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U.S. - Iranian Nuke Deal - Team Obama Runs Up The White Flag

December 11, 2013

November 26, 2013 – San Francisco, CA – – The just concluded public negotiating sessions between Iran and the P5 +1 [the US, Great Britain, France, Russia, China and Germany] nations are being fraudulently represented as having produced a draft agreement which curtails Iran's rapidly developing capacity to build and deliver nuclear weapons.

Instead it's a green light, removing the limited constraints there were on the country's ability to pursue its long sought after goal of having the Shia bomb.

Amazingly, Mr. Obama seems entirely comfortable with the idea that a revolutionary Islamic theocracy - already the world's chief terror financier - can be trusted to become a moderate and responsible custodian of the most destructive weapons known to mankind.

To Obama, it's just an accepted fact, sorry Israel…go shove it.

The fact that everything the Mullocracy has done up to this point augurs against such a judgment is of no consequence to this President.

Note: Anyone claiming that Iranian President Rouhani is a "moderate" is delusional.

In remarks delivered on August 2, Iran's "Al-Quds [Jerusalem] Day," the country's figurehead said, in an obvious reference to the Jewish state that, "…it is an old wound that has been sitting on the body of the Islamic world, in the shadow of the occupation of the holy land of Palestine and the dear Quds...Muslim people will not forget this historical right and will always stand against oppression and aggression." [source, Arash Karami, Rouhani's Comments on Israel ‘Distorted' by Iran Media , Iran Pulse News]

Well everyone knows that cauterizing is the only cure for an old wound – which is exactly what Iran has in mind.

As outlined by Al-Jazeera America, the plan is characterized as a positive step forward; the impression being that something of consequence had occurred.

"…Under the deal hammered out between Iran and the U.S., France, Britain, Germany, China and Russia, Tehran agreed to what President Barack Obama called "substantial limitations" on its nuclear program in return for "modest relief" of sanctions that have harshly impacted the Iranian economy. The agreement covers a six-month period, during which the parties hope to establish momentum for a more far-reaching deal…." [source, Barbara Slavin, How Iran and world powers finally got to yes on a nuclear deal ]

But Iran's President Rouhani, in a speech delivered just after conclusion of the talks, stressed that throughout the period governed by the agreement [6 months] nuclear development will essentially continue as if there were no agreement, "During the six-month agreement, all nuclear facilities at Natanz, Fordow, Isfahan, and Bandar Abbas will continue their activities," he stated. [source, World recognizes Iran's nuclear rights: Rouhani, Tehran Times]

Since their activities were and remain geared to the production of weapons of mass destruction, Rouhani as much as states that the terms of the agreement will present no impediment to the country producing sufficient numbers of nukes to forever change the face of Middle East power relationships.

The region faces at least three primary threats upon Iran obtaining the bomb.

1. Israel will immediately be in the crosshairs, with a second Shoa threatened by the Ayatollahs.

The most recent, not-so-reassuring words from Khomenei delivered in a Tweet – "It came from the mouth of the rabid dog of the region-#Israel-that Iran is a threat to the world! No, fake Israeli regime & allies are a threat." [source, Robert Mackey, New Obstacle to a Nuclear Deal: Taunts From Iran's Ruler , New York Times]

2. The entire Middle East will become militarily destabilized if Iran is able to bring deliverable nukes online in the immediate future. Saudi Arabia is having none of this and is collaborating with Israel to the extent that according to reports, Israeli teams are already on Saudi turf exploring the possibility of launching an attack.

Egypt can't be pleased, nor can Turkey, and this would seriously undermine Pakistan's ultimate claim to relevance, its nuclear monopoly in the region would evaporate, possibly even take a back seat since the Mullahs appear eager to put their soon to be arriving nukes to work.

3. Loss of U.S. prestige and any powerbase within the Muslim world. No one is afraid of a nuclear Obama but everyone is rightly terrified of a nuclear Khamenei.

In traditional diplomacy the degree to which the signatories comply with the terms of the agreement is the basis upon which a treaty's success or failure is determined.

But…has the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] been granted full and unfettered access [via unannounced visits] to every Iranian facility which even marginally deals with technologies applicable to developing a nuclear weapon?


As per the agreement, this is the level of access the IAEA will be given:

"…- Daily IAEA inspector access when inspectors are not present for the purpose of Design Information Verification, Interim Inventory Verification, Physical Inventory Verification, and unannounced inspections, for the purpose of access to offline surveillance records, at Fordow and Natanz.

- IAEA inspector managed access to:

. centrifuge assembly workshops;

. centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities; and,

. uranium mines and mills.…"

Note that the highest level of access which Iran has "voluntarily" granted to anything of real importance is "managed," meaning led around like donkeys.

For example, the inspectors can view some of the means of producing the country's thousands of centrifuges but not the centrifuge cascades themselves.

So what does Iran get?

Everything it needs.

But on a deeper level, consider the sea change in psychology [not to mention the reversal of the long-standing U.S. diplomatic position that Iran has "no right to nuclear enrichment"] necessary to encompass Iran as a global nuclear power.

"…A senior Obama administration official says the nuclear deal with Iran does not include recognition of Iran's right to enrich uranium…" [source, US: No Right To Enrich In Nuclear Deal, Talking Points Memo]

So, who are you going to believe, an anonymous WH hack or your lying eyes?

As former IAEA inspector Ollie Heinonen states:

"…Everything it needs to accomplish its goal of a nuclear weapon stockpile and the key component at this time is the money and credit lines which will be freed up along with a large increase in oil revenues…once Iran produces weapons-grade uranium and already has 20% enriched uranium, 90% of the work is already done. It is incorrect to refer to 20% enriched uranium as "medium-enriched uranium," he said, because "the cup is not half-full or half-empty, it's a cup 90% full, because…you need to do only that tiny, small additional 10% of effort to produce highly enriched uranium…[once] you have produced 3.5% or 5% enriched uranium — Iran now has quite a big stock of seven metric tons of that material — actually you have done something like 60% of the effort you need to do in order to produce weapons-grade uranium."

With Iran's current inventory of 20% enriched uranium hexafluoride, he added, "they can turn it into the equivalent of nuclear weapon material in one month's time. That's a fact." If they start with 3.5% enrichment, it would take two months or slightly more, he said…" [source Raphael Aran, ‘Iran two weeks away from weapons-grade uranium', The Times of Israel]

In a fairly shocking admission Iran is claiming that it has18,000 centrifuges, while Western estimates - dependent upon a sheer guess by the IAEA - are in the 10-12 thousand range.

"…Iran's outgoing nuclear chief says Tehran has a total of 18,000 centrifuges for uranium enrichment…Fereidoun Abbasi's announcement came as he handed over his post Saturday to Ali Akbar Salehi, appointed by new President Hasan Rouhani…" Abbasi's breakdown is, "10,000 centrifuges currently operating are of an older model, IR-1, while about 7,000 more of the same model are ready to be installed along with just over 1,000 centrifuges of an advanced new model…" [source, Ex Nuke Chief: Iran has 18,000 centrifuges, AP via USA Today]

If the West can't even determine exactly how many centrifuges Iran has, what gives anyone confidence that any new agreement can possibly be enforced?

Bearing on this matter, the agreement's first footnote states, "…Iran announces that during the first 6 months, it will replace existing centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type…"

Does anyone really believe that an engineering enterprise would replace worn out equipment without upgrading it to the current state of the art, which has the ability to enrich uranium at a 5 times faster rate than the first generation IR-1 series.

Of course since we really have no idea of how many centrifuges the country has, the prospect of the IAEA being able to halt the upgrading of older models with far faster and more efficient units is ludicrous.

Again they don't have the access, manpower, or frankly, the will to push this one to the hilt.

Regarding will of the IAEA types, the Iranians have failed to provide the required reports for the country's heavy water reactor [IR-40 at Arak] since 2006!

That's 7 years of no compliance, important technically because this type of reactor's only purpose is to produce plutonium which is why it's commonly understood that the facility is the regime's second pathway to the bomb.

"…Iran has failed to provide the IAEA as required with an updated Design Inventory Questionnaire (DIQ) on the IR-40 reactor since 2006. The IAEA reiterated its long-standing concern that the "lack of up to date design information is having an increasingly adverse impact on the Agency's ability….to implement an effective safeguards approach." [source, David Albright, Christina Walrond, and Andrea Stricker, ISIS Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report , Institute for Science and International Security]

And then there is the question of nuclear triggers and warhead development, about which the draft agreement is mum.

Not very comforting is it?

The timing of this process as the President is besieged because of the gimpy rollout of O-Care is entirely too convenient to be anything but a planned diversion. This makes Team Obama willing to take one of the biggest security risks in modern U.S. history in an attempt to draw the bloodhounds, which increasingly include the pres, away from the worsening ObamaCare disaster.

There is another question at play here, since Team Obama shares Iran's facility for duplicity one must ask what the entire final agreement might really be?

As previously reported, this WH established back channel negotiations with Iran over the period of at least a year with Valerie Jarrett and Hillary Clinton both figuring large in the process.

"…The real story here is that this administration established back-channel relations with Iran a long time ago at the behest of Barack Hussein Obama.

Remember Saint Hillary's mysterious bump on the head?

Uhhh…hard landing somewhere near Tehran?

And then there is Valerie Jarrett – born in Shiraz, Iran…

The bottom line:

In direct abrogation of international agreements Obama, through actions which he directed the Treasury Department to take, has unilaterally removed economic sanctions against Iranian front organizations, thus freeing them to continue the jihad.

"…The Obama administration began softening sanctions on Iran after the election of Iran's new president in June, months before the current round of nuclear talks in Geneva or the historic phone call between the two leaders in September… "For five months, since Rouhani's election, the United States has offered Iran two major forms of sanctions relief," Dubowitz [Mark Dubowitz, the executive director of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies] said. "First there's been a significant slowdown in the pace of designations while the Iranians are proliferating the number of front companies and cutouts to bust sanctions." [Exclusive: Obama's Secret Détente , Daily Beast]…" [source, MoveOn Freaking Over Failing "Negotiations" with Iran ,

[Editor's note, this posting was made when it appeared that the talks would end in failure over French objections.]

It must be understood then that the official text of the agreement [reproduced below] is not really the controlling document, that has most likely been agreed upon in advance via the backchannel, with the negotiations in Geneva just Obama's latest dog and pony show.

In summary this agreement is a non-factor. Iran will continue to do what it has been doing, producing deliverable atomic weapons [including EMP weapons, which pose an extraordinary threat] at the fastest rate possible.

The West will have officially given thumbs up to the country joining the nuke club and the billions freed up by the lifting of sanctions will only hasten the day of ultimate reckoning.

The following is the full text of the nuclear deal between Iran and six world powers:

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Joint Plan of Action – Preamble:

The goal for these negotiations is to reach a mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek or develop any nuclear weapons. This comprehensive solution would build on these initial measures and result in a final step for a period to be agreed upon and the resolution of concerns. This comprehensive solution would enable Iran to fully enjoy its right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the NPT in conformity with its obligations therein. This comprehensive solution would involve a mutually defined enrichment program with practical limits and transparency measures to ensure the peaceful nature of the program. This comprehensive solution would constitute an integrated whole where nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. This comprehensive solution would involve a reciprocal, step-by step process, and would produce the comprehensive lifting of all UN Security Council sanctions, as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to Iran?s nuclear program.

There would be additional steps in between the initial measures and the final step, including, among other things, addressing the UN Security Council resolutions, with a view toward bringing to a satisfactory conclusion the UN Security Council?s consideration of this matter. The E3+3 and Iran will be responsible for conclusion and implementation of mutual near-term measures and the comprehensive solution in good faith. A Joint Commission of E3/EU+3 and Iran will be established to monitor the implementation of the near-term measures and address issues that may arise, with the IAEA responsible for verification of nuclear-related measures. The Joint Commission will work with the IAEA to facilitate resolution of past and present issues of concern.

Elements of a first step

The first step would be time-bound, with a duration of 6 months, and renewable by mutual consent, during which all parties will work to maintain a constructive atmosphere for negotiations in good faith.

Iran would undertake the following voluntary measures:

* From the existing uranium enriched to 20%, retain half as working stock of 20% oxide for fabrication of fuel for the TRR. Dilute the remaining 20% UF6 to no more than 5%. No reconversion line.

* Iran announces that it will not enrich uranium over 5% for the duration of the 6 months.

* Iran announces that it will not make any further advances of its activities at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (1), Fordow (2), or the Arak reactor (3), designated by the IAEA as IR-40.

* Beginning when the line for conversion of UF6 enriched up to 5% to UO2 is ready, Iran has decided to convert to oxide UF6 newly enriched up to 5% during the 6 month period, as provided in the operational schedule of the conversion plant declared to the IAEA.

* No new locations for the enrichment.

* Iran will continue its safeguarded R&D practices, including its current enrichment R&D practices, which are not designed for accumulation of the enriched uranium.

* No reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of reprocessing.

* Enhanced monitoring:

- Provision of specified information to the IAEA, including information on Iran?s plans for nuclear facilities, a description of each building on each nuclear site, a description of the scale of operations for each location engaged in specified nuclear activities, information on uranium mines and mills, and information on source material. This information would be provided within three months of the adoption of these measures.

- Submission of an updated DIQ for the reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as the IR-40, to the IAEA.

- Steps to agree with the IAEA on conclusion of the Safeguards Approach for the reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as the IR-40.

- Daily IAEA inspector access when inspectors are not present for the purpose of Design Information Verification, Interim Inventory Verification, Physical Inventory Verification, and unannounced inspections, for the purpose of access to offline surveillance records, at Fordow and Natanz.

- IAEA inspector managed access to:

. centrifuge assembly workshops4;

. centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities; and,

. uranium mines and mills.

In return, the E3/EU+3 would undertake the following voluntary measures:

- Pause efforts to further reduce Iran?s crude oil sales, enabling Iran?s current customers to purchase their current average amounts of crude oil. Enable the repatriation of an agreed amount of revenue held abroad. For such oil sales, suspend the EU and U.S. sanctions on associated insurance and transportation services.

- Suspend U.S. and EU sanctions on:

. Iran?s petrochemical exports, as well as sanctions on associated services. (5)

. Gold and precious metals, as well as sanctions on associated services.

• Suspend U.S. sanctions on Iran?s auto industry, as well as sanctions on associated services.

• License the supply and installation in Iran of spare parts for safety of flight for Iranian civil aviation and associated services. License safety related inspections and repairs in Iran as well as associated services. (6)

• No new nuclear-related UN Security Council sanctions.

• No new EU nuclear-related sanctions.

• The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions.

• Establish a financial channel to facilitate humanitarian trade for Iran?s domestic needs using Iranian oil revenues held abroad. Humanitarian trade would be defined as transactions involving food and agricultural products, medicine, medical devices, and medical expenses incurred abroad. This channel would involve specified foreign banks and non-designated Iranian banks to be defined when establishing the channel.

* This channel could also enable:

a- transactions required to pay Iran?s UN obligations; and,

b- direct tuition payments to universities and colleges for Iranian students studying abroad, up to an agreed amount for the six month period.

• Increase the EU authorisation thresholds for transactions for non-sanctioned trade to an agreed amount.

Elements of the final step of a comprehensive solution*

The final step of a comprehensive solution, which the parties aim to conclude negotiating and commence implementing no more than one year after the adoption of this document, would:

• Have a specified long-term duration to be agreed upon.

• Reflect the rights and obligations of parties to the NPT and IAEA Safeguards Agreements.

• Comprehensively lift UN Security Council, multilateral and national nuclear-related sanctions, including steps on access in areas of trade, technology, finance, and energy, on a schedule to be agreed upon.

• Involve a mutually defined enrichment program with mutually agreed parameters consistent with practical needs, with agreed limits on scope and level of enrichment activities, capacity, where it is carried out, and stocks of enriched uranium, for a period to be agreed upon.

• Fully resolve concerns related to the reactor at Arak, designated by the IAEA as the IR-40. No reprocessing or construction of a facility capable of reprocessing.

• Fully implement the agreed transparency measures and enhanced monitoring. Ratify and implement the Additional Protocol, consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Majlis (Iranian parliament).

• Include international civil nuclear cooperation, including among others, on acquiring modern light water power and research reactors and associated equipment, and the supply of modern nuclear fuel as well as agreed R&D practices.

Following successful implementation of the final step of the comprehensive solution for its full duration, the Iranian nuclear program will be treated in the same manner as that of any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT.


(1) Namely, during the 6 months, Iran will not feed UF6 into the centrifuges installed but not enriching uranium. Not install additional centrifuges. Iran announces that during the first 6 months, it will replace existing centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type.

(2) At Fordow, no further enrichment over 5% at 4 cascades now enriching uranium, and not increase enrichment capacity. Not feed UF6 into the other 12 cascades, which would remain in a non-operative state. No interconnections between cascades. Iran announces that during the first 6 months, it will replace existing centrifuges with centrifuges of the same type.

(3) Iran announces on concerns related to the construction of the reactor at Arak that for 6 months it will not commission the reactor or transfer fuel or heavy water to the reactor site and will not test additional fuel or produce more fuel for the reactor or install remaining components.

(4) Consistent with its plans, Iran?s centrifuge production during the 6 months will be dedicated to replace damaged machines.

(5) ?Sanctions on associated services? means any service, such as insurance, transportation, or financial, subject to the underlying U.S. or EU sanctions applicable, insofar as each service is related to the underlying sanction and required to facilitate the desired transactions. These services could involve any non-designated Iranian entities.

(6) Sanctions relief could involve any non-designated Iranian airlines as well as Iran Air.

This item is available on the Militant Islam Monitor website, at