Terrorists Within - experts warn that Al Qaeda is determined to attack America again
May 22, 2006
A former top Homeland Security official warns that the terrorists aren't confined to the battle fronts abroad, but are already here in America living among us. And he says the government needs to redouble its efforts to root them out.
"While we certainly should continue to take the fight to the enemy wherever he is, we need to face the awful reality that the enemy may already be in our very own backyard," says former Homeland Security Department Inspector General Clark Kent Ervin. "The frightening truth is that there are already terrorists among us."
Osama bin Laden recently warned that al-Qaeda is making final preparations for another massive attack on America. Assuming the terrorist kingpin isn't bluffing, he could have terrorist cells secreted inside American cities.
While the FBI says it's found no evidence of such terror cells here, it also said much the same thing before the 9/11 attacks. And Ervin points out that the bureau nonetheless knows of at least 1,000 al-Qaeda sympathizers in the U.S. today -- a number that he calls "low." It's possible there are thousands of sympathizers supporting and facilitating hundreds of terrorist operatives inside the U.S., he fears, and the FBI has yet to make the connections.
"It's safe to say that a not insignificant number of suspected terrorists are known to be in the country today," Ervin says in a new tell-all book, Open Target: Where America Is Vulnerable To Attack.
While the FBI says it can find no evidence of al-Qaeda cells operating inside America, Ervin insists the agency has not looked at all the Saudi-based evidence since 9/11.
He says the FBI failed to examine "stacks of boxes" of potential evidence containing the applications of thousands of young Saudi men who had applied for and received visas to travel to the U.S. around the same time as the 15 Saudi hijackers.
Ervin, who recently resigned from DHS, says he discovered several unexamined boxes of Saudi visa applications in a storage room at the U.S. embassy during a trip two years ago to Riyadh, the Saudi capital. He was told by consular officers there that FBI agents neglected to go through the boxes and pull the files to see if there might have been any connections -- tribes, families, villages, occupations, addresses, phone numbers and so on -- between those applicants and the hijackers.
Even in the aftermath of 9/11, "predictably, the FBI fell woefully behind in vetting these applications," Ervin says. The FBI missed clues to the first World Trade Center terror plot in 1993 because they were buried in boxes of unexamined evidence from an earlier terror case.
Ervin says a team of FBI agents did visit the embassy in the months after the 9/11 attacks and asked the consular section to pull some of the files.
But for some unexplained reason, he says, the agents left the embassy in Riyadh without examining the thousands of other applications stored in the stacks of boxes, even though Saudi Arabia is a known al-Qaeda hotbed.
"As I write these words today," Ervin says on page 45 of his book, "these applications have yet to be examined, and the more time goes by, the less potentially useful any intelligence they might contain will be."
He adds: "While it is certainly possible that the remaining applications contained nothing important, it is equally possible that examining them might yet lead to tracking down other terrorists presently in the United States, lying in wait to launch follow-up attacks, or simply copycat cells hiding out until an opportune time to launch another attack."
Ervin speculates that the FBI chose not to examine the other Saudi visa applications because "doing so was too much trouble."
Asked about it, FBI spokesman Bill Carter says it's the first he's heard of any unexamined boxes of Saudi visa applications. He says generally it's the State Department's duty to check out visa applicants, and the FBI plays only a minor supporting role in the process.
"The State Department is usually responsible for the processing of visa applications. And generally what happens in that regard is there's a name-check process," Carter says. "In other words, they would send the names over to the FBI, and we run it through our case files to determine if there's anything in the FBI databases that would preclude or prevent that individual from coming into the United States."
"But," he adds, "I'm not familiar with the fact that there are boxes that remain unreviewed."
Carter says the FBI's legal attache office in Riyadh -- which has come under fire recently -- may have been involved initially in reviewing the visa files. But he maintains it was not ultimately responsible for running down terror leads on Saudi individuals after 9/11. "Most of what that [office activity] had to do with was tracking financial issues with regard to support of terrorist groups," Carter explains.
FBI agents in Washington have complained that they received little help after 9/11 from the bureau's office in Riyadh, which was run by two Muslim agents. One, Egyptian-born Gamal Abdel-Hafiz, maintains they were understaffed and hobbled by an antiquated computer system.
But he and his boss Wilfred Rattigan, a black convert to Islam, nonetheless found time to travel to Mecca for the hajj pilgrimage, where they surrendered their FBI cell phones to Saudi nationals and were out of contact with officials back in the U.S. who were trying to ring them up about investigations into al-Qaeda and 9/11.
Both Rattigan and Abdel-Hafiz, who have since been reassigned within the bureau, wore traditional Muslim headgear and robes while on the job in Saudi Arabia, further annoying fellow agents.
When a senior FBI supervisor paid a visit to the Riyadh office nearly a year after 9/11, she found secret documents strewn about the office, some even wedged between cabinets. She also found a huge backlog of boxes each filled with three feet of paper containing secret, time-sensitive leads. Much of the materials, including information on Saudi airline pilots, had not been translated or reviewed.
Ervin, now a homeland security expert at the Aspen Institute in Washington, insists that someone in law enforcement -- whether the FBI or an agency within DHS -- still needs to review the unexamined boxes sitting in the embassy in Riyadh.
"Why hasn't anyone from the Department of Homeland Security bothered to look through them to see whether there might be links between any of those applicants and any of the hijackers?" he complains.
DHS, for its part, says it has introduced a program meant to add another layer of security to State's visa application process. Two years ago, under the Homeland Security Act, it deployed so-called Visa Security Officers (VSOs) to Saudi Arabia, still a hotbed of terrorism, to review applications for people who could be considered national security threats.
But the Saudi program has been plagued with problems. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) last year reported that officers assigned there are spread too thin by a heavy workload.
And the case volume is expected to grow. The administration recently agreed to a request by the Saudi royal government to ramp up the number of student visas issued to Saudi nationals, a process that was slowed after 9/11.
Making matters worse, only one of the first 10 VSOs sent to Saudi Arabia could speak Arabic. "Needless to say," Ervin says, "the officers' effectiveness was severely limited by their inability to speak and read the language of the visa applicants."
While it remains unclear how many Saudi terrorist suspects have received visas to travel to the U.S., authorities have identified several Saudi nationals associated with the hijackers or al-Qaeda, or both, who are still at large and may pose a potential threat to America. Here are a few:
Ervin warns that al-Qaeda is "bound and determined to hit us again, and even harder than last time."