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Militant Islam Monitor > Articles > Terrorist attacks up by 40% - US government chart with statistics and briefing on Release of 2006 Country Reports on Terrorism

Terrorist attacks up by 40% - US government chart with statistics and briefing on Release of 2006 Country Reports on Terrorism

April 30, 2007


Country Reports on Terrorism -Report Home Page
Released by the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
April 30, 2007

National Counterterrorism Center: Annex of Statistical Information

April 13, 2007


Consistent with its statutory mission to serve as the U.S. Government's knowledge bank on international terrorism, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is providing the Department of State with required statistical information to assist in the satisfaction of its reporting requirements under Section 2656f of title 22 of the U.S. Code. The statistical information included in this Annex to the 2006 Country Reports on Terrorism is drawn from the data NCTC maintains on the www.nctc.gov website.

Section 2656f(b) of Title 22 of the U.S. Code requires the State Department to include in its annual report on terrorism "to the extent practicable, complete statistical information on the number of individuals, including United States citizens and dual nationals, killed, injured, or kidnapped by each terrorist group during the preceding calendar year." While NCTC keeps statistics on the annual number of incidents of "terrorism," its ability to track the specific groups responsible for each incident involving killings, kidnappings, and injuries is significantly limited by the availability of reliable open source information, particularly for events involving small numbers of casualties. Moreover, specific details about victims, damage, perpetrators, and other incident elements are frequently not fully reported in open source information.

  • The statistical material in this report, therefore, is drawn from the incidents of "terrorism" that occurred in 2006 as reported in open sources information, which is the most comprehensive body of information available to NCTC for compiling data that it can provide to satisfy the above-referenced statistical requirements.

In deriving its figures for incidents of terrorism, NCTC in 2005 adopted the definition of "terrorism" that appears in the 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2), i.e., "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents."

  • Through 2004 NCTC compiled statistical data on the basis of a more limited methodology tied to the definition of "international terrorism," which is also contained in 22 U.S.C. § 2656f.
  • Because of the change in methodology, 2006 data is only comparable to 2005 data compiled by NCTC, the highlights of which are contained in the 2005 Country Reports on Terrorism.
  • Subject to changes in reporting statutes, NCTC anticipates that future statistics provided by it will continue to be tied to the broader definition of "terrorism."

To record and update incident records NCTC has continued to post information in the repository for the U.S. Government's database on terrorist incidents, the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) that was unveiled in 2005. A data management system with a more comprehensive dataset than those used in previous years, WITS is accessible on the NCTC website at www.nctc.gov for the public to have an open and transparent view of the NCTC data. NCTC will insure that the data posted to the website is updated as often as necessary by regularly posting information about new or prior incidents.

Considerations for Interpreting the Data

NCTC cautions against placing too much emphasis on any single set of incident data to gauge success or failure against the forces of terrorism. Furthermore, NCTC does not believe that a simple comparison of the total number of incidents from year to year provides a meaningful measure.

  • Tallying incident data necessarily involves relying exclusively on frequently incomplete and ambiguous information-information for these statistics is not derived from federal government collection programs created or operated specifically to obtain incidents data. The quality, accuracy, and volume of incident open source reporting can vary greatly from country to country. As a result, determining whether an incident meets the NCTC criteria for a terrorist incident is often difficult and highly subjective. This is particularly true if the incident does not involve mass casualties because little information is typically available on these incidents that usually are not subject to heavy media coverage. Furthermore, in the parts of the world where there is little press coverage and little non-governmental organization presence, terrorist incidents go unreported.
  • Incident tallies exclusively do not provide a complete picture of the magnitude or seriousness of the terrorism challenge confronting a country or region. For example, that 50 percent of the incidents in the NCTC database involve no loss of life would be only one factor for assessing the danger of terrorism globally. Moreover, different factors weigh more heavily than others in assessing the dangers posed by terrorism. For example, an attack that kills 100 civilians is likely to be considered more alarming than an attack that damages a pipeline but harms no one; however, each attack is simply tallied as one incident.
  • Counting protocols matter and inevitably require judgment calls that may have an impact on results. For example, NCTC protocols dictate that events identified as simultaneous and coordinated would be recorded as one incident, as would be attacks that subsequently targeted first-responders. For instance, on the morning of August 17, 2005, there were approximately 450 small bomb attacks in Bangladesh, and because they were coordinated according to a central plan, NCTC counted them as a single incident. Other valid counting protocols would register these attacks as 450 separate attacks.
  • Analyzing incident data from year-to-year to identify trends and notable deviations in the data is problematic, and not meaningful in most cases. The availability, quality, and depth of open source reporting vary making it hard to isolate whether a rise or fall of a particular data element from one year to the next is due to an increase or decrease of this open source reporting or whether actual events are behind the change in the data.

Despite these limitations, tracking and analyzing incidents can help us understand some important characteristics about terrorism, including the geographic distribution of incidents and information about the perpetrators, their victims, and other details about an attack. Year-to-year changes in the gross number of incidents across the globe, however, may tell us little about the international community's effectiveness either for preventing these incidents, or for reducing the capacity of terrorists to advance their agenda through violence against the innocent.

Methodology Utilized to Compile NCTC's Database of Terrorist Incidents

For compiling 2005 results, NCTC, working with a panel of terrorism experts, adopted a revised methodology for counting terrorist incidents, basing it on the broader statutory definition of "terrorism" rather than that of "international terrorism,"1 on which the NCTC based its incident counting in previous years. For 2006, we continued using this broader definition of "terrorism" and overall this broader definition and improvements in cataloging have resulted in a larger, more comprehensive set of incident data, all of which can now be found on NCTC's website, www.nctc.gov.

The data provided on the website is based on the statutory definition set forth in the Developing Statistical Information section to this Annex. Accordingly, the incidents NCTC has catalogued in the database are those that, based on available open source information, meet the criteria for "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents." Determination of what constitutes an incident of terrorism, however, is sometimes based on incomplete information and may be open to interpretation. The perpetrator's specific motivation, whether political or otherwise, is not always clear, nor is the perpetrator's identity always evident. Moreover, additional information may become available over time, affecting the accuracy of initial judgments about incidents. Users of this database should therefore recognize that expert opinions may differ on whether a particular incident constitutes terrorism or some other form of political violence.

NCTC has made every effort to limit the degree of subjectivity involved in the judgments. In the interests of transparency NCTC has adopted counting rules that require that terrorists must have initiated and executed the attack for it to be included in the database; foiled attacks, as well as hoaxes, are not included in the database. Spontaneous (i.e. non-premeditated) hate crimes without intent to cause mass casualties are excluded to the greatest extent practicable.

What is a "noncombatant"?

Under the statutory definition of terrorism that NCTC uses to compile its database, the victim must be a "noncombatant." However, that term is left open to interpretation by the statute. For the purposes of the WITS database, the term "combatant" was interpreted to mean military, paramilitary, militia, and police under military command and control, in specific areas or regions where war zones or war-like settings exist. Further distinctions were drawn depending on the particular country involved and the role played by the military and police, e.g., where national security forces are indistinguishable from police and/or military forces. Noncombatants therefore included civilians and civilian police and military assets outside of war zones and war-like settings. Diplomatic assets, including personnel, embassies, consulates, and other facilities, were also considered noncombatant targets.

Although only acts of violence against noncombatant targets were counted as terrorism incidents for purposes of the WITS database, if those incidents also resulted in the death of combatant victims, all victims (combatant and noncombatant) were tallied. In an incident where combatants were the target of the event, non-combatants who were incidentally harmed were designated "collateral" and the incident excluded from the posted data set. For example, if terrorists attacked a military base in Iraq and wounded one civilian bystander, that victim would be deemed collateral, and the incident would not be counted.

In the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, it is particularly difficult to gather comprehensive information about all incidents and to distinguish terrorism from the numerous other forms of violence, including crime and sectarian violence, in light of imperfect information. The distinction between terrorism and insurgency in Iraq is especially challenging, as Iraqis participate in the al-Qaida in Iraq and other terrorists network as well as in tribal and sectarian violence. Therefore, some combatants may be included as victims in some incidents when their presence was incidental to an attack intended for noncombatants. We note, however, that because of the difficulty in gathering data on Iraq and Afghanistan, the dataset does not provide a comprehensive account of all incidents of terrorism in these two countries.

What is "politically motivated violence"?

The statutory definition also requires the attack to be "politically motivated." NCTC has adopted a series of counting rules to assist in the data compilation. Any life threatening attack or kidnapping by any "Foreign Terrorist Organization" or group appearing on the list of "Other Organizations of Concern" is deemed politically motivated. Similarly, any serious attack by any organization or individual against a Government/Diplomatic official or a Government/Diplomatic building is deemed politically motivated and is therefore considered terrorism. On the other hand, any attack that is primarily criminal or economic in nature or is an instance of mob violence is considered not to be "politically motivated." Similarly, any terrorist organization actions that are primarily intended to enable future terrorist attacks (robbing a bank or selling narcotics for the purpose of raising money, for example) are not considered terrorism.

In between these relatively clear-cut cases, there is a degree of subjectivity. In general, NCTC counting rules consider that attacks by unknown perpetrators against either unknown victims or infrastructure are not demonstrably political and therefore are not terrorism. However, there are exceptions to this general rule: if such an attack occurs in areas in which there is significant insurgency, unrest, or political instability, the attack may be considered terrorism; or if the attack occurs in a region free of such political violence, but involves something more than a shooting (for instance, improvised explosive device, beheading, etc.), the attack may, depending on the circumstances, be considered terrorism. Finally, if low level attacks against noncombatant targets begin to suggest the existence of a chronic problem, the attacks may be considered terrorism.

Incidents of Terrorism Worldwide2



Incidents of terrorism worldwide



Incidents resulting in death, injury, or kidnapping of at least one individual



Incidents resulting in death of at least one individual



--Incidents resulting in the death of zero individuals



--Incidents resulting in the death of only one individual



--Incidents resulting in the death of at least 10 individuals



Incidents resulting in the injury of at least one individual



Incidents resulting in the kidnapping of at least one individual



Individuals worldwide killed, injured or kidnapped as a result of incidents of terrorism



--Individuals worldwide killed as a result of incidents of terrorism



--Individuals worldwide injured as a result of incidents of terrorism



--Individuals worldwide kidnapped as a result of incidents of terrorism



Incidents of Terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan2



Incidents of terrorism in Iraq



Incidents in Iraq resulting in death, injury, or kidnapping of at least one individual



Individuals in Iraq killed, injured, or kidnapped as a result of incidents of terrorism



Incidents of terrorism in Afghanistan



Incidents in Afghanistan resulting in death, injury, or kidnapping of at least one individual



Individuals in Afghanistan killed, injured, or kidnapped as a result of incidents of terrorism



NCTC Observations Related to Terrorist Incidents Statistical Material

Approximately 14,000 terrorist attacks occurred in various countries during 2006, resulting in over 20,000 deaths. Compared to 2005, attacks rose by 3,000, a 25 percent increase in 2006 while deaths rose by 5,800, a 40 percent increase. As was the case last year, by far the largest number of reported terrorist incidents and deaths occurred in the Near East and South Asia. These two regions also were the locations for 90 percent of all the 290 high casualty attacks that killed 10 or more people-only a total of five high casualty attacks occurred in Europe-Eurasia, East Asia-Pacific, and the Western Hemisphere.

  • Of the 14,000 reported attacks, 45 percent-about 6600-of them occurred in Iraq where approximately 13,000 fatalities-65 percent of the worldwide total-were reported for 2006.
  • Violence against non-combatants in eastern and sub-Saharan Africa, particularly related to attacks associated with turmoil in or near Sudan and Nigeria, rose 65 percent in 2006, rising to 420 from the approximately 253 attacks reported for 2005.
  • The 749 attacks in Afghanistan during 2006 are over 50 percent more than the 491 attacks reported for 2005 as fighting intensified during the past year.
  • The number of reported incidents in 2006 fell for Europe and Eurasia by 15 percent from 2005, for South Asia by 10 percent, and for the Western Hemisphere by 5 percent. No high casualty attacks occurred in Western Europe, and only two occurred in Southeast Asia, in the southern Philippines. There were no high casualty attacks and 95 percent fewer victims of terror in 2006 in Indonesia that was attributable, at least in part, to enhanced Indonesian security measures.

The number injured during terrorist incidents rose substantially in 2006, as compared with 2005, by 54 percent, with most of the rise stemming from a doubling of the reported number of injuries in Iraq since 2005. Although kidnappings in Iraq during 2006 rose sharply by 300 percent, kidnappings overall declined by more than 50 percent in 2006 due to a large drop of approximately 22,000 kidnappings in Nepal where peace discussions during the year apparently curtailed hostage taking.


The perpetrators of over 9,000 terrorist attacks in 2006 could not be determined from open source information. Of the remaining incidents, as many as 290 various subnational groups-many of them well-known foreign terrorist organizations-or clandestine agents were connected to an attack in various ways, including as a claimant, as the accused, and as the confirmed perpetrator. In most instances, open source reporting contains little confirmed or corroborating information that identifies the organizations or individuals responsible for a terrorist attack. In many reports, attackers are alleged to be tied to local or well-known terrorist groups but there is little subsequent reporting that verifies these connections. Moreover, pinpointing attackers becomes even more difficult as extremist groups splinter or merge with others, make false claims, or deny allegations.

  • According to open source reports, Sunni extremists, more than any other subnational group, claimed they conducted the largest number of incidents with the highest casualty totals.
  • Sunni extremists in various countries carried out about the same number of high fatality attacks in 2006 but with deadlier results, and were involved in more kidnappings than these extremists reportedly carried out in 2005.

Although no terrorist attack occurred last year that approached the sophistication of planning and preparations that were characteristic of the 9/11 attacks, open source reporting alleges that al-Qaida leaders played an important role in steering the airline hijacking plot in the United Kingdom that was disrupted in August. Reporting points to a steadfast al-Qaida that is planning attacks in northwest Pakistan, and was able to expand its propaganda campaign in 2006 to invigorate supporters, win converts, and gain recruits while its al-Qaida in Iraq associates and other linked groups carried out several successful attacks.

  • Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula conducted the first-ever terrorist attack against a Saudi Arabia oil facility at the major oil processing plant at Abqaiq on 24 February 2006. Security forces, suffering a few casualties, prevented the attackers from damaging processing capabilities.
  • According to open sources, al-Qaida senior leadership approved the merger with the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which conducted its first attack against a US target at La Trappe, Algeria on 10 December. The GSPC remotely detonated a bomb that struck a bus and wounded one of the US passengers who worked for a US company, and subsequently the attackers used small arms to fire bullets at the bus, killing or wounding 9 non-US civilians.

Types of Attacks

As was the case in 2005, in 2006 most attacks were perpetrated by terrorists applying conventional fighting methods that included using bombs and weapons, such as small arms. However, technology continues to empower terrorist and effective methods of attack continue to be developed by them to offset countermeasures. Terrorists continued their practice of coordinated attacks that included secondary attacks on first responders at attack sites, and they uniquely configured weapons and other materials to create improvised explosive devices.

  • While bombing incidents increased by 30 percent from those in 2005, the death tolls in these incidents during 2006 rose by 39 percent and injuries by 45 percent. The use of suicide bombing attacks overall fell 12 percent, most notably in the use of suicide car bombers. However, suicide bombers operating outside of vehicles increased by 25 percent, and the ability of these attackers to penetrate large concentrations of people and then detonate their explosives probably accounted for the increase in lethality of bombings in 2006.
  • A new CBRN terrorist attack method in Iraq emerged in 2006. According to an Iraqi Interior Ministry explosive expert, a large vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) attack that included chemicals in Sadr City on 23 November signaled a dangerous strategic shift in tactics for 2007 that features the use of chemical weapons.

Victims and Targets of Attacks

As was the case in 2005, Muslims again bore a substantial share of being the victims of terrorist attacks in 2006.

  • Approximately 58,000 individuals worldwide were either killed or injured by terrorist attacks in 2006. Based upon a combination of reporting and demographic analysis of the countries involved, well over 50 percent of the victims were Muslims, and most were victims of attacks in Iraq.

Open source reporting identifies approximately 70 percent of the 58,000 killed or injured victims of terror as simply civilians, and therefore actual tallies of significant types of victims cannot be specifically determined. However, the reporting does yield some insights about the demographics of these victims.

  • Government officials such as leaders, police, department personnel, paramilitary personnel such as guards, were reported 20 percent more often, rising from approximately 9,500 in 2005 to just over 11,200 in 2006. More specifically, police victims were reported more often, their total rising more than 20 percent, from over 6,500 in 2005 to over 8,200 in 2006.
  • More killings of educators were reported in 2006; 148 deaths were highlighted in 2006 reporting as compared to 96 last year. Reporting of student victims increased over 320 percent to over 430 either killed or injured in attacks, and reports of teachers as victims also increased by over 45 percent reaching 214 either killed or injured in attacks.
  • Children were also reported more often as victims in 2006, up by more than 80 percent, with over 1,800 children either killed or injured in terrorist attacks.
  • More attacks involving journalists were reported, an increased of 5 percent, yet in those attacks more journalist deaths and injuries were reported in 2006, an increase of 20 percent.

In addition to the human toll, 19,500 facilities were struck or were the target during terrorist attacks last year. For both 2005 and 2006, the most common types of properties damaged or destroyed during an incident were vehicles and residences, which were hit in about 27 and 12 percent of the incidents in each year, respectively. The percentage of incidents that included other types of property damage or destruction, such as those associated with energy, transportation, education, government, and other enterprises, remain unchanged at single digit levels with a few notable exceptions.

  • Approximately 350 Mosques were targeted or struck during an attack in 2006, in most cases by Islamic extremists, representing over a three-fold increase from 2005. The attack against the Shia Golden Dome Mosque in Iraq, attributed to al-Qaida in Iraq, triggered a watershed of escalating sectarian violence in Iraq.
  • Fewer incidents involved civil aircraft and airports, resulting in less damage to either one in 2006.
  • Electoral polling stations saw over an 80 percent drop in attacks by terrorists in 2006.

An Academic's Perspective of Statistical Data

"In this short note, which was invited by NCTC, I highlight some of the challenges encountered in producing credible data on terrorist incidents. The WITS database strikes me as a particularly useful resource to use to evaluate trends in terrorist activity, to infer patterns in terrorists' methods in order to take the best possible precautions, and to test hypotheses concerning the causes of terrorism. With these applications in mind, there are three areas in which the WITS data deserve particular attention: Definition, measurement and significance. The definition is missing two important pieces, whether or not an attack is international or domestic, and political violence ‘usually intended to influence an audience.' Measurement of the error rate in the WITS data is important to understand. Statistical techniques used by other government statistical agencies could be adopted to measure the rate of error, comprehensiveness, and consistency of the WITS data. These measures will facilitate use of the WITS data by researchers and highlight areas where the data are weak. Providing measures of significance of events (e.g., a terrorist Richter scale running from 1 to 5) and coder confidence would be particularly useful. The collection and provision of data like the WITS is a quintessential public good, and NCTC is the most appropriate government agency to collect such data."

Alan B. Krueger
Princeton University
April 11, 2007

The full letter of Dr. Krueger is available in the 2006 NCTC Report on Terrorist Incidents, available via the Internet at www.nctc.gov.

Terrorism Deaths, Injuries, Kidnappings of Private U.S. Citizens, 20063

Provided by the Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State

The term "Private U.S. Citizen" refers to any U.S. citizen not acting in an official capacity on behalf of the U.S. Government; therefore these figures do not include, for example, U.S. military personnel killed or injured in a terrorism-related incident while on active duty or employees of the Department of State and other federal agencies. Members of U.S. Government employees' households are considered private U.S. citizens.

Although every effort was made to include all terrorism-related deaths and injuries involving private U.S. citizens, the figures below reflect only those cases reported to, or known by, the U.S. Department of State, and may not reflect actual numbers of injured, which may not always be reported depending on their severity. As NCTC also notes, in the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, it is particularly difficult to gather comprehensive information about all incidents and to distinguish terrorism from the numerous other forms of violence.

U.S. citizens worldwide killed as a result of incidents of terrorism: 28
U.S. citizens worldwide injured as a result of incidents of terrorism: 27
U.S. citizens worldwide kidnapped as a result of incidents of terrorism: 12



Date of Death




May 18, 2006


Islam Qal, Herat, Afghanistan

December 6, 2006


Kandahar, Afghanistan


January 6, 2006


Nasiriyah, Iraq

January 16, 2006


Baghdad, Iraq

January 18, 2006


Basrah, Iraq

February 11, 2006


Baghdad, Iraq

March 9, 2006


Baghdad, Iraq

March 14, 2006


Tal Afar, Iraq

March 20, 2006


Baghdad, Iraq

May 3, 2006


Tallil, Iraq

May 7, 2006


Balad-Tahwilla, Iraq

May 8, 2006


Near Rustamiyah, Iraq

August 17, 2006


North of Tallil, Iraq

August 18, 2006


Baghdad, Iraq

August 28, 2006


Baji, Iraq

September 17, 2006


Hawijah, Iraq

September 22, 2006


Basrah, Iraq

October 4, 2006


Baghdad, Iraq

October 11, 2006


Tikrit, Iraq

October 22, 2006


Baghdad, Iraq

November 2, 2006


Baghdad, Iraq

November 13, 2006


Baghdad, Iraq

December 21, 2006


Baghdad, Iraq

Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank

May 14, 2006


Tel Aviv, Israel


March 2, 2006


Karachi, Pakistan


September 16, 2006


Hat Yai, Thailand



Date of Death




April 7, 2006


Lashkargar Province, Afghanistan

May 18, 2006


Islam Qal, Herat, Afghanistan


December 10, 2006


Algiers, Algeria


April 24, 2006


Dahab, Sinai, Egypt


July 11, 2006


Srinagar, India

August 16, 2006


Imphal, India


January 18, 2006


Basrah, Iraq

January 29, 2006


Taji, Iraq

May 18, 2006


Herat, Iraq

May 29, 2006


Baghdad, Iraq

October 24, 2006


Keokuk, Iraq

December 21, 2006


Baghdad, Iraq

Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank

April 17, 2006


Tel Aviv, Israel

October 11, 2006


Nobles, the West Bank


January 11, 2006


Moscow, Russia


September 16, 2006


Hat Yai, Thailand



Date of Death




March 30, 2006*


Near Gresham, Afghanistan


March 30, 2006*


Baghdad, Iraq

July 9, 2006*


Baghdad, Iraq

August 5, 2006*


Baghdad, Iraq

November 16, 2006


Aswan, Iraq

Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank

June 10, 2006*


Nobles, the West Bank

August 27, 2006*


Gaza City, Gaza


January 30, 2006*


Offshore the Niger Delta, Nigeria

August 23, 2006*


Port Harcourt, Nigeria

*Date rescued/released.

1 Users who wish to determine the number of incidents of "international terrorism" (i.e., incidents that involve the territory or citizens of two or more countries) will find these incidents included in the WITS database.
2 In all cases limited to incidents targeting noncombatants. The 2005 numbers were updated since last year's publication. Updates are available on the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System at <www.nctc.gov>.
3 In all cases limited to incidents targeting noncombatants.

Country Reports on Terrorism 2006 (html format)


U.S. law requires the Secretary of State to provide Congress, by April 30 of each year, a full and complete report on terrorism with regard to those countries and groups meeting criteria set forth in the legislation. This annual report is entitled Country Reports on Terrorism. Beginning with the report for 2004, it replaced the previously published Patterns of Global Terrorism.

Background Information: Country Reports on Terrorism and Patterns of Global Terrorism

-- Table of Contents
-- Chapter 1 -- Strategic Assessment
-- Chapter 2 -- Country Reports: Africa Overview
-- Chapter 2 -- Country Reports: East Asia and Pacific Overview
-- Chapter 2 -- Country Reports: Europe and Eurasia Overview
-- Chapter 2 -- Country Reports: Middle East and North Africa Overview
-- Chapter 2 -- Country Reports: South and Central Asia Overview
-- Chapter 2 -- Country Reports: Western Hemisphere Overview
-- Chapter 3 -- State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview
-- Chapter 4 -- The Global Challenge of WMD Terrorism
-- Chapter 5 -- Terrorist Safe Havens (7120 Report)
-- Chapter 6 -- Terrorist Organizations
-- Chapter 7 -- Legislative Requirements and Key Terms
-- National Counterterrorism Center: Annex of Statistical Information
-- International Conventions and Protocols on Terrorism



Terror attacks increase, says US

The number of people killed around the world in terror attacks rose by 40% last year to more than 20,000, the US State Department has said.

The increase is mostly due to greater violence in Iraq the State Department's annual report on terrorism says.

Iran is listed as the world's biggest state sponsor of terrorism, supporting extremist groups throughout the Middle East but particularly in Iraq.

Venezuela is criticised for allowing Colombian rebels to use its territory.

The number of attacks in Iraq nearly doubled to 6,630, accounting for 45% of the global total.

Iraq alone accounts for nearly two-thirds of all terrorism-related deaths last year.

The numbers do not include attacks on US or other coalition troops in the country.

'Destabilising role'

In the latest violence, a suicide bomber wearing a vest packed with explosives killed 32 people and himself at a Shia funeral in Khalis, north of Baghdad in Diyala province.

GLOBAL TERROR REPORT 2006 40% increase in deaths to 20,498 28% increase in attacks to 14,338 Iraq: 65% of all deaths 700 children killed, 1,100 wounded Source: US State Department

Iran is playing a "destabilising role" in Iraq, supporting Shia militias that have attacked Sunnis, as well as US and British forces, the report says.

The report also points to "militias and death squads increasingly engaged in sectarian violence and criminal organisations taking advantage of Iraq's deteriorating security situation."

The number of attacks also took a large jump in Afghanistan.

Syria is named as the number two state supporter of terrorism, followed by Cuba, North Korea and Sudan.

Children were increasingly the victims of terror attacks last year. As many as 700 children were killed and 1,100 wounded - an increase of 80%.

The report, put together by the US National Counterterrorism Center says that al-Qaeda is adapting to counter-terror measures.

"Although we have killed or captured numerous senior al-Qaeda operatives," said the NCTC's director Frank Urbancic, "al-Qaeda's core elements are resilient and they remain the immediate national security threat."

The report also repeated allegations from previous years that the Venezuelan government allows the Colombian left-wing rebel groups Farc and ELN to use its territory as a safe haven.


Briefing on Release of 2006 Country Reports on Terrorism


Frank C. Urbancic, Acting Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism; Russ Travers, Deputy Director of the National Counterterrorism Center

Washington, DC
April 30, 2007

(4:15 p.m. EST)

MR. CASEY: Well, good afternoon, everyone. I congratulate you on -- those of you who are now attending your third or fourth briefing of the day, if you include the gaggle from this morning. We wanted to have this opportunity to have two of our officials talk with you today and talk to you in a little more detail about the Country Reports on Terrorism that most of you, I see, have in front of you. We've got some additional information here from NCTC to share with you as well.

Once again, we'll have with us this afternoon our Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism Mr. Frank Urbancic as well as, in a repeat performance from years past, Russ Travers, who as I think you all know is one of the Deputy Directors over at NCTC.

So, Frank, let me turn the podium over to you and Russ.

MR. URBANCIC: Thanks very much. Thanks. I do have a couple of opening remarks to introduce the report. I'll go through them, and then of course we'll be happy to take your questions after -- Russ has got a few points to make as well.

Besides meeting the congressional requirements, the 2006 Report aims to inform, to stimulate constructive debate and to enhance our collective dynamic understanding of the global terrorist threat. It should serve as a reference tool to inform policy makers, the American public and our international partners about our efforts, progress and challenges in the war on terrorism.

As background and introduction, I would note that the Country Reports of 2006 begin with a strategic assessment to illustrate trends and to gage our progress. We are very pleased to note that cooperative international efforts have produced genuine security improvements, particularly in securing borders and transportation, in enhancing document security, in disrupting terrorist financing and in restricting the movement of terrorists.

Working with allies and partners across the world through coordination and information sharing, we have created a less permissive operating environment for terrorists, keeping leaders on the move or hiding. We've degraded their ability to plan and mount attacks. This has contributed to reduced terrorist operational capabilities and detention or deaths of numerous key terrorist leaders.

It's also important to note our shared successes, not to take credit for them but to demonstrate results. The longer we fight terrorism, the better we get at inflicting serious setbacks on our adversaries. Despite this undeniable progress, serious challenges do remain. There's no question about that. The number of incidents increased overall, largely due to terrorist attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan. The perpetrators of these terrorist acts do not represent nation-states and they have no authority, neither do they have any desire, to sign any sort of peace accord with us. As we've said before, this is not the kind of war where you can measure success with conventional numbers. We cannot aspire to a single decisive battle that will break the enemy's back, nor for a hoped -- nor can we hope for a signed peace accord to mark victory.

The Report also underscores the barbaric nature that the extremists we are fighting pose for us. The vast majority of the victims were innocent civilians and a majority of them were Muslims. Attacks on children were up more than 80 percent, if you can imagine, with more than 1,800 children killed or injured in terrorist attacks in last -- in 2006. The terrorists also targeted workers essential to civilized society. They targeted police. They targeted government leaders. They targeted teachers. They targeted journalists. The international community is working together to confront these extremists because they threaten the right of people everywhere to live in peaceful, just, secure neighborhoods and countries.

On al-Qaida, although we have captured or killed numerous senior al-Qaida operatives, al-Qaida's core elements are resilient and they remain the most immediate national security threat to the United States. They are a significant security challenge to the entire international community as well and they are so recognized. Al-Qaida is highly adaptive. It quickly evolves new methods in response to our countermeasures, and we have to develop countermeasures to those countermeasures.

The international community's success in disrupting terrorist leadership and operational capacity has led al-Qaida to focus greater efforts on misinformation and anti-Western propaganda. What they can't get by force, they want to take by lies. This trend accelerated in 2006 with al-Qaida exploiting the grievances of local groups and attempting to portray itself at the vanguard of a global movement. Al-Qaida openly describes itself as a transnational guerilla movement; it applies classic insurgent strategies at the global level. Through intermediaries, web-based propaganda and subversion of immigrant expatriate populations; al-Qaida inspires local cells to carry on attacks, thus circumventing the need to insert a team across borders or clandestinely to transfer funds and materiel. The 2004 Madrid bombings, the London attacks of 2005 and the thwarted August 2006 attempt to attack passenger jets operating from British airports included elements of this approach.

We have in the Report a section on state sponsors of terrorism. Much of this will not be of surprise to you, unfortunately. Al-Qaida is not the only challenge. Certain states continue to sponsor terrorism and Iran remains at the head of that list. Iran continues to threaten its neighbors. It continues to destabilize Iraq by providing weapons, training, advice and funding to select Iraqi militants. And as the President has said, some of the most powerful improvised explosive devices, IEDs that we are seeing now in Iraq today, include components that came from Iran.

Iran has also expanded its lethal assistance and funding for militant organizations, most notably Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas. And these all oppose reinvigorated Arab-Israeli peace efforts.

Iranian defiance of UN Security Council resolutions by providing weapons and assistance to Hezbollah demonstrates that Tehran continues to be the most dangerous enabler of terrorism in that region.

In addition, Syria, both directly and in coordination with Hezbollah, has attempted to undermine the democratically elected Government of Lebanon and to roll back progress toward democratization in the Middle East as a whole. Foreign fighters and terrorists continue to transit Syria's borders into Iraq. Syria also continues to provide political and material support to Hezbollah and political support to Palestinian terrorist groups, including the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas, who base their external leadership in Damascus.

Finally, state sponsors of terrorism pose a potentially grave weapons of mass destruction threat. A WMD program in the hands of a state sponsor of terrorism could easily enable a terrorist organization to acquire sophisticated WMD. Thus, state sponsors of terrorism deserve special attention and they are getting it as potential facilitators of WMD terrorism.

This year's Report also includes a discussion of terrorist safe havens. Safe havens allow terrorists to organize and operate with relative impunity because of challenging geography, because of limited governance capacity, limited political will or other reasons. Whatever the reason, physical safe havens provides security for terrorist leaders and they allow them to plan acts of terrorism around the world. Areas of concern include the Trans-Sahara, Somalia, the Sulawesi/ Sulu Seas, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. This unfortunately isn't an exhaustive list, but it's illustrative.

Because of the importance of safe havens to terrorists' operational success, the United States is working with our many partners around the world to strengthen counterterrorism capabilities and to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people while they also control effectively their sovereign national territory. Unfortunately, problem areas do remain.

On Iraq, most of the increase in terrorist attacks in 2006 did take place in Iraq. Much of the increase is due to the spike in violence in Iraq in the aftermath of the bombings of the Al-Askariya Mosque, one of the holiest Shia Muslim sites. And a paramount strategic objective in Iraq and the regions is prevent al-Qaida -- that's our objective -- its affiliates and other terrorists from enjoying safe haven in Al Anbar or anywhere else in Iraq. Groups such as al-Qaida in Iraq, that's the AQI; Ansar al-Islam, the AI; or the Ansar al-Sunna, the AS; as well as the Kurdistan Workers' Party, the PKK, as it's formerly known and which we continue to use as a shorthand; view Iraq as potential safe haven and they are attempting to make that into a reality.

Iraq, however, is an ally in the war on terror. Developing Iraq's security forces will require further training and resources before they can address effectively the terrorist groups already operating within Iraq's borders without further international assistance. Iraq's intelligence services continued to improve in both competency and confidence in 2006 and they require additional support before they can identify and respond adequately to internal and external terrorist threats in the future.

The international community's support is critical to ensure the Government of Iraq's plans to reduce violence, to improve services and to increase economic opportunities are successful. Prospects for increasing stability in Iraq will depend on the extent to which the Iraqi Government and political leaders can establish effective national institutions that transcend sectarian or ethnic interests. The Government of Iraq must continue to authorize its security forces to pursue extremist elements of all kinds. Success will also depend on the extent of the international support to the Government of Iraq to do so, the extent to which extremists, most notably the AQI, can be defeated in their attempt to foment inter-sectarian struggle between Shia and Sunnis, and the extent to which Iraq's neighbors, especially Iran and Syria, can be persuaded to stop the flow of militants' ammunitions across their borders.

In Pakistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the FATA of Pakistan, have become safe haven for al-Qaida terrorists and other extremist insurgents since the fall of the Taliban in December 2001. Despite Pakistan's effort to eliminate threats and to establish effective governance in the FATA, these tribal areas continue to be terrorist safe havens and sources of instability for Pakistan and its neighbors.

The Pakistani Government maintains approximately 80,000 troops, including army and Frontier Corps units along the Afghanistan border. The U.S. plans to help modernize and increase the capacity of the Frontier Corps so that they can become a more effective force. Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps units have targeted and raided al-Qaida and other militant safe havens in the FATA. The failure of the tribal leaders in the FATA to fulfill their promises to the government under the terms of the North Waziristan agreements which were signed in September led to additional insurgent infiltration into Afghanistan.

For our part, the State Department recognizes that military actions alone do not eliminate the terrorist threat. And we are working through the Regional Strategic Initiative with Ambassadors and interagency representatives in key terrorist countries of operation to assess the threat and to devise collaborative strategies, action plans and policy recommendations. We employ all the tools of state craft to establish long-term measures to marginalize terrorists.

Our strategy is aimed over the long term. With time our goal and regional cooperative efforts will reduce the terrorist capacity to harm us and our partners on a local security and development assistance will build -- I'm sorry -- to harm us and our partners, while local security and development assistance will build our partners' capacity.

Once partner capacity exceeds the threat, the need for close U.S. engagement and support will diminish and the threat will be reduced to a level that our partners can manage for themselves. As of December 2006, RSI strategy groups were already in place for Southeast Asia, Iraq and its neighbors, the eastern Mediterranean, the western Mediterranean and East Africa. In 2007 we have already organized a strategy session with our ambassadors in the Trans-Sahara, while new sessions are scheduled for South Asia and Latin America later this year, in addition to the groups that will continue functioning and that are already established.

Our strategy to defeat terrorists is structured at multiple levels: a global campaign to counter violent extremism and disrupt terrorist networks; a series of regional collaborative efforts to deny terrorists safe havens; numerous bilateral security and development assistance programs which are designed to build liberal institutions, support law enforcement and the rule of law; to address political and economic injustice; and to develop military and security capacity.

This enhances our partners' capacity to resist the terrorist threat and to address conditions that terrorists exploit. You'll find in the report as well, as in past years, regional overviews and reports on terrorists -- the terrorist situation in individual countries. We note progress and a lack of progress where appropriate. Examples include: (a) Afghanistan, which remains threatened by the Taliban, insurgents and religious extremists; (b) close cooperation between Pakistani, British and United States law enforcement agencies which expose the August London Heathrow bomb plot; (c) the capture of Abu Faraj al-Libbi which disrupted contacts in the Middle East and North Africa, the death of Ayman al-Zawahiri's lieutenants in January in Pakistan; (d) the 2006 -- in 2006 the Canadians disrupted a major extremist plot on their own territory and arrested 17 individuals in Toronto and; (e) in March the Australians arrested three suspected terrorists in Melbourne as part of an ongoing counterterrorism operation which disrupted a significant threat to that community.

We must measure counterterrorism success in the broadest perspective. While killing and capturing key terrorist actors is fundamental in combating terrorism, these actions do not eliminate the threat. We must also seek to build trusted networks of governments, private citizens and organizations, multilateral institutions, and business groups that will work collaboratively to defeat the threat from violent extremism and its radical ideology. Such networks, over time, help wean at-risk populations away from subversive manipulation by terrorists and they create mechanisms to address people's needs and grievances, thus marginalizing the terrorists.

I'll refer you to the report for any additional specifics that you might like, but I'll cut it short here to take some questions after Russ Travers has had a chance to talk about the methodology and the numbers because we don't want to confuse you with what we've done. Thank you very much.

MR. TRAVERS: Thanks, Frank. What I will do is give you kind of a quick overview, a high level on what we counted, how we counted matters for 2006. I would emphasize that there's a great deal more material on the nctc.gov website. That'll give you a sense of the methodology. It gives you, actually, a search engine against which you can look at all of the incidents if you're so inclined.

Next please, John.

I don't want this to be a methodology brief, but a couple important points. There are over a hundred definitions of terrorism according to political scientists. To avoid any controversy, we focused on the statutory definitions. Up through 2004, we used the definition there of international terrorism and that specifically emphasizes citizens or territory of more than one country. What we found was that there were some very important incidents that didn't get counted so that in 2005, we made a switch and we're now using a much broader definition of terrorism.

If you think about the key parameters, it's attacks against noncombatants for political reasons. And so it's an extraordinarily broad definition and as a result, what we've seen is that the incident totals have grown from a few hundred to well over 10,000.

Next please, John.

Since we've made the definitional switch, we have two full years of data for 2005 and 2006. Bottom lines, as Frank indicated, the incidents have grown from about 11,000 in '05 to something -- or 14,000 in '06. Fatalities up from about 14.5 thousand to about 20.5 thousand. Total victims actually in '05 and '06; that is, killed, wounded and kidnapped, about 74,000 in both years.

Two very important points: There is absolutely no question that cataloguing incidents over time can help give you some significant trends with relationship to what's going on in the terrorism problem. However, we are very convinced that trying to combine global totals on a year-by-year basis doesn't tell you very much. Why? Because embedded in a global total would be, for instance, the FARC in Colombia, ETA in Spain, the Maoists in Nepal, Lord's Resistance Army in Africa, and al-Qaida and all the Sunni affiliates. Simply adding all of those categories together just doesn't tell you very much and as Frank said, numbers can never be the total metric for terrorism. I see some of you having trouble looking at these. You've got -- your packages actually have got the full set of viewgraphs in the materials.

Next, please, John.

So we have to boil it down a little bit. What you see here is a regional breakout. The first point I would make is that terrorism is a tactic used around the globe. Here you've got in the dark color '05, in the red color '06 data. As you can see in the combination of the Near East and South Asia accounts for about 80 percent of the total. I mentioned that the total terrorist incidents have gone up from about 11,000 to 14,000. As you can see, most of that growth occurs in the Near East and most of that is accounted for by Iraq and I'll get into that here in a second. The rest of the world is relatively flat. There are some puts and takes and I'll walk you through those very quickly as we burrow down into countries.

Next please.

We'll look at Iraq first. The lower left-hand box will give you a sense of both incidents and fatalities as they grew from '05 to '06. And as a share of the total worldwide incidents, Iraq accounted for just under half of the total incidents and about two-thirds of the total fatalities. The top graph gives you a sense of what was going on month by month in Iraq. The light blue incidents with the scale on the left would be incident totals and the darker color will give you suicide bombings on the right.

Frank alluded to the bombing of the Golden Mosque on the 22nd of February and as he suggested, after that, you can see how the incident totals grew significantly across Iraq. Of somewhat interest, I think, might be the issue of suicide bombings. And you can see in the first six months of the year, suicide bombings are actually quite low relative to the second six months.

We don't know exactly why, but a couple of possibilities: You may recall that in the middle of 2005, Zawahiri admonished Zarqawi about indiscriminate bombings of Shia. That may be manifest in the first six months of the year, it may be because we were able to interdict suicide pipeline. Irrespective what was going on, quite clearly, there was a decision in -- sometime in the spring of last year to try to incite sectarian violence and suicide bombings increased dramatically in the second half of the year.

Next please.

With respect to the rest of the world, the lower left-hand graph again will show you the fatalities and incident totals: relatively flat. We'll get into some of the specifics, but working our way from left to right, obviously no major attacks in the United States. There were, according to Consular Affairs, 28 American citizens that were killed overseas. In the Western Hemisphere, Colombia was the -- certainly had the most terrorist incidents, about 750. That's very close to what we saw in 2005.

In the Middle East, Israel was up dramatically in terms of increased rocket attacks in Israel, although suicide bombings was down in Israel to very small numbers last year. There were no major attacks in either Jordan or Saudi Arabia.

Europe and Russia, nothing to compare to the July 7th bombings in the UK and Europe, and similarly nothing like what we've seen in previous years for the bombings in Chechnya and Russia over the last several years.

In Africa, the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, GSPC, merged with al-Qaida in the fall and we saw the first attacks against Western and U.S. interests, and that presaged also what we've seen here over the last several months.

In South Africa, a number of locations in Sub-Saharan Africa, there were additional numbers of attacks. I will tell you that the data for that part of the world is the most suspect of anyplace in the world.

In South Asia, Afghan attacks were up by about 60 percent. Pakistan and India both had fewer attacks. And in the Far East, Indonesia for the first time in several years had no major attack. We've seen attacks there every fall over the last several years until last year. In Philippines, attacks were up somewhat. In Thailand, attacks were down somewhat.

I would call your attention to that lower right-hand box; numerous plots either disrupted or just fizzled. An important point: If, as Frank suggested, the attacks in the UK, if the air plot had occurred, we'd been giving you a very different brief today. So the difference between success and failure can be very, very close.

Next, please.

In terms of types of attacks, on the left-hand side you see a pie chart that breaks out the different ways in which terrorists conducted their attacks. This looks very similar to 2005. Roughly half of all incidents were armed attacks and roughly a quarter were bombings and then the other quarter broken out in the various categories.

On the right-hand side, suicide bombings. As I mentioned, they were down last year from '05 and that's largely because of the first six months in Iraq being down. However, Afghanistan went up dramatically, by about a factor of five or six. And again, this is only attacks against noncombatants. We don't track military attacks in Afghanistan or Iraq.

Next, please.

And finally, with respect to victims, as I mentioned at the outset, about 74,000 victims -- that's killed, wounded and kidnapped. In terms of fatalities themselves, a couple of key data points. As I mentioned, 28 Americans killed. Like last year, Muslims bore a disproportionate share of the attacks. Of the 20,000 fatalities, certainly something over half of all fatalities worldwide were Muslims, largely at the hands of other Islamic extremists.

Other categories, as it suggests there on the chart, several thousand police officers -- and Frank gave you some numbers -- many hundreds of children and teachers and press and so forth. So many categories. These are undoubtedly low. They were only the indications we get from reporting. The numbers are undoubtedly higher.

And finally, let me close with one more warning about just using gross total numbers. The chart on the right gives you a graph of fatality ranges and the number of people that were actually killed by -- broken out by incidents. The chart there, as you can see on the right-hand side, like last year, over half of all incidents had no fatalities whatsoever, whereas you can see on the far left-hand chart, something less than 300 incidents accounted for over one-third of all fatalities. So it was -- on the left-hand side you're getting a sense of just how many fatalities were caused by individual incidents.

So with that, I'd be happy to stop and turn it back over to Frank.

QUESTION: Let me ask just some numerical questions to start. Can you give us the figures for the number of terrorism-related fatalities in Iraq in 2006 versus 2005 and in Afghanistan in 2006 versus 2005? I don't believe they're in there. There's one rough estimate of about 13,000 for Iraq. But taking your point that one shouldn't just use gross numbers; can you give us the precise numbers for fatalities for Iraq and Afghanistan and the five comparatives?

MR. TRAVERS: I can. Why do you -- we've got other questions, I'll come back to this and we can get those for you. Sure.

QUESTION: Okay. Great. And then the second question that I had was looking at the fact -- and this may be for you, sir -- looking at the fact that the majority of deaths clearly occurred in Iraq, do you believe that the war in Iraq ultimately has been good for the effort to reduce terrorism generally?

MR. URBANCIC: You know, if the battle against terrorism isn't in Iraq, it's going to be somewhere else. It started out in Afghanistan. The terrorists are looking for places where they can operate and that's what they're doing. So we can fight them in Iraq, we can fight them somewhere else. The fact is they are there and they're going to find other ungoverned spaces and they're doing that and they're expanding -- they're expanding their scope. So yes, I mean, Iraq is at least a relatively friendly place. The people of Iraq are deserving people and they deserve better and it's good for us to help them.

I can start.

QUESTION: Yeah. Can I just -- I have another numbers question, and that is -- and then I have another one. Why did you choose to say there was a 25 percent increase in the number of attacks when, in fact, the percentage is slightly higher than that -- almost 29 percent?

MR. TRAVERS: You will have slightly different numbers here in the book because the information cutoff -- I mean, these numbers change. As you'll find out, the '05 numbers that we have are different than the '05 numbers that were in country reports. I don't know what you've got there exactly.

QUESTION: It's the same in the report and in your -- in this little fact sheet. You have incidents growing from 11,153 to 14,338, which I believe is about a 28.5 percent increase. And yet the copy -- these say 25 percent. I'm just curious as to why you used the lower 25 percent figure, as opposed to --

MR. TRAVERS: Probably it points to the art, not science, aspect of this, as you suggest. I also said I think that Iraq counted for half of the total incidents. In reality, it's closer to 45 percent. So I mean, what we're trying to do is give you an order of magnitude on these numbers.

QUESTION: Can you then -- and this is the non-number question. What is it that has made a -- that has turned a 25 percent or 28.5 percent increase -- why has that resulted in a 40 percent or 40.2 percent jump in fatalities?

MR. URBANCIC: Well, I mean, that --

QUESTION: That is an exponentially larger --

MR. URBANCIC: I'll go back to that, but if we could start out, we would like to emphasize the text of this report. We're mandated to produce the numbers and we're happy to do that and Russ is doing an extremely competent job. But I really wouldn't want to get involved in a discussion about .2 percent versus .6 percent. So just -- I'd beware of that --

QUESTION: That's fine, but it's not .2 percent. It is 3.5 percent.

MR. URBANCIC: Okay. But I'd just like to get that out there. We'd like to talk about the text. That's our primary focus on this.

And the terrorists, there's no question, are intelligent people and they learn from each other. They learn from each other -- they watch each other. The people in Afghanistan are watching the people in Iraq. The people in Iraq are watching the people elsewhere, and there's a snowball effect and they work through the internet. They communicate. They're working on all kinds of nasty things. The IEDs are being perfected. There's no question that they're learning. So I mean, I think that's the basic reason. They're efficient people. They're evil people. They have finances and they have contacts. But we have to continue to fight them.


QUESTION: What is it that's kept Iraq from being included in the list of safe havens? Well, I mean, you say, I mean, the language on Iraq in the safe haven chapter is almost identical to last year, although the situation seems to have evolved quite a bit. Why is Iraq not considered a safe haven for terrorists?

MR. URBANCIC: Well, it's a potential safe haven this year. And we simply looked at the assessment according to the definition that we use, which is broader than the statutory assessment or the statutory definition. For 2006, that's where we came out. That does not mean that we're not worried about al-Qaida in Iraq. It doesn't mean that we're not worried about the PKK in Iraq. We very seriously are and we're watching it very carefully.

So again, don't be misled by distinctions that don't really count. We are very concerned about the fact that the terrorists want to use Iraq as a safe haven and they're working as hard as they can to turn it into an actual safe haven. There's no question about that.

QUESTION: And why today is it not a safe haven?

MR. URBANCIC: Well, the report addresses 2006. The situation is serious and we're watching it. I mean, there's no question that they are increasing their capabilities.


QUESTION: Frank, you said that -- I think it was your wording -- attacks on children were up more than 80 percent. I was wondering if you could elaborate on that. I mean, are there instances where they were actually singling out busloads of kids? Are you talking about large-scale bombings that were indiscriminate? Is there a trend where they're targeting children?

MR. URBANCIC: So far, thank God, children themselves by and large have not been targets, but the indiscriminate attacks lead to a great increase in -- well, they're all innocent, but in the deaths of very, very vulnerable populations.

MR. TRAVERS: Do we get the two different (inaudible)?

MR. URBANCIC: Do you have that?

MR. TRAVERS: Afghanistan in '05 was 684 dead. In '06, 1,040. Iraq, 8,262 up to 13,340.

QUESTION: Thank you.

QUESTION: So Iraq, the first one you gave us?

MR. TRAVERS: Iraq, 8,262.


QUESTION: Mr. Coordinator, do you consider November 17 terrorist organization closed once and for all or is still active since in your report the picture is not clear?

MR. URBANCIC: Well, we hope it's closed.

QUESTION: You don't know if it is or not?

MR. URBANCIC: The actual -- if I need a legal response to that, let me get back to you. But there are -- the situation -- there are, you know, various groups bleeding back and forth into other ones. Let me back to you on that.

QUESTION: So it's not clear yet?

MR. URBANCIC: Let me just get back to you with a more specific answer.

QUESTION: One more question. In your report you are saying that the entire Republic of Cyprus, the Kurdish organization PKK maintain an active presence for the first time. Question: Based on which information you are claiming that since it's very well known, as you said earlier, that PKK members are stationed in northern Iraq and making the Turks very angry?

MR. URBANCIC: Making the Turks very angry. The PKK is -- I'm sorry?

QUESTION: About Cyprus, you are saying in the report that for the first time you note very active PKK members in Cyprus. And I was wondering on what did you base this information?

MR. URBANCIC: As you may know, the United States is running -- is working actively against the PKK. General Ralston is working the trilateral part with the Turks, the United States and the Iraqi Government. And I, in fact, am leading the part of Western Europe. And what we are finding as we work more and more with our West European allies is that the PKK is like an octopus. It has a head -- actually, it has multiple heads in various West European countries and it has tentacles that go throughout West Europe and leading far into East Europe for that matter.

It's a criminal organization in addition to its terrorist aspects and it has money-laundering operations. It has trafficking-in-persons operations. It has operations that would -- we would recognize here as basic mafia type operations. And so I think it's not surprising to find them operating in any particular West European country. We are working now to raise both the effectiveness of the counterterrorist threat -- our counterterrorist response to the PKK threat in Western Europe and to raise the consciousness and the understanding of the Europeans of the threat that the PKK poses.

QUESTION: Including Cyprus? That's my question.

MR. URBANCIC: Including Cyprus. Cyprus is part of our East European RSI.


QUESTION: Yes. On North Korea.

MR. URBANCIC: Our embassy in Cyprus, not the government of Cyprus.

QUESTION: Yeah. North Korea is still on the state sponsors list. What are they going to need to do to get themselves off that finally?

MR. URBANCIC: As you may know, we have an agreement or we reached an agreement this year, so it's not technically covered, although it's in the 2006 report. We have an agreement with the North Koreans that we will take initial steps. This is a -- coming off that list is quite a long process. You may recall how long it took us to work on Libya. The same types of things the North Koreans will have to do. But the first initial steps are what's -- are what we're committed to. This is not a decision to take them off. It's just a decision to begin the process to begin the discussion.

QUESTION: Okay, because there are specific points.

MR. URBANCIC: That's right.

QUESTION: You know, the question of abductees, the question of the Japanese Red Army.

MR. URBANCIC: That's right.

QUESTION: Are they going to have to address each and every one of those?


QUESTION: So just to follow up on North Korea, could you explain the reasoning why the entry of North Korea this year is much shorter in comparison to the previous years? There's a lot of detail that's been omitted. And the language seems a bit softer also when you say Japanese nationals believed to have been abducted rather than just Japanese nationals who were abducted.

MR. URBANCIC: The Country Reports on Terrorism provides the Department of State's annual statutorily mandated assessment of trends in international terrorism. There are numerous mechanisms that the North Koreans have to meet, but as part of the six-party process to resolve the North Korean nuclear threat the United States agreed on February 13th, 2007 to initial actions, as I mentioned before, to begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism.

As part of the six-party process we also have begun the process, but there's no timetable set. And the language in the report therefore changes each year to reflect developments in that year. This is technically actually a little out of place since it happened in 2007. And just to alert you, probably the language will be different in 2007 as well -- not to predict anything, but across the board, we change the language as developments occur.

QUESTION: So you felt it was reasonable to omit a lot of the detail, especially regarding the Japanese abductees this year in relation to what happened in February of this year?

MR. URBANCIC: Actually, the discussion of 2007, to be quite frank, is simply to be more complete. It does not change what happened in 2006, obviously.


QUESTION: I have a question on North Korea. In the text you mentioned about Red Army first and then comes to the abduction issues. And in the previous years in the report, the abduction comes first and Red Army is added at the end. What the reason for the change? I don't recall any particular incident regarding the Red Army?

MR. TRAVERS: I would just urge you not to read too much into this. I think if you just read the -- read what it says, it will be complete.


QUESTION: So if Pakistan is a safe haven for terrorists and also in the chapter here you are saying that President Karzai also complaining that you have to go after terrorists and terrorism beyond Afghanistan, those who are training and arming and financing and terrorist camps and here I'm referring to Pakistan. And they also have an 80,000-person army on the border. Why can't we control terrorism into Pakistan from Pakistan or Afghanistan when they are sending terrorism around the globe, and also why don't we have yet Usama bin Laden or his deputy with 80,000 army?

MR. URBANCIC: Okay. Pakistan is an ally in the war on terror. Afghanistan is an ally on the war on terror -- in the war on terror. The problem that we have is the border, which neither has complete control over on either side. We are working very strongly with those allies to help them establish control in those areas. That, I think, is the key.

The border area is what we're talking about. There are multiple ways that this has to be addressed. It has to be addressed on the economic side. It has to be addressed on the military side. It also has to be addressed on the social side. And we are acutely aware of both the limitations and the great stress -- to the great progress and the great efforts that the government of both Pakistan and Afghanistan have made. We're very pleased that Presidents Karzai and Musharraf were able to meet in Turkey, just finished up, and this is also something that we hope we'll be able to build on in the future.

QUESTION: Just a quick follow-up.

MR. CASEY: We have time for a couple more, so Goyal --

QUESTION: Just a quick one. Sir, I understand that General Musharraf has been ally and also President Karzai as far as global war on terrorism and with the U.S. But at the same time, U.S. has its army there in the area and they have not been allowed to search for Usama bin Laden or go beyond the border. Are you expecting anything, because since they have failed to help the U.S. beyond what they have done so far, are you expecting that now U.S. army may have to take action to find those who are most wanted here in the U.S. and around the globe?

MR. URBANCIC: Well, I certainly -- I don't want to speculate on military operations, but I can say that we are working as closely as we can and we have very good cooperation not only with President Musharraf but with the Government of Pakistan, and we anticipate that we will continue to have. As situations evolve, we will have to deal with those situations.

MR. CASEY: Michele.

QUESTION: I just have a very basic question. Why shouldn't Americans look at this report and members of Congress look at this report, the numbers and the analysis, and come to the conclusion that we're losing this war on terrorism?

MR. URBANCIC: Well, for several reasons. First of all, I mean, people who want to draw conclusions or who have prejudgments, they will draw those conclusions. We are working as hard as we can to defeat the terrorists. We have to continue to do that. The situation on the ground -- the terrorists are not omnipotent and they are not almighty and they have suffered real losses. We've been very successful against their leadership. We've been very successful in disrupting many of their networks. Not all of the things that we've been successful in doing have been able to be made public, but there are great successes that are out there.

But these people are intelligent and they want spectacular successes against us and they have been able to achieve some of those.

MR. CASEY: Thanks a lot.

MR. URBANCIC: Thank you.


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