research. PSR research units conduct and organize four types of activities: research and policy analysis, empirical surveys and public opinion polls, task forces and study groups, and meetings and conferences. The units focus on current public policy issues with a special reliance on empirical research as a tool to advance scholarship and understanding.
PSR is dedicated to promoting objective and nonpartisan research and analysis and to encouraging a better understanding of Palestinian domestic and international environment in an atmosphere of free debate and exchange of ideas. PSR is registered as a nonprofit institution in the Palestinian Ministry of Justice.
https://www.pcpsr.org/en/about-psr-page
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MIM: In 2007 Khalil Shikaki published a 16 page working paper as a Senior Fellow at Brandeis University's Crown Center For Middle East Studies where he remains salaried as of this writing, He concluded that ideally a coalition of Fatah 'inclusionists' and Hamas 'moderates' must be created to form 'a nationalist - Islamist coalition' "which would enable the creation of a sovereign Palestinian State "that is not at the mercy of Israel's goodwill."
Shikaki also utilized the term 'Hamas moderates' and emphasized the need to engage with this mutually exclusive euphemism which might refer to genocidally inclined jihadis who don't scream Allahu Akhbar when attacking their victims. As the definition and meaning of their name Hamas implies:
(Hamas is an acronym of the Arabic phrase حركة المقاومة الإسلامية or Ḥarakah al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah, meaning "Islamic Resistance Movement". This acronym, HMS, was glossed in the 1988 Hamas Covenant[95] by the Arabic word ḥamās (حماس) which itself means "zeal", "strength", or "bravery".[96])
MIM:Below is the PSR's Domestic Politics Unit's mission statement regarding their approach to documenting and presenting/sanitizing Hamas by making the Islamonazi terrorist group appear to be a legitimate political entity.
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Hamas
PSR's Domestic Politics Unit seeks to examine the Palestinian domestic scene and the process of governance. It focuses on the different facets of state building and political change. Issues of interest include institution building, security sector reform transition to democracy, clean government, civics, political trends, and political alignment. DPU seeks to develop various quantitative political indicators with a special focus on developing a Palestinian democracy index, a security sector index, as well as trends in political affiliation and the domestic balance of power.
Hamas:
- Can Hamas Moderate? Insights from Palestinian Politics during 2005-2011 - Dr. Khalil Shikaki - January 2015
- With Hamas in Power: Impact of Palestinian Domestic Developments on Options for the Peace Process - Dr. Khalil Shikaki - February 2007
https://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/264
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MIM: Conclusion:
With Hamas in Power:
Impact of Palestinian Domestic Developments on Options for the Peace Process
Dr. Khalil Shikaki
Working Paper
1 February 2007
Brandeis University
Crown Center For Middle East Studies
With Hamas in Power
Conclusion
"The Israeli and Western response to the electoral victory of Hamas failed to see the advantages in encouraging the forging of a Palestinian coalition spearheaded by Fatah's "inclusionists" and Hamas's moderates. Instead, working closely with Fatah's "exclusionists," the response of Israel and the international community has so far focused on isolating Hamas and imposing financial sanctions on its government. This was done in the hope of forcing the Islamist movement to make fundamental changes in its ideological and political positions. But Hamas is highly unlikely to make such a strategic shift in the near future."
Nonetheless, a need to engage Hamas exists. Such an engagement would seek to create a nationalist-Islamist coalition, one that would create a strong central government able to enforce law and order, protect and indeed consolidate the nascent democratic experiment, put an end to the violence against Israel, and engage Israel in serious negotiations.
Moderate forces within Hamas are seeking to find ways to align the group with the Palestinian and international consensus on the question of the peace process. However, these moderates cannot achieve more than small and gradual progress on their own. Engaging Hamas would help these moderate forces accelerate the process of change and would increase the possibility of achieving a permanent peace.
A viable negotiating option for a nationalist-Islamist coalition would be one that seeks to end the violence and the occupation while enabling the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state that is not at the mercy of Israel's good will. Given Hamas's ideological views, an end to the conflict is not feasible for now. Since this is also the preference of the current Israeli government, an interim settlement, while not ideal, is the most feasible option at this time.
https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/publications/working-papers/pdfs/wp1.pdf
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MIM: Further proof of the Shikaki's role as a Hamas and PIJ operative and that his PSR is a propaganda mill for Hamas. PIJ and the PA can be seen in the title and thesis of this paper by Khalil Shikaki in 2015. The title says it all.
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Can Hamas Moderate?
Insights from Palestinian Politics during 2005-2011
Khalil Shikaki
January 2015
The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR)
PSR is an independent nonprofit institution and think tank of policy analysis and academic research. It was founded in 2000 with the goal of advancing scholarship and knowledge on immediate issues of concern to Palestinians in three areas: domestic politics and government, strategic analysis and foreign policy, and public opinion polls and survey research. PSR conducts policy analysis and empirical surveys and public opinion research and organizes task forces, study groups, meetings and conferences. Its work focuses on current public policy issues with a special reliance on empirical evidence as a tool to advance scholarship and understanding.
PSR is dedicated to promoting objective and nonpartisan research and analysis and to encouraging a better understanding of Palestinian domestic and international environment in an atmosphere of free debate and exchange of ideas. PSR is registered as a nonprofit institution in the Palestinian Ministry of Justice.
This initiative has been organized in cooperation with the U.S./Middle East Project and the Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre
The Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR)
P. O. Box 76, Ramallah, Palestine Tel: +970-2-2964933 Fax:+970-2-2964934 [email protected] www.pcpsr.org
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Author
Khalil Shikaki is the director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (Ramallah). He is also a senior fellow at the Crown Center for Middle East Studies at Brandeis University. He finished his Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University in 1985, and taught at several Palestinian and American universities. Since 1993, Dr. Shikaki has conducted more than 200 polls among Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. His research has focused on Palestinian state building, public opinion, transition to democracy, and the impact of domestic Palestinian politics on the peace process. He is the co-author of Arabs and Israelis: Conflict and Peacemaking in the Middle East (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), with Abdel Monem Said Aly and Shai Feldman. Other recent publications include "The Future of Israel-Palestine: a One-State Reality in the Making," NOREF Report, May 2012;"Coping with the Arab Spring; Palestinian Domestic and Regional Ramifications, " Middle East Brief, no. 58, Crown Center for Middle East Policy, Brandeis University, December 2011; and Public Opinion in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The Public Imperative During the Second Intifada, with Yaacov Shamir, Indiana University Press, 2010.
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Introduction
On April 23, 2014, a Hamas-Fatah reconciliation agreement was signed in Gaza that led five
weeks later to the formation of a government of technocrats headed by Rami al-Hamdallah.1 This development represented the most meaningful step taken toward West Bank–Gaza Strip reunification since Hamas's violent takeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, which in turn occurred eighteen months after Hamas's surprising, indeed striking, victory in the January 2006 Palestinian elections.
The reconciliation agreement revived the debate regarding the means, costs, and consequences of the integration of Islamists into the Palestinian political system. The debate has focused on the consequences of such integration, and of Islamists' participation in the formal political process, for the direction of Palestinian state-building and peacemaking. The core question has been whether the integration of Hamas would help moderate its views in three main areas: political governance, social agenda, and the peace process.
The Arab Spring has provided two contradictory models of Islamist integration: the example of Tunisia and that of Egypt. In Tunisia, the Al Nahda Party demonstrated adaptability and openness, and the integration process was relatively smooth and unconstrained, enabling a successful transition to more democratic governance by December 2014. In Egypt, exclusion of others along with authoritarian tendencies among the Muslim Brotherhood and a much more constrained process of integration, assured failure by June 2013. What about the Brotherhood's sister organization, Hamas? What direction did it take during the period of its integration into the formal Palestinian political system, and what kind of integration process and other challenges was it forced to confront?
This Brief addresses the question by summarizing the findings of research conducted by the author at the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in Ramallah. The research, covering the period between 2005 and 2011, aimed at testing the "moderation thesis"— a hypothesis that argues that Hamas would most likely show moderation in the three areas under consideration, owing to the movement's need to gain a local and international stamp of approval, to forge coalitions within the political system to advance important elements of its agenda, and to remain sensitive to Palestinian public opinion, which has been moving over the years toward moderation with respect to most of the components of these issue areas.
In other words, the proposition tested by the research is that politics necessarily involves debate, give-and-take, and, in the end, compromise. If the moderation thesis is correct, Palestinians and the Palestinian political system would ultimately stand to benefit from Hamas's integration. If the thesis proves wrong, they are likely to pay a cost. Moderation was measured in our research by the extent to which Hamas's behavior has moved closer to or farther from the center or the "Palestinian street"—bearing in mind that the latter was revealing, at the time of Hamas's integration, a tendency to embrace democratic and liberal values and practices and to support the peace process.
1 Before heading the new conciliation government, al Hamdallah served as prime minister of the Palestinian government in Ramallah, reporting to the president of the Palestinian Authority (PA), Mahmoud Abbas.
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Our research findings show that although Hamas did behave in some respects in ways predicted by the moderation thesis, in many other areas its behavior did not accord with the expectations of that thesis. This Brief seeks to explain both Hamas behavior that has conformed to the expectations of the thesis and that which has not. Hamas—its ideology, its elite, and its internal dynamics—is responsible for both outcomes. But the political context of integration provides an additional explanation. The Brief begins with a description of that context, followed by a summary of findings and a discussion of factors driving change, or the lack of it. It ends with a few conclusions.
The Political Context of Hamas Integration
Since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994, Palestinian Islamists—specifically, Hamas and Islamic Jihad—had refused to recognize, let alone participate in, the formal institutions of Palestinian government. On both ideological and pragmatic grounds, Islamists found it counterproductive to take part in the formal political process, which they considered illegitimate. Instead, they opted for playing a role outside the formal structures of governance, using violence and street mobilization to advance their aims.
The death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004 changed this. Under Arafat, Hamas was convinced that the Fatah-dominated system would always remain authoritarian and that Islamists would never be able to influence public policy through the ballot. With Arafat gone, however, Hamas expected the political system to open up and Fatah, the dominant political player, to weaken.
Fatah's twin failures in peacemaking and state-building had already more than doubled Hamas' strength among Palestinians between 2000 and 2005. Throughout 2003 and 2004, polls conducted by PSR showed Islamists becoming the most popular political faction, with Fatah coming in second. Capitalizing on this increased public support and relying on existing support for armed resistance to Israeli occupation, Hamas sought to translate that popularity into parliamentary seats without having to give up its armed capacity. It therefore agreed to take part in the Palestinian legislative elections scheduled for July 2005 and later rescheduled for January 2006.2
The official decision to participate in the formal PA political system came in March 2005, when nationalist and Islamist parties signed the Cairo Declaration. The new PA president, Mahmoud Abbas, who had been elected only two months earlier, lacked the capacity to force Hamas to agree to end the second Intifada and cease violent attacks on Israel. He therefore offered the group a deal: Hamas would cease violence against Israel in return for integration into the formal political process. Throughout the Intifada, Hamas had rejected the slogan "one authority, one gun" and claimed that "under occupation, no law is above the law of resistance." But in the 2005
2 All polling data referred to in this piece are from the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research. PSR polls have been conducted regularly every three months among a representative sample of 1,270 Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, including East Jerusalem. The margin of error in all polls was 3%. For details on PSR's methodology, see http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/153; for details on all PSR polls, see http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/154.
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Cairo Declaration, Hamas agreed to a trade-off: a cease-fire in return for political participation in elections to be held by the PA.
But Hamas never agreed to give up its arms. While PA laws prohibited the formation of armed groups, the legacy of the PLO, as an umbrella organization of armed groups fighting for an end to occupation, enjoyed a public and institutional legitimacy that allowed Hamas, and indeed almost all other Palestinian factions, to participate in the political process without having to dissolve their armed militias. A weak Palestinian Authority, public opposition to disarming Hamas before the occupation was ended, and continued Palestinian-Israeli violence made it impossible for Abbas and Fatah to condition Hamas's participation in the political process on prior disarmament. Having thus assured its ability to maintain its armed wing—the al-Qassam Brigades—Hamas was now ready to become part of the formal political system.
Hamas's decision brought the group significant electoral gains. With the peace process perceived by the Palestinian public as futile and with Hamas capitalizing on Fatah's fragmentation and on perceived PA corruption and mismanagement, the group did relatively well in local elections and even better in national elections, managing in January 2006 to win 44 percent of the popular vote and 56 percent of the seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC).3
Hamas's electoral victory was immediately followed, however, by the statement on the part of the international Quartet conditioning recognition of the Hamas government and continued financial support on Hamas's meeting three requirements: recognition of Israel, acceptance of previous agreements signed by the PA and the PLO, and renunciation of violence. Hamas was quick to reject all three. Consequently, once the Hamas government was sworn in, the international community refused to grant it recognition and stopped all financial support to the PA—and Israel likewise stopped all revenue transfers to the Palestinians. That Israeli decision alone cost the PA 60 percent of its domestic revenues, amounting to about $55 million per month. As a result of these international and Israeli sanctions, Hamas's first government was unable to govern effectively, to enforce law and order, or to deliver much of the basic and social services that the Palestinian public had come to expect from its government.
With help from Saudi Arabia, which brokered the Mecca Agreement in February 2007, a national unity government (NUG) was formed in March 2007, made up of the two largest political factions, Fatah and Hamas, as well as several smaller ones. This was the first time that a broad nationalist-Islamist coalition had come to rule the PA since its establishment in 1994. The Israeli government refused to recognize the unity government and saw no point in entering into negotiations with Abbas so long as the NUG failed to endorse the Quartet's three conditions— and the (second George W.) Bush administration supported the Israeli position. While the response of the international community has not been uniform, very few countries agreed to establish high-level diplomatic contacts with the Hamas members of the newly created unity government.
In June 2007, an internal Hamas coalition of hardliners led by the al-Qassam Brigades took the radical step of using military force to defeat Fatah and PA forces loyal to President Abbas and take control of all PA headquarters and military bases in the Gaza Strip. This in turn led to the dissolution of the three-month-old National Unity Government created by the Mecca Agreement
3 For details, see Khalil Shikaki, "The Palestinian Elections: Sweeping Victory, Uncertain Mandate," Journal of Democracy 17, no. 3 (July 2006), pp. 116–30..
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and to President Abbas's formation instead of an emergency government headed by Salam Fayyad whose authority was limited to the West Bank. The result was the creation of two political entities, one in the Gaza Strip controlled by the Islamist Hamas and one in the West Bank controlled by the nationalist Fatah.
Research Methodology
The research conducted by the author and his team has focused on Hamas's positions and behavior in three issue areas: political governance, social agenda, and the peace process. We compared Hamas positions and behavior before and after its integration into the political process and sought to explain any perceived change, or lack of it, by examining three possible propelling factors: the political context in which integration unfolded, the nature of Hamas's elite and its decision-making, and shifts in the attitudes of Hamas's constituency. When the link was evident, we documented how change in one issue area affected change in others.
In documenting change in Hamas positions, formal statements as well as informal attitudes of Hamas leaders and its popular base were reviewed. In examining behavior, official acts of Hamas and its government as well as acts that Hamas tolerated unofficially were explored. In addition, documents deemed relevant, including Hamas's charter and election campaign platform, (as well as the NUG platform), Hamas government decisions and statements, and Hamas parliamentary statements and legislative proposals were examined. Content analysis of the main Hamas media and Internet outlets was also conducted, including a systematic review of the al Khalas Party's (Hamas's) newspaper, al Risalah,4 comparing Hamas's statements and media coverage before and after integration. Interviews were conducted with dozens of senior Hamas leaders, ministers, and elected officials in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Outcomes of Track II meetings involving Hamas and Fatah as well as Hamas and Fatah along with American and Israeli researchers and former political officials were utilized to assess possible routes a pragmatic Hamas might pursue under certain conditions.
Our research also benefited from public opinion surveys among Palestinians, as they helped us assess changes in public attitudes during the period under examination. Surveys were also critical for our understanding of Hamas's base and electoral constituency. Finally, data were collected from various open sources on Hamas's social infrastructure, organizational hierarchy, internal election methods and results, and decision-making processes.
Research Findings
Governance:
4 Issued in the Gaza Strip; the paper did have a limited circulation in the West Bank until June 2007, when it was banned by the PA. Content analysis of the newspaper covered two periods: one year before the January 2006 elections (representing the pre-integration period) and two years after the elections (representing the post-elections period).
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With respect to governance and on the domestic political front, the main question we asked concerned the way Hamas interacted with formal and informal political institutions of governance. The most important themes we examined were: Hamas's willingness to accept the 'rules of the game' by respecting the Basic Law (the most important PA constitutional document) and other laws passed by the earlier PLC; its willingness to form coalitions with other groups in the government and in Parliament; the way it related (in the cabinet and in Parliament) to other actors in the political system, such as the PLO, the armed militias of various groups, the security services, the presidency, and the judiciary; and its acceptance of decisions made by the courts or the president.
Hamas's use of military force in June 2007 was a glaring indication of a failure to moderate—an example of Hamas acting in a manner clearly in contradiction to the moderation thesis. This observation was confirmed by other findings, including many examples of violations of the Basic Law: Hamas disregarded the principle of separation of powers and placed the judiciary under the control of the executive; it transferred the power of the presidency to its prime minister; and it created new public institutions not sanctioned by the Basic Law.
Hamas also established a Hamas-only security service (the Executive Force) in total disregard of existing laws. It rejected major court rulings and denied the legitimacy of certain other security forces and in some instances used force against them. It frequently denied the constitutional powers of the presidency. It maintained its own militia even after Fatah dissolved and disarmed its own. Furthermore, Hamas showed reluctance to engage in coalition building with smaller factions or to establish normal relations with the PLO.
Social Agenda:
On the social agenda front, our research focused on how Hamas approached the legislative process and what kind of gender-related and education-related agenda it formulated. The central question we raised was: Was Hamas seeking to Islamize Palestinian society from the top down, or was it showing a willingness to respect existing secular/liberal tendencies in Palestinian society, including the rights of women and minorities? The most important themes we examined were: the social content of the movement's legislative agenda and of parliamentary debates, the role played by Hamas's female members in the parliament, the management of PA ministries and other agencies, and the implementation of government priorities at the social level, focusing on the extent to which women's issues were affected.
Our findings reveal that at the formal level, Hamas was highly sensitive to criticism of its intentions regarding a social agenda; it accordingly sought to reach consensus rather than impose its own preferences. If consensus was not attainable, the movement sought to postpone decision- making rather than confront dissension. But in the meanwhile, it allowed its ministries, along with groups and individuals affiliated with it—such as its Dawa branch—to promote, and at times insist on, the respecting of traditional religious values, mostly in relation to women's dress and gender mixing.
According to our research, Hamas's elite was divided on most of the social issues, while its constituency tended in general to be more conservative than its elite. While some of the movement's leading religious scholars, particularly in its Dawa branch, advocated a conservative interpretation of Sharia rules regarding women, the formal and official behavior of the Hamas government remained relatively liberal. Nonetheless, the government of Hamas in the Gaza Strip
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informally and unofficially demonstrated a willingness to allow a more conservative approach to coexist side by side with a more liberal one.
When it came to political matters, Hamas interpreted Sharia as prohibiting the election or appointment of women as presidents or judges. It did, however, encourage the full participation of women in voting and demonstrations. With regard to personal status matters of marriage and divorce, the movement seemed to insist on fully implementing Sharia rules. But it left dress code matters to be resolved by individuals and Palestinian society, while making it clear that it preferred the more conservative interpretation. It encouraged women's participation in the workplace, reflecting a tendency highly supported by its popular constituency, while informally discouraging gender mixing.
Despite its declared wish to introduce a more conservative social order, Hamas was willing on at least three occasions to crack down on militant non-Hamas conservative groups that sought to take matters into their own hands and enforce a more extreme code of Islamic conduct on the population.5 The crackdowns were motivated in part by a rejection of these more extreme practices, but they were also intended to assure Hamas's monopoly over the use of coercive force in the Gaza Strip. Other non-Hamas conservative groups were allowed to operate openly as long as they did not take the law into their own hands. Indeed, in some cases, it is believed that the more conservative Hamas leaders sought to use such groups to implement their own social agenda.
Hamas endorsed the principle of equality for all citizens—meaning, Muslims and Christians— but maintained that certain public offices, such as the presidency, the top leadership of the army, and the head of the judiciary, could not be occupied by Christians. Hamas's constituency seems to agree with respect to at least some of those offices. Hamas's behavior reflected acceptance of Christians as potential coalition partners in parliamentary and municipal elections, and Hamas has often condemned attacks on Christians by extreme religious groups in the Gaza Strip. But some human rights organizations criticized the group's lack of vigor in investigating those attacks. Hamas has avoided any discussion of constitutional or legal changes regarding the status of Palestinian Christians.
Our research found concern among secularists about Hamas's intentions to "Islamize" textbooks and school curricula. Two indications of those intentions were an increase in classes allocated to religious education in Palestinian schools and the hiring by Hamas's government of a large number of religious education teachers. While Hamas informally encouraged separation of the sexes in schools and universities, its official position was to maintain the status quo. But Hamas's constituency tended to agree on the need to separate the sexes, even if it was inclined to be more liberal in other areas. Hamas has shown little tolerance for mixed attendance at cultural activities, especially those involving music, singing, and dancing.
The Peace Process:
5 For example, Hamas cracked down on extreme Salafist groups that on various occasions bombed women hair salons. Hamas's own policy was to ban men from working in these salons. These extreme groups also bombed internet cafes and restaurants.
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On the peace process front, our focus was on Hamas's position on the two-state solution, on Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, and on the role of violence. The most important themes examined were Hamas's willingness to disarm and disband its militia, to participate in negotiations with Israel, to respect and implement existing peace agreements, and to recognize the state of Israel within the context of a two-state solution and mutual recognition.
During the period under investigation, Hamas adopted a declared position that advocated a hudna, rather than the permanent peace and end of conflict usually advocated by Fatah. As understood by Hamas, a hudna is an armistice that does not resolve all the underlying causes of conflict but articulates terms for temporary peace, thereby creating conditions of quiet and coexistence for a limited period of time; once that period is over, violence could be resumed. The length of the hudna period envisioned by Hamas has varied, with some Hamas leaders talking about ten years while others have spoken of several decades. After the 2006 elections, Hamas's discourse focused on the movement's willingness to extend the hudna period rather than on the inevitable return to violence when it ended. Indeed, some of the movement's leaders have not ruled out conducting negotiations for a permanent peace once a hudna was put in place.
Our findings also show that Hamas was willing to moderate its rhetoric on other aspects of the peace process. For example, while it has consistently denied the legitimate right of Israel to exist, Hamas has not rejected the acceptance of Israel as a reality, a fact on the ground; and it was willing, under conditions of a hudna, to allow a Palestinian state to engage in normal relations with the state of Israel. Finally, while rejecting a permanent peace, Hamas did not rule out the possibility that the severity of conflict would diminish over time.
Hamas's first government offered in 2006 to negotiate with its Israeli counterparts on matters of living conditions and the daily needs of the two sides. But it delegated responsibility for peace negotiations to PA president Mahmoud Abbas. The platform of the unity government of 2007 indicated, however, that any peace agreement signed with Israel would have to be ratified by the PLO National Council or by a referendum.
The movement has also made changes in its position regarding Palestinian statehood and recognition of Israel, indicating a willingness to accept language that comes close to a two-state solution formula. For example, in the so-called Prisoners Document, Hamas explicitly agreed to accept the establishment of a Palestinian state in the areas occupied by Israeli in 1967, with East Jerusalem as its capital.6 It declared its willingness to accept Israel as a de facto reality, without formal recognition of its statehood or acceptance of its legitimacy. And in Track II meetings, pragmatists within the Hamas leadership agreed not only to sit down with Israelis around a negotiating table but also to endorse a two-state solution and the principle of permanent peace. Indeed, at one such meeting in 2007, Hamas leaders were able to formulate two-state language acceptable to their Israeli counterparts. Other Hamas pragmatists, though not willing to go that far, saw hudna as a first step toward permanent peace, rather than as a temporary cease-fire to be followed by violence once its period ended. It is notable, however, that during the period under
6 The document, which calls itself the "National Conciliation Document of the Prisoners" and was also signed by Fatah and (with stated reservations) Islamic Jihad, among others, talks about "the right to establish [an] independent state with al-Quds al-Shareef [East Jerusalem] as its capital on all territories occupied in 1967." The full text is available at http://www.miftah.org/Display.cfm?DocId=10371&CategoryId=32.
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investigation, even the most pragmatic Hamas leaders continued publicly to deny Israel's legitimacy and to reject the notion of permanent peace.
Hamas has steadfastly refused to accept and implement agreements, such as Oslo, signed by the PLO with Israel. But our findings show differing approaches within the group to those agreements. Many rejected them, considering them unjust and unsatisfactory or based on their belief that Israel had not honored its own commitments. A few argued that the group should go further and fight against those agreements, by violence if necessary. But a third view argued that the group should accept those agreements, even if it did not find them fair. The Mecca Agreement, indicating a willingness to "respect" the agreements, represented a middle ground between the first and third approaches. By "respect," Hamas meant that it would not abrogate such agreements but would be selective in implementing them based on various considerations, including their own reading of Israel's record of implementation and the extent to which the agreements, in Hamas's view, annulled historical Palestinian rights.
On the question of violence, the group made a dramatic shift in its declared position and, most importantly, in its behavior. While it remained solidly attached to the notion that only violence would force Israel to accept a Palestinian state along the 1967 boundaries, Hamas was willing to abandon violence and impose a cease-fire in the areas under its control. Once in office, Hamas significantly reduced its armed attacks against Israelis and sought a tahdia, or quiet, that would allow it to consolidate its position within the Palestinian political system and the regional Arab order.
In an additional significant shift, the group accepted responsibility for imposing an undeclared cease-fire with Israel on all non-Hamas factions as well. In fact, at times Hamas cracked down not only on small militant Salafi groups, such as Jaish al Islam, Ansar al Sunna, and Jaish al Umma, but also on established militias like Saraya al Quds, Islamic Jihad's armed wing. Occasionally, Hamas leaders such as Mahmoud al Zahar openly attacked those who broke the cease-fire by launching rockets against Israel, accusing them of serving Israel's interests.
Explaining the Findings
Our overall findings regarding Hamas's behavior since 2005 indicate that despite important examples of moderation, the group has essentially failed to moderate its position and behavior. Insights gained from the research indicate that some of the reasons for the failure have to do with factors internal to Hamas and its constituency, but that the failure was also driven by constraints imposed on the process of integration of Islamists into the Palestinian political system. Both domestic and external impediments, including those stemming from the nature of Hamas's relationship with Fatah, made it extremely difficult for the group to fully integrate into the formal political system. Hamas failed to cope with the challenges imposed by the political context—and this failure was one of the reasons it failed to moderate. By early 2006, contrary to its earlier expectations, Hamas had come to see the PA's political system as inhospitable, with Fatah treating it as a "foreign" actor.
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But the main impediment to moderation came from within Hamas itself. For most of the period under examination, ideologues enjoyed the upper hand within the movement, while pragmatists remained marginal. Our findings made clear that Hamas's ideologues tend to view the political system produced by the Oslo peace process as illegitimate and therefore doubt the benefits of formal political integration. They also tend to have conservative political and social values and to adhere to a more literal interpretation of Islamic doctrine, and as a result sometimes question the compatibility of democratic and Islamic values.
More than anything else, it has been Hamas's views and behavior regarding the peace process that have been influenced by its religious and ideological convictions. For example, Hamas's original declared position on relations with Israel (as reflected in its 1987 charter, which stipulated rejection of any solution that would allow ceding part of Palestine to non-Muslims) was grounded in religious terms. While pragmatists have sought to modify this position, ideologues have sought to affirm it.
Pragmatist Hamas leaders, particularly those with ties to Fatah's 'young guard,'7 tend to support integration into the formal political system, to espouse liberal democratic values, and to embrace a more nuanced interpretation of Islamic doctrine, norms, and rules. They seek allies outside Hamas in order to encourage pragmatic and moderate trends within their own organization in the hope of making it more appealing to the larger public. Indeed, content analysis of Hamas's newspaper, al Risalah, indicates that the group tended to moderate its views on the peace process—for example, on the recognition of Israel—when the process of political integration seemed to be making progress and to harden its views when integration was constrained or failing.
Hamas ideologues are for the most part found in the Gaza Strip and in Jordan.8 Pragmatists, on the other hand, are concentrated in the West Bank and in Israeli jails;9 few are to be found in the Gaza Strip. The tendency to advocate hard-line views was clearly more evident among Hamas leaders in the Gaza Strip and their constituency there.
The nature of the domestic Palestinian political environment posed other impediments to Hamas's successful moderation. Five factors were found to be critical.
The wide ideological gap between the systems controlled by Fatah and Hamas, as expressed in major differences between the two with respect to both secular and liberal social values and relations with Israel, greatly complicated the process of integration.
Hamas's exaggerated concern about perceived Fatah plans to deny it the fruits of its electoral victory heightened the Islamists' threat perception and encouraged a more militant and violent response to domestic opposition.
7 For details on Fatah's young guard, see Khalil Shikaki, "Palestinians Divided," Foreign Affairs (January- February 2002).
8 Among them: Mushir al Masri, Sami Abu Zuhri, Fathi Hammad, Atif Udwan, Younis al Astal, and Mohammad Nazzal.
9 Among them: Ismail Hanieh, Ahmad Yusuf, Hasan Yousuf, Omar Abdel Raziq, Nasir al Din al Sha'ir, Samir Abu Aishah, and Musa Abu Marzouk.
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Hamas's fear of losing the support of its local constituency led it at times to reject compromise both with its domestic opposition and with Israel.
For its part, owing to the PLO's legacy and the hegemony of its old guard with respect to decision-making in the organization, Fatah was unable to respect peaceful competition. And the reluctance of Hamas's elite to fully and publicly endorse liberal democratic values only exacerbated Fatah's own lack of democratic commitment.
Hamas's culture of secrecy, and its refusal to allow transparency regarding its internal structures and decision-making, heightened Fatah's suspicions regarding its commitment to democracy and its longer-term ambitions.
There were, finally, external impediments as well to Hamas moderation. For one thing, conflict and peace-making with Israel dominated the domestic Palestinian environment and conditioned integration with respect to the political and social issue areas on Hamas's willingness to moderate its views on the peace process. Hamas made things worse by allowing its position on the peace process to influence its position on and behavior in the other issue areas—for example, by refusing to fully acknowledge the legitimacy of all aspects of the political regime created by the peace process.
Additionally, Hamas's external relations and allies, such as Iran, Hezbollah, and Syria, put it in coalition with forces that have traditionally questioned the legitimacy not only of the peace process but also of the Palestinian political system. This alignment negatively affected Hamas's ability to moderate its views—not only on matters related to the peace process, but also on domestic political and social matters. By contrast, the PA relied on the West for financial support and on the U.S., Europe, Egypt, and Jordan for political support for the peace process and for state-building , and these PA allies tended to be suspicious of, if not hostile to, political Islam.
Conclusions
Why did the Palestinian experiment with political integration of Islamists fail? In other words, why did Hamas fail to moderate? Analysis of our findings and explanations leads to six conclusions. While these conclusions might apply equally to other Islamist groups, they do not necessarily apply to all. Indeed, when we look at the two models of Egyptian and Tunisian Islamist integration mentioned earlier, Hamas and its integration process and context seem to closely mirror the Egyptian rather than the Tunisian experience in two respects. First, Hamas itself—its ideology and value system, its elite and its practices—seems much more similar to the Muslim Brotherhood than to al-Nahda. Second, the environment of integration was greatly constrained in the Palestinian context, and in this respect it was similar to the Egyptian rather than the Tunisian model.
Hamas might not have been ready for its electoral victory. While seeking to encourage Hamas's participation in and integration into the political order might have been the best means available to the PA to moderate Hamas behavior, the integration process itself needed a more hospitable environment than the one that was possible during the 2005–6 period. The process might have been more successful if it had been slower and more gradual, enabling Islamists to gain
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experience and practical insight into politics at various levels of local and national government, executive and legislative, before taking on the burdens of full power, with its inherent dangerous temptations. In a sense, Hamas's electoral success may have highlighted its own organizational, political, and ideological deficiencies and contributed to its failure to moderate and to the ultimate failure of integration.
Hamas's internal structures are not democratic. Hamas could not or would not address the issue of internal reform and the democratization of its own structures and mechanisms for decision- making. While the group had a successful process of internal consultation, matters of internal hierarchy, nomination and election, and decision-making remained hidden from public view. Lack of transparency and accountability, dictated in part by the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, reduced the capacity of the movement's institutions and leaders to show sufficient sensitivity to public concerns and demands. This lack of sensitivity to public opinion in turn reduced its ability to moderate.
A long history of nationalist-Islamist distrust fueled Hamas's paranoid security concerns. Those who opposed integrating Islamists saw Hamas's hidden agenda as the transformation of the domestic political system, fearing that its end goal amounted to nothing less than Islamic authoritarianism. In this respect, Hamas's resort to domestic violence in order to resolve differences with Fatah and the president provided integration skeptics with ammunition to limit Islamists' participation in politics. But although Hamas's takeover of the Gaza Strip confirmed the worst nightmares of the skeptics, it should be understood in the context of the long history of Islamist distrust of nationalists and the prevailing circumstances under which Hamas perceived grave and present danger to its survival from its partners in government. Further studies should examine those circumstances with the goal of better understanding Hamas's motivations in June 2007.
But Hamas's survival instinct also pushed it toward moderation. Paradoxically, Hamas's formal integration into the political process has done more to limit its room for maneuver in its relations with Israel than any other development since 1993. After 2005–6, Hamas and its government often refrained from using violence, preferring immediate political survival over "resistance." Indeed, Hamas's commitment to its declared and undeclared cease-fire arrangements with Israel has been relatively stable even when they failed to force public concessions, or exact the intended price, from the Israelis. But in carrying out this balancing act between resistance and state-building, Hamas has risked losing some of its foot soldiers to more extreme groups. Indeed, several Salafist and jihadist groups emerged during the period of Hamas governance, even though they never threatened its control.
Hamas's moderate interpretation of Islam and Sharia and its traditional reform philosophy contributed to its relative success in avoiding making too many big mistakes in the social management of the Gaza Strip. Hamas has been willing to underplay its religious convictions and conservative social agenda and forgo large-scale Islamization of Palestinian society for the sake of gaining public support and international acceptance. Hamas's socialization in the traditional Muslim Brotherhood values and its belief in the importance of reforming the individual contributed to this relative success. Yet in doing so, Hamas encouraged its own more conservative party apparatus to seek to "impose" Islamization via informal means.
Finally, based on our findings and conclusions, we believe that the relationship between Palestinian Islamist participation and moderation is best explained by the strength of push-and-
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pull factors: the push of power politics (the struggle for power and the lure of control) vis-à-vis the pull of ideology (as represented by the challenges of secularism and of recognition of the legitimacy of Israel). These push-and-pull factors cannot be observed directly; rather, they are mediated by three dynamics, constraints, and opportunities:
the internal make-up and structures of the main players involved in the political competition, such as the nature of the party elite and its internal decision-making process;
the domestic political setup, such as the extent of democratization and pluralism already achieved, the nature and extent of political and ideological polarization, and the state of normative public opinion regarding the major questions of the day; and
the nature of the regional alignment system, such as the number of competing blocs, their ideological and political positions, and their international support systems.
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https://www.pcpsr.org/sites/default/files/Can%20Hamas%20moderateJan2015.pdf
| Islamic Jihad Movement حركة الجهاد الإسلامي في فلسطين |
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Islamic Jihad Movement logo |
The Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine (Arabic: حركة الجهاد الإسلامي في فلسطين, Harakat al-Jihād al-Islāmi fi Filastīn), commonly known simply as Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), is a Palestinian Islamist paramilitary organization formed in 1981.[6]
- April 1995: Bomb Attack in Netzarim and Kfar Darom. The first bomb killed 8 people including American student, Alisa Flatow, and injured over 30 on an Israel bus; the second attack was a car bomb that injured 12 people.[51]
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Palestinian_Islamic_Jihad
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MIM: The Brandeis University memorial page for Alisa Flatow, a 20 year old Brandeis student who was murdered in a suicide bus bombing by Khalil Shikaki's brother Fathi's Palestinian Islamic Jihad which was orchestrated by PIJ's American wing lead by Sami Al Arian. In an obscene travesty Khalil Shikaki who was a PIJ operative in Florida for the jihadi group which orchestrated her murder and that of 7 others, is presently employed as a Senior Fellow at Brandeis University's Crown Center For Middle East Studies. https://www.brandeis.edu/crown/people/fellows.html
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On April 9, at 12:07 p.m. Israeli time, a suicide bomber plowed his car into a public bus near the Israeli settlement of Kfar Darom in the Gaza Strip. Seven Israeli soldiers, all under the age of 21, and an American student from New Jersey, Alisa Flatow, were killed. Alisa was my best friend for more than two years; she was my girlfriend for the last year. Besides changing my life forever, her murder has spurred me to speak out on this issue.
I first met Alisa Flatow in September '92 at a freshman orientation event during our first week of school at Brandeis. It was a karaoke party and we were both a bit excited and nervous since we did not know many people. After fumbling through a couple of songs, we became instant friends. We would spend many of our waking hours together for the next few years. Two weeks from her death, April 24, was to be our 1 year anniversary. Needless to say her death hit me very hard. Alisa meant the world to me- when she was murdered, I felt as if my heart had been torn in two.
As her father Stephen Flatow has repeatedly said these past few weeks, "Alisa loved the Jewish people, the Torah, and the land of Israel." In the many letters that I received since she arrived in Israel on January 10, this basic description proved true.
In the first letter I received from her, the day after her arrival, she wrote: "Even as I write this now there are tears in my eyes. And its the strangest thing because I'm so happy to be here while at the same time so upset. I guess I'm realizing how much a part of my life you really are."
Alisa was afraid of not knowing what the semester was going to be like. However, as the days progressed she became more comfortable in her new surroundings, even though her thoughts were miles away. "Things here are good," she wrote on Jan. 15, " I haven't cried in days...I'm happy. I love flashing my bus pass on the bus and I'm starting to learn what goes where...I miss you and think about you all the time. Miss me, think of me and write to me. All my love."
Since learning about Israel was important to her, Alisa took time out from her busy school schedule to find new experiences. "I saw the most unbelievable, incredible, amazing thing tonight," she wrote on Jan. 26. " I went to the initiation for the paratroopers at the Kotel [Western Wall] -it was unreal...hearing speeches about the fallen soldiers and the hard times in front of them-they are such kids..."
"It was such a good feeling to be part of something like this. I was just so taken by the whole ceremony. Things are starting to set in and I realize how lucky I am. For the last two years I carried sociology books and now I carry a Bible, Talmud, etc. To be able to sit and learn all day and then go to a program like this at night at the Kotel is really an incredible experience." She realized the incredible opportunity she had to see new things and to tour the country, and she took full advantage of her chance.
Since she viewed Israel as her second home, it did not take Alisa long to adjust to Israeli life and begin to establish a 'routine'. "Things here are good. In case I haven't said it , coming here is probably the best thing for me-I'm so relaxed. I go to school, the gym, come home, make macaroni, relax, learn, read, write-whatever! I mean of course its so hard not being with you, but I really believe that in the long run, its all for the best." [letter February 5, 1995]
However, besides her daily schedule, Alisa would also find time to do the special, little things that she enjoyed. "...I went to the Kotel and did one of my favorite things; I just sat and watched the people," she wrote on Feb. 13. "I love doing that - seeing the contrast between people who come for a purpose, or as tourists with no clue, and everything in between."
"Yesterday was [the Jewish holiday of] Purim," she wrote on March 15. "Bayit Vegan [a Jerusalem neighborhood] was so cute with all the little kids in costume. Tons of brides, police officers and power rangers...I had a great time."
In terms of school, Alisa had always been a diligent student and was eager to learn new and interesting material - the key word being 'interesting'. "I sat through Navi (prophet) class bored out of my mind," she wrote on February 14. "All we did was read and translate. I went to the teacher after class, and before I could even open my mouth, she told me that the class was too easy for me. She suggested that I move up to the next level."
A month later, however, she wrote: "I've really learned a lot here. I have a ton of notes on Purim and I'm sure I'll have more for Passover. I want to share it all with you -if you'll listen to me...I love you and can't wait to speak to you."
Alisa was always looking ahead and planning for the future. She did not want to waste any time starting her life, and she felt that it would be best if she could settle on a career while she was abroad. "I'm so excited-I found a radio station with good American music," she wrote on Feb. 18. "I got another number of an occupational therapist to call. I hope that it works out. If I can't volunteer, I will see if I can at least observe somewhere. I'm getting nervous that I don't know if it's what I want to do and if not, then what? Oh well-my life!"
One of Alisa's most endearing qualities was her fun attitude, and her ability to find humor in almost every situation: "This is funny -I'm on my way out of my building this morning and I see a father/son mail delivery team. The father is having big problems finding the mailboxes. I'm standing waiting for our mail when he hands me a pile of letters and says, 'Here, put these in the right place.' Excuse me, do I look like I work for the post office? I almost asked him for a cut of his pay check, but I decided the 50 agurot (17 cents) wouldn't do me any good." [letter March 20, 1995]
Today is Israel's national day of remembrance or Yom Hazikaron. All those who have perished so that the country could survive are mourned, remembered, and honored as heroes. Alisa is now a part of this day forever.
As we remember the tragedy inflicted upon her by members of Islamic Jihad - a terrorist group committed to the violent destruction of Israel and the establishment of an Islamic theocracy throughout the Middle East - we must keep in mind one basic fact; one that has been driven closer to home as a result of the recent terrorist bombing in Oklahoma City.
This could have been your daughter, your girlfriend, your sister or your friend. She was not an extremist, a settler, a soldier or any other stereotypical term often seen and heard in the press. Alisa had the same fears, desires, worries and interests as any 20 year old American woman.
It is easy to talk about the "enemies of peace", as Clinton , Rabin and Peres often do, and how we must not capitulate to their demands. However, since the Oslo accord was signed over 18 months ago, 174 Israelis and Americans have been killed in attacks launched by Arab terrorists. That is more than in any comparable period since the end of Israel's War of Independence in 1949.
How many more casualties of peace must there be before things change? How many Alisa Flatows must be murdered before we realize that a real peace should not, must not, and would not have such a high price tag?
In one of her many letters, Alisa wrote: "Miss me, think of me, and write to me." To ensure that there are no more casualties of peace, we must always think of Alisa and be true to her memory. In addition, we must ask ourselves one final question. A question that Alisa has seemingly answered for us. Is it worth negotiating with a vicious killer and entrusting him with the fate of Israel's security in Gaza and the West Bank, if Israelis are being slaughtered in record numbers?
The true answer to this question can be seen in a joint interview scheduled to air today on Israeli television. Through a video hook-up, Prime Minister/ Defense Minister Rabin apologizes to Stephen Flatow for not being able to protect his daughter, and prevent her murder. On this solemn day, there surely exists no clearer answer than this.
Five days after her death, and two days before my birthday, I received a card in the mail. Alisa had mailed it before she left on what turned out to be her final trip so that I would receive it before my birthday.
In it, she wrote: "As far as I'm concerned, you're the greatest, Sorry I can't be there to share your 21st birthday with you but if I have any say in the matter, I'll be around for many future birthdays. Happy Birthday sweetie, and many more. All my love."
Alisa, I love you and miss you - and I'll always remember you.
Alan Mitrani
(This article appeared in 1995 on Yom HaZikaron(Day of Remembrance) in the Boston Herald and the Jewish Advocate(New England), in the New York Post on May 10, and in the New Jersey Star Ledger on May 14.)
https://www.cs.brandeis.edu/~philip/memorial/alisa/alisa.html
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Visiting Scholar Profile: Khalil Shikaki
Dec 9, 2014 | Innovative Methodology, International Profile
Growing up in Palestine during a period of political tension, Khalil Shikaki became fascinated with politics. After completing a BA in Political Science at the American University of Beirut, Shikaki pursued these questions with a PhD in Political Science from Columbia University. Two core questions drive his research: What direction is Palestinian society taking? How do Palestinians view the relationship with Israel?
After finishing in 1985, he began teaching at An-Najah National University in the Northern part of the West Bank. Shikaki designed and taught his first course (the same course he is teaching here this semester): Palestinian Politics & Society. At that time, he realized there were no data to support and test theories. Even politicians relied on word of mouth to gauge public opinion.
"…In 1992, Shikaki started training survey administers and opened the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) in Nablus (PCPSR moved to Ramallah in 2000). And the first survey ran in 1993. Results of the survey, which explored public attitudes toward the Oslo agreement, were published in the same day the agreement was officially signed in Washington DC…."
"…We are extremely pleased to have Khalil Shikaki in residence at the Center for Political Studies (CPS). During his time at CPS, he has also been continuing his collaborations with the Arab Barometer, the Aggression Research Program, and Scott Atran…."
https://cpsblog.isr.umich.edu/?p=1171
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MIM: On December 9th 2014 the University Of Michigan's Center For Political Studies gushed that Khalil Shikaki their 'Visiting Scholar' would be 'teaching' the same course on 'Palestinian Politics And Society" that he developed while teaching at the Hamas jjhad hotbed An Najah University:
" After finishing (a degree) in 1985, he began teaching at An-Najah National University in the Northern part of the West Bank. Shikaki designed and taught his first course (the same course he is teaching here this semester): Palestinian Politics & Society.
At that time, he realized there were no data to support and test theories. Even politicians relied on word of mouth to gauge public opinion."
MIM: An Najah University is hotbed of Hamas and PIJ jihad activitiy. From 1996 to 1999 Shikaki was the Dean Of Scientific Research there. HIs 'teaching' position was concurrent with his serving as director of his Palestinian Center For Survey And Research which he started in Nablus in 2000. The PCSR moved to Ramallah the location of Arafat's HQ in 2000.
On August 9th 2001 a suicide bomber detonated a huge bomb filled with nails,nuts and bolts in the middle of the busy Sbarro Pizzeria in Jerusalem. 16 men,women,children and babies were eviserated and burned alive. Over 130 were maimed for life.
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Excerpt from Wikipedia - The Sbarro Suicide Bombing On August 9th 2001.
A Palestinian suicide bombing at a pizzeria in downtown Jerusalem on 9 August 2001 killed 16 people, including seven children and a pregnant woman. A further 130 were wounded. The attack occurred during the Second Intifada.
Attack
At the time of the bombing, the Jerusalem branch of the Sbarro pizza restaurant chain was located at the corner of King George Street and Jaffa Road in Jerusalem, one of the busiest pedestrian crossings in the region. Although not required to do so, owner Noam Amar added extra support columns on the advice of city inspectors.[1]Ahlam Tamimi, who was charged as an accomplice, scouted for a target before leading Izz al-Din Shuheil al-Masri, the suicide bomber, to the Sbarro restaurant. They arrived just before 2:00 p.m., when the restaurant was filled with customers, "dozens of women, children and babies",[2] and pedestrian traffic outside was at its peak. Tamimi departed before Al-Masri, thought to be carrying a rigged guitar case or wearing an explosive beltweighing five to 10 kilograms, containing explosives, nails, nuts and bolts, detonated his bomb.[2]
Chaviv Avrahami, who saw the scene of the attack after the bombing, recounted: "I heard a tremendous explosion, and I was thrown up a metre into the air. I knew immediately that it was a bomb attack, and a catastrophic one. There were people – babies – thrown through the window and covered with blood. The whole street was covered with blood and bodies: the dead and the dying."[3] Naor Shara, a soldier who witnessed the attack, said, "The worst thing I saw, which I think will haunt me all my life, is a baby that was sitting in a stroller outside a shop and was dead. After the explosion, the After the explosion, the baby's mother came out of the store and started screaming hysterically."[3]
Casualties
The dead included 14 Israelis, one pregnant American, and one Brazilian.[citation needed]Additionally, 130 were injured.[citation needed] One victim, Chana Nachenberg, remained hospitalized in a persistent vegetative state more than 20 years after the attack until finally dying of her injuries on 31 May 2023.[4][5] She was 31-years-old at the time of the bombing. Her daughter, who was two years old at the time, was one of the few in the restaurant who was not injured.[2]
Yocheved Shoshan, 10, was killed, and her 15-year-old sister Miriam was severely injured with 60 nails lodged in her body, a hole in her right thigh, third degree burns on 40 percent of her body, and a ruptured spleen.[2]
Mordechai and Tzira Schijveschuurder, both children of Holocaust survivors, were killed along with three of their children. Two other daughters, Leah, 11, and Chaya, 8, were critically injured.[6] The family was of Dutch origin.[7][8]
Perpetrators
Both Hamas and the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine initially claimed responsibility,[9][better source needed] with Hamas saying that the attack was in response to Israel's assassination ten days earlier in Nablus of the two leading Hamas commanders Jamal Mansour and Omar Mansour as well as six civilians including two children.[3][10][11]
Izz -al-Din Shuheil al-Masri, the perpetrator of the bombing
The suicide bomber who died in the course of carrying out the attack was later identified to be Izz al-Din Shuheil al-Masri[12] (Arabic: عز الدين شهيل المصري) from the PalestinianWest Bank town of Aqabah. Izz al-Masri was 22 at the time and the son of a successful restaurant owner, and from an affluent land-owning family.[citation needed]
The person who constructed the explosives was Abdallah Barghouti. For his part in the bombing and a string of other attacks, in which 67 civilians were killed and 500 injured, he received 67 life sentences on 30 November 2004.[13][better source needed]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sbarro_restaurant_suicide_bombing
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Less than a month later and two weeks after 9/11 'students' at An Najah University celebrated the attack by erecting an 'exhibition' celebrating the carnage.
It was eventually closed because Yasser Arafat was worried that would be bad optics and decrease sympathy for the 'Palestinian cause' in the post 9/11 climate.
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MIM: This is a webpage from the Israeli Government's official website.
Suicide bombing at the Sbarro pizzeria in Jerusalem
Topic:
Secondary topic:
Palestinian Terror and Incitement
Publish Date:
09.08.2001
Updated date:
04.06.2023
Suicide bombing at the Sbarro pizzeria in Jerusalem
August 9, 2001
16 people were killed, including 7 children, and about 130 were injured in a suicide bombing at the Sbarro pizzeria at the corner of King George Street and Jaffa Road in downtown Jerusalem. Concealing the explosives in a guitar case which he had carried with him into Jerusalem, the terrorist entered the restaurant just before 2 PM and detonated the bomb. The 5 kg.-10 kg. bomb, which was packed with nails, screws, and bolts to ensure maximum damage, completely gutted the restaurant, which was full of lunchtime diners.
The terrorist was killed in the blast. His controller was on the list of wanted terrorists submitted by Israel to the Palestinians Authority this week. Hamas and the Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the attack.
The names of the victims:
- Giora Balash, 60, of Brazil
- Zvika Golombek, 26, of Carmiel
- Shoshana Yehudit Greenbaum, 31, of the U.S.
- Tehila Maoz, 18, of Jerusalem
- Frieda Mendelsohn, 62, of Jerusalem
- Michal Raziel, 16, of Jerusalem
- Malka Roth, 15, of Jerusalem
- Mordechai Schijveschuurder, 43, of Neria
- Tzira Schijveschuurder, 41, of Neria
- Ra'aya Schijveschuurder, 14, of Neria
- Avraham Yitzhak Schijveschuurder, 4, of Neria
- Hemda Schijveschuurder, 2, of Neria
- Lily Shimashvili, 33, of Jerusalem
- Tamara Shimashvili, 8, of Jerusalem
- Yocheved Shoshan, 10, of Jerusalem
- Chana Tova Chaya Nachenberg, of Modi'in, was 31 at the time of the attack. Severely injured, she was in a coma for almost 22 years and succumbed to her wounds on Thursday, 1 June 2023.
The Israeli response:
Foreign Minister Peres (August 9): "If the Palestinian Authority had acted with the necessary determination and carried out preventive detentions of Hamas terrorists and their operators, the murders today in Jerusalem would have been prevented."
In response to these terrorist attacks, Jerusalem police closed down the PLO's east Jerusalem Orient House headquarters and nine other Palestinian buildings, while the IDF has taken control of Palestinian military and political headquarters at Abu Dis just outside Jerusalem early Friday morning. The IDF also attacked the Palestinian Authority's West Bank police headquarters in Ramallah.
- IDF forces take control of Governor's House Compound in Abu Dis - Aug 10, 2001
- Israeli Measures in the Jerusalem Area in Response to Palestinian Terrorism - Legal Aspects - Aug 10, 2001
- Briefing following Israeli Cabinet Meeting - Aug 10, 2001
Reactions of world leaders:
US President George Bush:
"I deplore and strongly condemn the terrorist bombing in downtown Jerusalem today. My heartfelt sympathies and those of the American people are with the victims of this terrible tragedy and their families."
White House press release - August 9, 2001
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan
"UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan condemned today's terror attack by a suicide bomber in Jerusalem. He deplored all acts of terror and is deeply disturbed by the terrible loss of life."
UN Secretary-General press release - August 9, 2001
European Union
Belgian EU Presidency:
"The Presidency of the European Union unreservedly condemns the bombing of a Jerusalem shopping centre today, 9 August. It abhors this cowardly act which mainly claimed the lives of innocent civilians."
EU press release, August 9, 2001
Major terrorist attacks in Jerusalem since July 26:
In the past two weeks, there has been a Palestinian effort to concentrate terror attacks in Jerusalem, as follows:
- July 26: Small arms fire on from an ambush towards an Israeli vehicle close to Givat Ze'ev. An Israeli youth was killed and his father was wounded.
- July 27: A watermelon containing an explosive charge based on high explosives, standard and improvised, nails and a cellular detonating system was placed in a bus parked near the Malha shopping mall and was neutralized following a bus driver's alertness.
- July 29: Following intensive incitement regarding the Israeli intention to take over the Temple Mount, there were severe disturbances by Muslim worshippers on the Temple Mount, resulting in the injury of 15 policemen and some 20 Palestinians.
- July 29: A car bomb (containing 5 gas canisters, a hand grenade and nails with an alarm clock) exploded in the car park of an apartment building in Pisgat Ze'ev in Jerusalem. Two persons were lightly injured.
- July 30: A beer can containing high explosives, nails, and a digital watch was placed in the commercial center in the city center, probably by a member of Hamas from Nablus. There were no casualties.
- July 31 and August 4: Small arms fire towards Gilo nieghborhood, resulting in an injured woman and 14 damaged apartments. Carried out by Fatah operatives.
- August 1: Explosion of a pipe bomb in the King David Hotel car park - there were no casualties. The Hamas claimed responsibility
https://www.gov.il/en/pages/suicide-bombing-at-the-sbarro-pizzeria-in-jerusalem
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MIM: Below are 3 news media accounts of the 'suicide bombing exhibit' which was constructed at Al Najah University in Nablus.
A link to a short YouTube video entitled "Gruesome Exhibits In Student Show On Intifada' is directly below.
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=p851F38QDzM
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Palestinian University Features Exhibit Showing Suicide Bombing in Jerusalem
By Daniel del Castillo
SEPTEMBER 25, 2001
Palestinian students at al-Najah National University, in the West Bank city of Nablus, on Sunday inaugurated a controversial exhibition that includes a depiction of last month's suicide bombing of the Sbarro pizzeria in Jerusalem that killed 15 civilians.
The exhibition, which was staged by students supportive of Hamas, the militant Islamic movement that claimed credit for the attack, commemorates the first anniversary of the most recent intifada, the Palestinian revolt against Israeli rule.
Thousands of students have visited the exhibition, which is set up in the university's cafeteria and scheduled to run for a week.
Al-Najah, which was founded in 1918, has been the site of numerous clashes over the past year. Sixty of the university's 9,000 students reportedly remain in Israeli "administrative detention." The institution has become popular among supporters of militant Islam, and a number of suicide bombers have come from its student body.
As part of the exhibition, a Palestinian donning military fatigues and a black mask set off a mock explosion, mimicking the suicide bombing in the pizzeria on August 9, one of the deadliest terrorist acts in Israel since the resumption of the intifada.
Our message from this exhibition to our people is that the occupiers will suffer as long as we are under occupation," Ala Hamedan, one of the organizers, reportedly said. "To the Israeli people: If you leave the occupied territories, you will not suffer and you will not see blood anymore."
The exhibition also includes mannequins dressed like suicide bombers, replete with a Koran in one hand and an automatic weapon in the other -- reminiscent of poses that suicide bombers frequently assume in video recordings they leave behind as inspirational symbols of their acts.
Other themes in the exhibition include open graves with white coffins -- tributes to Hamas leaders slain by Israeli squads over the last year of the conflict. Near a mannequin dressed like an ultra-Orthodox Jew, a broadcast recording says, "O believer, there is a Jewish man behind me. Come and kill him."
Twenty-one Palestinians have blown themselves up in suicide bombings since the intifada began. More than 50 people have been killed by these acts and hundreds wounded. The radical Islamic movements Hamas and Islamic Jihad have carried out the majority of the attacks.
"This exhibition shows the reality we live in. Suicide bombings here, killings there," said Ghadir Haddad, a 19-year-old economics student. "I'm very happy because as they kill and torture us, they are also killed and tortured."
Israeli officials could not be reached to comment on the exhibit.
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An Exhibit On Campus Celebrates Grisly Deed
By Ian Fisher
- Sept. 26, 2001
The students did as they were told and today tried to tone down, to the extent such a thing is possible, an exhibit here that celebrates a suicide bombing.
The exhibit at Al Najah University, the largest in the West Bank, has outraged Israelis since it opened on Sunday. The most contentious section is a mock-up of the Sbarro restaurant in Jerusalem where 15 people were killed in a suicide attack in August including not only gnawed pizza crusts but bloody plastic body parts suspended from the ceiling as if they were blasting through the air.
Created by a student faction of Hamas, the radical Islamic group that claimed responsibility for the Sbarro attack, the exhibit by definition portrays an extreme view. It marks the one year anniversary of the so-called second intifada, when Palestinians declared the peace talks dead and renewed fighting. Israelis contend that it was Yasir Arafat, the Palestinian leader, who walked away from the peace deal brokered last year by President Clinton.
Worried about a backlash at a time when much of the world is shocked by suicide bombings, Mr. Arafat issued a statement today that he was ''gravely disturbed and offended by the images in the exhibit,'' and that he ordered it closed. It had been scheduled to close at the end of the day on Tuesday.
But this afternoon it was still open, if altered: on orders, the students cut down a plastic hand dangling from the ceiling. But they managed only partly to obscure a fake severed leg, encased in jeans and a bloody black sneaker. The heel still poked out from behind a curtain.
Aside from anger, some Israelis noted that the exhibit shows how many strands of mutual empathy have been cut, as the warring sides here mark the first anniversary, this Thursday, of renewed fighting between Palestinians and Israeli soldiers.
''The superficial conclusion will be that they are something else, that they are not human beings,'' said Benny Elon, a right-wing member of Israeli Parliament. ''This is not the truth. They are intelligent students, up to date, but with another mentality, another way of thinking. They are really proud of the exhibit.''
Mr. Elon said specifically the exhibit is one more example of how Muslims have declared cultural war on the West, in the same way of the plotters who carried out the attacks two weeks ago that toppled the World Trade Center, damaged the Pentagon and killed more than 6,000 people.
Many Palestinians argue that, unlike Osama bin Laden, their fight is not with West, but with Israel.
Students confirmed Mr. Elon's view that the two sides here do not view things the same way: where Israelis see attacks like the one on Sbarro as simple terrorism, many Palestinians see them as acts of resistance in renewed fighting that has taken more than 800 lives in the last year, three quarters of them Palestinians. ''I would hope to see more than that,'' Amani Ewagan, a 20-year-old architecture student, meaning that a few Israeli body parts in an exhibit were not enough. ''As Palestinian, I hope to see more Israelis killed by more Palestinians.''
Her friend, Amani Aquad, a administration student, added: ''The Israelis have no compassion for us. Why should I feel sympathy for them?''
Much of the exhibit is devoted to the dead on the Palestinian side: rows of gory photographs show Palestinians hit by bullets or shells, and there is no shortage of body parts there either: there are parts of brains, a headless torso, a severed hand. There are also photographs of several children killed in the last year.
But the part that has received the most attention is the Sbarro restaurant, which also serves as the exhibit's entrance. The doormat is composed of two flags, one Israeli and one American. Above it hangs the green and red Sbarro sign.
Inside are toppled stools, pizza crusts, police tape, broken glass, as well as photographs of the actual scene of carnage and of the young Palestinian, Izzeden Masri, who carried into the restaurant some 20 pounds of explosive reportedly hidden in a guitar.
Ala'a Hmeidan, 25, the student activist who headed up the exhibit, said he understood the anger that the Sbarro exhibit generated.
''This section represents resistance,'' he said. ''The problem is with this kind of resistance, it is addressed against civilians. This creates a negative reaction from the world. But where was the world when Israel was killing Palestinian children?''
One student, Mohamed Mahamud, 23, said he wondered too if now was the moment for celebrating what happened in the Sbarro.
''It is not a good time to exhibit these things,'' he said. ''We must look for peace, not look for war.''
https://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/26/world/an-exhibit-on-campus-celebrates-grisly-deed.html
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Arafat closes 'suicide bombing' art show
Wednesday 26, September 2001
The three-day exhibition closed a day early
Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat has closed down an art exhibit which featured a recreation of the scene of a suicide bombing.
The exhibition, at An-Najah University in the West Bank town of Nablus, was organised to mark the first anniversary of the Palestinian intifada.
A security official confirmed that Mr Arafat ordered the early closure of the show which featured a recreation of last month's attack on a Jerusalem pizzeria.
"The president was gravely disturbed and offended by the images in the exhibit," the official said.
The display divided those who saw it |
The room-sized installation had broken tables splattered with fake blood and body parts.
A university branch of the militant Palestinian group Hamas built the exhibit, which recreates the scene of last month's attack on Sbarro Pizza house in Jerusalem.
A suicide bomber - Ezzaldin Almasri - blew himself and 15 other people up during a busy lunchtime at the restaurant.
The installation included a portrait of the bomber holding a koran and a rifle.
Underneath, in a reference to the military wing of Hamas - Ezzedine al-Qassam Brigades - the artist had written: "Qassami Pizza is more delicious."
Outside the exhibition, which opened on Sunday, a mural also depicted the Sbarro bombing.
Arab-Israeli relations in Nablus are tense |
A spokesman for Mr Arafat said the leader had instructed the authorities concerned "to investigate the matter and reprimand those responsible".
The Simon Wiesenthal Center, a Holocaust memorial institution, had asked the US Government to protest to Arafat about the exhibition.
The director of the centre, Rabbi Marvin Hier, said the university, which is under Arafat's control "pays homage to suicide bombers".
But some of those who visited the exhibition supported the display.
'Hit back'
"We don't like blood, but this a way to retaliate against the massacres committed by Israel, " said Alas Hmeidan, head of Islamist students at the university.
We want to show them we can hit back."
But during a speech in Washington on Monday, former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu showed pictures of the restaurant exhibit.
He said that Mr Arafat is not stopping terror attacks against Israel.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/entertainment/1564188.stm
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